

*A Guide to the Microfilm Edition of*

**The Special Studies Series  
Foreign Nations**

**The Soviet Union and  
Republics of the  
Former U.S.S.R.**

**Special Studies,  
1995–1997  
Supplement**

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# SCOPE AND CONTENT NOTE

No single organization can provide the background information, the wide range of current data, and the crucial analyses that are required by the executive departments of the federal government on complex and volatile international issues. When there can be little margin of error concerning the facts and recommendations being given to key officials, executive departments depend upon an elite group of private and governmental organizations—“think tanks”—for special studies of the highest caliber.

The authors of these special studies are associated with many of the finest research facilities in the United States, including the Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute, the National Defense University, the Institute for Defense Analysis, the Army Command and General Staff College, the American Institutes for Research, and major international institutes at Harvard, Columbia, Stanford, Georgetown, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and Yale.

Described below are several of the federal government agencies and organizations, U.S. military educational institutions, and quasi- and nongovernment think tanks and consulting corporations identified in this publication.

## **U.S. Federal Government Agencies and Organizations**

### **Advanced Research Projects Agency, Department of Defense**

The Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) is a separately organized agency within the Department of Defense (DOD) under a director appointed by the secretary of defense. The agency, under the authority, direction, and control of the director of Defense Research and Engineering (DDRE), engages in advanced basic and applied research and development projects essential to the DOD; conducts prototype projects that embody technology that may be incorporated into joint programs, programs in support of deployed U.S. forces, or selected military department (Army, Navy, and Air Force) programs; and, on request, assists the military departments in their research and development efforts.

In this regard, the agency arranges, manages, and directs the performance of work connected with assigned advanced projects by the military departments, other government agencies, individuals, private business

entities, and educational or research institutions, as appropriate; recommends through the DDRE to the secretary of defense assignment of advanced projects to the agency; keeps the DDRE, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the military departments, and other DOD agencies informed on significant new developments and technological advances within assigned projects; and performs other such functions as the secretary of defense or the DDRE may assign.

### **Agency for International Development, Department of State**

Established in 1961 by President John F. Kennedy, the Agency for International Development (AID) is the independent government agency that provides economic development and humanitarian assistance to advance U.S. economic and political interests overseas.

### **Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Department of State**

The mission of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) is to strengthen the national security of the United States by formulating, advocating, negotiating, implementing, and verifying effective arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament policies, strategies, and agreements. ACDA ensures that arms control is fully integrated into the development and conduct of U.S. national security policy.

Strategic arms control with what used to be the Soviet Union is now a small fraction of what the ACDA does and of America's national security and arms control requirements. The president and a bipartisan Congress revitalized ACDA in 1994 in order to meet the arms control and nonproliferation challenges of the post-cold war era. The acts and ambitions of rogue states such as North Korea, Libya, Iraq, and Iran underscore that ACDA's work is more essential than ever.

ACDA efforts in the post-cold war era have brought about ratification of the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and START II. Meanwhile, the U.S. arms control agenda with Russia has broadened to include controls over surplus Russian nuclear expertise and materials. The United States must also press Russia to fulfill its obligations on chemical and biological arms.

### **Bureau of Export Administration, Department of Commerce**

The Bureau of Export Administration (BXA) promotes U.S. national and economic security and foreign policy interests by managing and enforcing the department's security-related trade and competitiveness programs. BXA plays a key role in challenging issues involving national security and nonproliferation, export growth, and high technology. The bureau's continuing major challenge is combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) while furthering the growth of U.S. exports.

### **Bureau of International Labor Affairs, Department of Labor**

The Bureau of International Labor Affairs (ILAB) carries out the Department of Labor's international responsibilities under the direction of the deputy under secretary for international affairs and assists in formulating international economic, trade, and immigration policies affecting American workers.

ILAB implements these objectives through the following activities: (i) representing the secretary of labor on international issues in the interagency policy-making processes chaired by the National Economic Council and the National Security Council; (ii) representing the U.S. government at the International Labor Organization; (iii) implementing the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC), the labor supplemental agreement to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA); (iv) issuing reports on international child labor issues and funding international programs to eliminate child labor exploitation; (v) representing the U.S. government in the Human Resources Working Group of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum; (vi) preparing G-7 and European Union (EU) meetings involving labor market policy issues; (vii) representing the U.S. government in the Employment, Labor and Social Affairs (ELSA) Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD); (viii) assisting the U.S. Trade Representative in international trade negotiations, including immigration-related issues; (ix) coordinating labor market technical assistance programs with foreign countries; and (x) undertaking research on the impact of international trade and immigration policies on U.S. workers.

### **Bureau of Mines, Department of the Interior**

The U.S. Bureau of Mines was created in 1910 because our need for minerals was having tragic consequences for too many Americans. As a growing industrial power, the United States required coal, metals, and other minerals, but hundreds of workers were dying in the nation's mines.

Over the years, agency scientists developed ways to make mining safer and more efficient. By advocating wage and hour and safety legislation, the bureau helped unskilled and semi-skilled Americans achieve a high standard of living while protecting the health and welfare of the worker. Its research also allowed for reclaiming mined land and recycling valuable resources.

### **Census Bureau, Department of Commerce**

The Census Bureau is the preeminent collector and provider of timely, relevant, and quality data about the people and economy of the United States.

### **Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency**

The Center for the Study of Intelligence (CSI) conducts research on intelligence and intelligence acquisition; publishes classified and unclassified editions of the *Studies in Intelligence* journal as well as books, monographs, and a newsletter; hosts academic conferences and symposia on subjects related to intelligence; and coordinates a number of academic outreach programs.

### **Central Intelligence Agency**

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is the keystone of the U.S. intelligence community. Its mission consists of supporting the president, the National Security Council, and all who make and execute U.S. national security policy by providing accurate, evidence-based, comprehensive, and timely foreign intelligence related to national security; and conducting counterintelligence activities, special activities, and other functions related to foreign intelligence and national security as directed by the president.

The CIA's core beliefs and values include: intelligence that adds substantial value to the management of crises, the conduct of war, and the development of policy; and objectivity in the substance of intelligence.

### **Cold Regions Research and Engineering Laboratory, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers**

The Cold Regions Research and Engineering Laboratory (CRREL) is a facility of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers that addresses the problems and opportunities unique to the world's cold regions. CRREL's mission is to gain knowledge of cold regions through scientific and engineering research and put that knowledge to work for the Corps of Engineers, the U.S. Army, the DOD, and the nation. CRREL is the DOD's only laboratory that addresses the problems and opportunities unique to the world's cold regions.

Specifically, CRREL's mission encompasses the following: conducting research to characterize the constraints placed on army materiel and operations in a realistic winter battlefield environment; developing techniques and equipment to mitigate those effects; providing engineering and consulting services on cold-related problems to developers of army doctrine and materiel; conducting research to characterize the nature and the impact of cold effects on construction, operations, and maintenance of army and civil works facilities and activities; developing new procedures and equipment to minimize costs; providing environmental services on cold-related problems to developers of equipment, managers of army and civil works facilities, and other field users; conducting research and recommending mitigative measures on the impact of human activity on the environment in cold regions; conducting fundamental research to understand the nature and characteristics of snow, ice, frozen ground, and other materials in cold

environments, including their interrelationship with other environmental parameters; and performing other research and development as required by agreements between the Office of the Chief of Engineers, other army and government agencies, and the private sector.

### **Commercial Service, Department of Commerce**

The Commercial Service of the Department of Commerce is committed to assisting U.S. firms in regard to their export potential by providing counseling and advice, information on markets abroad, international contacts, and advocacy services.

The Commercial Service is co-located in Export Assistance Centers throughout the United States and in more than seventy countries abroad. The domestic and international offices are directly linked through a worldwide communications and information network, which services U.S. exporters, including liaison with multilateral development banks.

### **Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, Department of Defense**

In 1991, Congress directed the DOD to help secure former Soviet WMD. Since 1991, Congress has provided \$2.3 billion to support cooperative threat reduction (CTR) efforts.

Based on this congressional direction, CTR's mission is to provide assistance to eligible states of the former Soviet Union (FSU) in order to dismantle WMD and to reduce the threat of proliferation. This mission supports core U.S. national security priorities. In support of U.S. security strategy, CTR plays a critical role in combating the spread and use of WMD, promoting arms control, and securing regional stability in the FSU.

The CTR mission also supports the DOD's other related U.S. foreign policy goals. CTR plays an important role in the DOD's policy of engagement with the FSU. In conjunction with the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission and other bilateral initiatives, CTR advances joint U.S. and Russian security objectives, development of a free market economy in the FSU, and stability and democracy throughout the FSU.

The CTR program translates these congressional directives, national security priorities, and foreign policy goals into a coherent program.

### **Defense Intelligence Agency, Department of Defense**

Established in 1961, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) is a designated combat support agency and the senior military intelligence component of the intelligence community. DIA's primary mission is to provide all-source intelligence to the U.S. armed forces. Intelligence support for operational forces encompasses a number of areas and challenges. Key areas of emphasis include targeting and battle damage assessment, weapons proliferation, warning of impending crises, support to peacekeeping

operations, maintenance of databases on foreign military organizations and their equipment, and, as necessary, support to UN operations and U.S. allies. In addition to providing intelligence to military forces, DIA also provides information to DOD policy makers and members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Additionally, DIA plays a key role in providing information on foreign weapons systems to U.S. weapons planners and the weapons acquisition community. In carrying out these missions, DIA coordinates and synthesizes military intelligence analysis for DOD officials and military commanders worldwide, working in close concert with the intelligence components of the military services and the U.S. unified commands.

### **Department of Commerce**

The Department of Commerce promotes job creation, economic growth, sustainable development, and improved living standards. Working in partnership with business, universities, communities, and workers, the Commerce Department builds and promotes U.S. competitiveness in the global marketplace; strengthens the nation's economic infrastructure; keeps America competitive with science and technology and an information base; and provides management and stewardship of the nation's resources and assets.

### **Department of Energy**

The origins of the Department of Energy (DOE) can be traced to the Manhattan Project and the race to develop the atomic bomb during World War II. In 1942, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers established the Manhattan Engineer District to manage the project. Following the war, Congress engaged in a vigorous and contentious debate over civilian versus military control of the atom. The Atomic Energy Act of 1946 settled the debate by creating the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), which took over the Manhattan Engineer District's sprawling scientific and industrial complex.

The AEC was specifically established to maintain civilian government control over the field of atomic research and development. During the early cold war years, the commission focused on designing and producing nuclear weapons and developing nuclear reactors for naval propulsion. The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 ended exclusive government use of the atom and began the growth of the commercial nuclear power industry, giving the AEC authority to regulate the new industry. In response to changing needs in the 1970s, the AEC was abolished and the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 created two new agencies: the Nuclear Regulatory Agency to regulate the nuclear power industry and the Energy Research and Development Administration to manage the nuclear weapon, naval reactor, and energy development programs.

The extended energy crisis of the 1970s soon demonstrated the need for unified energy organization and planning, however. The Department of Energy Organization Act brought the federal government's agencies and programs into a single agency. The DOE, activated on October 1, 1977, assumed the responsibilities of the Federal Energy Administration, the Energy Research and Development Administration, the Federal Power Commission, and parts and programs of several other agencies.

The DOE provided the framework for a comprehensive and balanced national energy plan by coordinating and administering the energy functions of the federal government. The department undertook responsibility for long-term, high-risk research and development of energy technology, federal power marketing, energy conservation, the nuclear weapons program, energy regulatory programs, and a central energy data collection and analysis program.

Over its two-decade history, the DOE has shifted its emphasis and focus as the needs of the nation have changed. During the late 1970s, the department emphasized energy development and regulation. In the 1980s, nuclear weapons research, development, and production took a priority. Since the end of the cold war, the DOE has focused on environmental cleanup of the nuclear weapons complex, nonproliferation and stewardship of the nuclear stockpile, energy efficiency and conservation, and technology transfer and industrial competitiveness.

The DOE contributes to the future of the nation by ensuring our energy security, maintaining the safety and reliability of our nuclear stockpile, cleaning up the environment from the legacy of the cold war, and developing innovations in science and technology.

### **Economic Research Service, Department of Agriculture**

The Economic Research Service (ERS) provides economic analysis on efficiency, efficacy, and equity issues related to agriculture, food, the environment, and rural development to improve public and private decision making. The ERS is one of four agencies in the Research, Education, and Economics (REE) Mission Area of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA).

### **Economics and Statistics Administration, Commerce Department**

Much of the statistical, economic, and demographic information collected by the federal government is made available to the public through the bureaus and offices of the Department of Commerce that are known collectively as the Economics and Statistics Administration (ESA).

This information is gleaned from many bureaus and offices, including the Census Bureau and the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). The Census Bureau conducts surveys for other departments as well as the Department of

Commerce. Most of the data in its periodic economic indicators is derived from surveys of businesses and most of the demographic information comes from surveys of households or the decennial census.

BEA is the “nation’s accountant,” integrating and interpreting data to draw a picture of the U.S. economy. BEA’s economic accounts—national, regional, and international—provide information on such key issues as economic growth, regional development, and the nation’s position in the world economy.

STAT-USA is an information service providing economic, business, and social/environmental program data produced by more than fifty federal sources.

### **Federal Research Division, the Library of Congress**

Since 1948, the Federal Research Division, the Library of Congress’s principal fee-based research service, has provided U.S. government agencies with the research and analysis needed to carry out their national and international missions.

Using the collections of the Library of Congress, the research staff of the Federal Research Division provides the information in formats based on specific agency requirements. The Federal Research Division provides federal agencies access to millions of books, newspapers, journals, maps, microforms, and other special format materials; materials in many languages; many current periodicals, of which almost half are in foreign languages; computer records in a variety of databases, including both English and foreign-language information; and comprehensive coverage of legal, scientific, technical, historical, cultural, political, sociological, economic, and numerous other fields of research.

### **Foreign Broadcast Information Service**

The Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) is a U.S. government operation that translates the text of daily broadcasts, government statements, and select news stories from non-English sources around the world. FBIS is supported by the CIA.

### **General Accounting Office, Comptroller General of the United States**

The General Accounting Office (GAO) is the investigative arm of the Congress and is charged with examining all matters relating to the receipt and disbursement of public funds.

GAO was established by the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 (31 U.S.C. 702) to independently audit government agencies. Over the years, Congress has expanded GAO’s audit authority, added new responsibilities and duties, and strengthened GAO’s ability to perform independently.

Supporting Congress is GAO's fundamental responsibility. In meeting this objective, GAO performs a variety of services, the most prominent of which are audits and evaluations of government programs and activities. The majority of these reviews are made in response to specific congressional requests. GAO also responds to individual member requests, as possible. Other assignments are initiated pursuant to standing commitments to congressional committees, and some reviews are specifically required by law. Finally, some assignments are independently undertaken in accordance with GAO's basic legislative responsibilities.

The ability to review practically any government function requires a multidisciplined staff. GAO's staff has expertise in a variety of disciplines—accounting, law, public and business administration, economics, the social and physical sciences, and others. When an assignment requires specialized experience not available within GAO, outside experts assist the permanent staff. GAO's staff goes wherever necessary on assignments, working onsite to gather data, test transactions, and observe firsthand how government programs and activities are carried out.

### **General Services Administration**

Established July 1, 1949, the General Services Administration (GSA) provides managed space, supplies, services, and solutions to enable federal employees to accomplish their missions. The GSA is about work environments. In support of its mission, the GSA provides workspace, security, furniture, equipment, supplies, tools, computers, and telephones. It also provides travel and transportation services; manages the federal motor vehicle fleet; oversees telecommuting centers and federal child care centers; preserves historic buildings; manages a fine arts program; and develops, advocates, and evaluates government-wide policy.

### **International Trade Administration, Department of Commerce**

The International Trade Administration (ITA) supports U.S. businesses in the global marketplace. The ITA is assigned to encourage, assist, and advocate U.S. exports by implementing a national export strategy, focusing on big emerging markets (BEMs), providing industry and country analysis for U.S. business, and supporting new-to-export and new-to-market businesses through U.S. Export Assistance Centers, domestic commercial service offices, and worldwide posts and commercial centers in seventy countries. In addition, ITA ensures that U.S. business has equal access to foreign markets by advocating on behalf of U.S. exporters who are competing for major overseas contracts and by implementing major trade agreements, such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and the Japan "Framework." It also enables U.S. business to compete against unfairly traded imports and safeguards jobs and

the competitive strength of American industry by enforcing antidumping and countervailing duty laws and agreements that provide remedies for unfair trade practices.

### **Office of Technology Assessment**

The Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) was established by Congress in 1972 to provide congressional committees with analyses of technical issues. Services included major assessment reports, background papers, briefings, and testimony. OTA explored complex issues involving science and technology, helped Congress identify policy options, and provided foresight about new developments that could have important implications for future federal policy. OTA did not advocate particular policies or actions but pointed out their pros and cons, sorted out the facts, and provided options.

### **Office of Technology Policy, Department of Commerce**

The mission of the Office of Technology Policy (OTP) is unique in the federal government: to work in partnership with the private sector to develop and advocate national policies that maximize technology's contribution to U.S. economic growth, the creation of high-wage jobs, and improvements in Americans' quality of life.

### **United States Institute of Peace**

Established in 1984, the United States Institute of Peace is an independent, nonpartisan federal institution created and funded by Congress to strengthen the nation's capacity to promote the peaceful resolution of international conflict. Free from political pressures, the institute is able to assist the executive branch, Congress, and others with nonpartisan research, analysis, and information.

The institute meets its congressional mandate through an array of programs, including grants, fellowships, conferences and workshops, library services, publications, and other educational activities. The institute's board of directors is appointed by the president of the United States and confirmed by the Senate.

### **United States International Trade Commission**

The United States International Trade Commission (USITC) is an independent, quasi-judicial federal agency that provides objective trade information to both the legislative and executive branches of government, determines the impact of imports on U.S. industries, and directs actions against certain unfair trade practices, such as patent, trademark, and copyright infringement. USITC analysts and economists investigate and publish reports on U.S. industries and the global trends that affect them. The

agency also updates and publishes the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States.

## **U.S. Military Educational Institutions and Organizations**

### **Air Force Institute of Technology**

The Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) traces its roots to the early days of powered flight when it was apparent that the progress of military aviation depended upon special education in this new science.

Graduates have made contributions to engineering, science, technology, medicine, logistics, and management. AFIT's flexibility is such that it adjusts quickly to changing air force requirements. The faculty, military and civilian personnel, stay abreast of projected air force operations, and the programs are continually updated to offer students the latest available material.

### **Air War College**

The mission of the Air War College is to educate senior officers to lead at the strategic level in the employment of air and space forces, including joint operations, in support of national security.

### **Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University**

The mission of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF) is to prepare selected military officers and civilians for senior leadership and staff positions by conducting postgraduate, executive-level courses of study and associated research dealing with the resource component of national power, with special emphasis on materiel acquisition and joint logistics and their integration into national security strategy for peace and war. Reflecting this joint and interagency perspective, 67 percent of the student body is composed of military representatives from the land, sea, and air services; 25 percent are drawn from the departments of Defense and State and ten other federal agencies; 7 percent are international military officers; and 1 percent come from the private sector.

In addition, at the direction of the under secretary of defense for acquisition and technology, ICAF serves as the information provider under the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act. In this capacity, ICAF acts as a consortium college of the Defense Acquisition University.

### **Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University**

The research and analysis mission of the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) is implemented through the Research Directorate (RD). RD is structured around six geographic and functional teams, each led by a senior expert. The institute's research agenda focuses on analysis of key issues of

strategy and policy that require in-depth research to support senior decision makers in the office of the secretary of defense, the Joint Staff, and the commanders-in-chief.

The studies and analyses typically address questions of strategic importance that have long-term implications for U.S. national security. INSS serves as the in-house think tank for senior Pentagon leadership. As part of the National Defense University, RD's mission includes providing support to the colleges with research opportunities, faculty programs, and academic forums.

### **National Defense University**

The mission of the National Defense University (NDU) is to ensure excellence in professional military education and research in the essential elements of national security.

The NDU consists of ICAF, the National War College, and the Armed Forces Staff College. The NDU prepares selected commissioned officers and civilian officials from DOD, the Department of State, and other agencies of the government for command, management, and staff responsibilities in a multinational, intergovernmental, or joint national security setting. The curriculum emphasizes the development and implementation of national security strategy and military strategy, mobilization, acquisition, management of resources, information and information technology for national security, and planning for joint and combined operations. In addition to mission-specific education, the colleges emphasize developing executive skills and improving competencies. The NDU faculty and students conduct short-range and long-range studies of national security policy, military strategy, the allocation and management of resources for national security, and civil-military affairs. A goal of university research is to create a national repository of expertise on mobilization, military strategy, and joint or combined policy and plans.

### **Naval Postgraduate School**

The Naval Postgraduate School, located in Monterey, California, is an academic institution with an emphasis on study and research programs relevant to the navy's interests, as well as to the interests of other arms of the DOD.

Students come from all service branches of the U.S. defense community, as well as from the Coast Guard, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and the services of more than twenty-five allied nations. The school provides more than forty programs of study, ranging from the traditional engineering and physical sciences to the rapidly evolving space science programs. The faculty, the majority of whom are civilians, are drawn from a broad diversity of educational institutions.

## **Naval War College**

The Naval War College prepares its students by providing them with a professional naval education, based on a clear understanding of the fundamental principles that have governed national security affairs in peace and in war throughout history.

The mission of the Naval War College is to enhance the professional capabilities of its students to make sound decisions in command, staff, and management positions in naval, joint, and combined environments; to provide a sound understanding of military strategy and operational art; to instill joint attitudes and perspectives; and to serve as a center for research and war gaming that will develop advanced strategic, war fighting, and campaign concepts for future employment of maritime, joint, and combined forces.

The president of the Naval War College is a U.S. Navy unrestricted line officer in the grade of rear admiral. The deputy to the president/chief of staff administers the college's academic and research programs through an organization composed of the dean of academics, who directs and coordinates all academic programs and departments, including the two international programs—the Naval Command College and the Naval Staff College; the dean of naval warfare studies, who directs and coordinates the college's major research efforts, including the War Gaming Department; the dean of administration, who is responsible for the direction of all day-to-day administrative and support functions; and the dean of students, who is responsible for all student matters connected with the colleges of Naval Warfare and Naval Command and Staff.

## **Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College**

The Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) traces its origin to the establishment in 1947 of the Advanced Studies Group by General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower, then chief of staff. The initial mission of this group was to develop concepts of national security in light of the revolution in warfare brought about with the onset of the atomic age. The group was elevated to the joint level with the creation of the DOD.

When the Army War College was reestablished in 1950, an Advanced Studies Group was chartered to consider strategy and land power. The group evolved into the Advanced Studies and Doctrine Division within the faculty of the college. As part of an army-wide reorganization in 1962, the division became the U.S. Army Combat Developments Command Institute of Advanced Studies, addressing strategic questions as well as those of organizing, equipping, and preparing the army to fight. The mission became exclusively strategic in 1971, and the institute received its present name.

Another army reorganization in 1973 brought both the U.S. Army War College and SSI under the deputy chief of staff for operations and plans, and SSI became a War College department. More recently, the institute has

developed a relationship with the Joint Staff, the NDU's Institute for National Security Studies, and the Center for Strategic Leadership (including its Peacekeeping Institute) at Carlisle Barracks. SSI continues to provide an analytical capability within the army to address strategic and other issues to support army participation in national security policy formulation.

### **U.S. Army Command and General Staff College**

The mission of the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) is to educate leaders in the values and practice of the profession of arms, to act as the executive agent for the army's Leader Development Program, to develop doctrine that guides the army, and to promote and support the advancement of military art and science. CGSC training, education, and professional military excellence prepare officers for wartime duties.

### **U.S. Army War College**

The mission of the U.S. Army War College (USAWC) is to prepare selected military, civilian, and international leaders to assume strategic responsibilities in military and national security organizations; to educate students about the employment of the U.S. Army as part of a unified, joint, or multinational force in support of the national military strategy; to research operational and strategic issues; and to conduct outreach programs that benefit the USAWC, the U.S. Army, and the nation.

## **Quasi- and Nongovernment Think Tanks and Consulting Corporations; Foreign Organizations with Official U.S. Governmental Representation**

### **Argonne National Laboratory**

Chartered in 1946, Argonne National Laboratory is one of the nation's first national laboratories and a DOE research center.

The laboratory supports more than two hundred research projects, ranging from studies of the atomic nucleus to global climate change research. Since 1990, Argonne has worked with more than six hundred companies and numerous federal agencies and other organizations. Argonne is operated by the University of Chicago.

Argonne research falls into four broad categories:

(1) basic science research. This includes experimental and theoretical work in materials science, physics, chemistry, biology, high-energy physics, and mathematics and computer science, including high-performance computing;

(2) energy resources programs;

(3) environmental management. Research includes alternative energy systems; environmental risk and economic impact assessments; hazardous

waste site analysis and remediation planning; electro-metallurgical treatment to prepare spent nuclear fuel for disposal; and new technologies for decontaminating and decommissioning aging nuclear reactors; and  
(4) industrial technology development.

### **Center for International Security Affairs, Los Alamos National Laboratory**

The Center for International Security Affairs (CISA) at Los Alamos National Laboratory was created in January 1995 to coordinate growing interactions with the Newly Independent States (NIS) of the former Soviet Union, China, and other countries. CISA is responsible for all programs specifically created for work in these countries, including the laboratory-to-laboratory effort in nuclear materials control, our participation in the International Science and Technology Center, and the Los Alamos component of the Industrial Partnering Program. In addition, CISA oversees other programs to ensure that all Los Alamos activities abroad are consistent with U.S. objectives and policy.

WMD and especially nuclear weapons represent the only strategic threat to the United States. The principal objective of the programs coordinated by CISA is to actively reduce the threat of WMD through collaborative projects with colleagues overseas. In the NIS, the center has the goal of stabilizing three major areas: nuclear materials, weapons expertise, and weapons institutions.

As the principal point of contact at Los Alamos for interactions in the NIS, China, and elsewhere, the center can assist laboratory personnel in establishing appropriate scientific projects and can provide the U.S. government and other organizations with information and advice on nuclear-related issues worldwide.

Over the past several years Los Alamos has developed a special relationship with the Russian nuclear weapons design institute at Arzamas-16 that has led to significant programs in nuclear materials control and other areas of science and technology of benefit to the United States. The laboratory is developing similar productive interactions with other NIS institutes in the FSU, in China, and other countries. Los Alamos has historically been a central player in the development of international safeguards and training programs to control the spread of nuclear technologies. The purpose of CISA is to ensure that the laboratory has a focused, coordinated, and consistent policy for international interactions with implications for WMD.

### **Center for Naval Analyses**

The CNA Corporation (CNAC) is a nonprofit organization providing research, analysis, and technical services to the government and other

organizations. CNAC's two operating divisions are the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) and the Institute for Public Research (IPR).

CNA is a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the Department of the Navy. For more than fifty years, CNA has conducted research and analysis that has helped the navy and Marine Corps. CNA conducts analyses for other DOD and non-DOD clients whose needs fall within CNA's mission as a federally funded research and development center.

IPR addresses a broad range of issues for government agencies and other organizations.

### **Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe/Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe**

On August 1, 1975, following nearly three years of negotiation, leaders of the United States, the Soviet Union, Canada, and all the states of Europe except Albania and the then still-occupied Baltic states met in Helsinki, Finland, to sign the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The conference was renamed the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe in 1995. The Helsinki Final Act is a politically binding agreement, adopted by consensus, that lays out fundamental principles and a broad range of measures designed to enhance security and cooperation in Europe, including provisions related to military and security issues; cooperation in the fields of economics, science, technology, and the environment; and cooperation in humanitarian and other fields as well as an agreed review procedure on implementation of the agreement.

### **Innovation Associates, Inc.**

Innovation Associates, Inc. (IA) "operationalizes" the learning organization concept. In practice, this entails teaching, training, coaching, and consulting with clients to clarify and revitalize their sense of purpose, articulate a shared vision of the future they aspire to create, understand the complexity and systemic nature of their key issues and decisions, and work together in "smart" teams. IA's specific offerings include public training programs, customized on-site programs, train-the-trainer and licensing programs, and consulting services.

### **International City/County Management Association**

The International City/County Management Association (ICCMA) is the professional and educational organization representing appointed managers and administrators in local governments throughout the world. Prior to May 1991, the association was known as the International City Management Association.

To achieve its goals, ICCMA sponsors, develops, and implements a number of programs that provide local government managers and

administrators with expertise on a variety of topic areas, such as environmental protection, transportation, disaster planning, municipal service delivery, public health, and business relations.

### **Internews**

Internews is an international nonprofit organization working to enhance tolerance and understanding by supporting independent media in emerging democracies, producing and distributing innovative television programming, and using the media as a tool to reduce conflict within and between countries.

Internews programs are based on the conviction that vigorous and diverse mass media form an essential cornerstone of a free society. A major focus of the organization is to assist the hundreds of small, nongovernmental television stations that have sprung up in emerging democracies. Internews programs now also include support for independent radio and Internet projects, and these programs currently span the FSU, Eastern and Western Europe, the Middle East, and Africa.

### **John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University**

What is today the John F. Kennedy School of Government traces its origins to Harvard University's Graduate School of Public Administration, which was established in 1936 through a gift from Lucius N. Littauer. Faculty were originally drawn from the economics and government departments to teach public administration, first for a one-year Littauer Fellowship, which later became the Mid-Career Master in Public Administration Program (MPA).

Two decades later, the program grew to include the Mason Fellows—emerging leaders from developing countries. By the mid-1960s, faculty began to develop a public policy curriculum based more in economics and analytic studies than on the management principles of traditional public administration. This grew into the two-year Master in Public Policy Program (MPP), which accepted its first students in 1969.

At the same time, Harvard sought to establish a memorial to the late President John F. Kennedy. Under the leadership of faculty, the Institute of Politics (IOP) was established by friends and Kennedy family members to serve as a bridge between the academic study of government and the real world of politics. The school was then renamed in memory of the late president.

The MPA program, the MPP program, and the IOP were brought together when the Kennedy School was dedicated in 1978. The school encompasses ten research centers and institutes and more than a dozen executive and degree programs, with enrollment figures reaching more than eight hundred students.

### **Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory**

Ernest Orlando Lawrence founded this laboratory, the oldest of the national laboratories, in 1931. Lawrence invented the cyclotron, which led to revolutionary discoveries about the nature of the universe. Known as a mecca of particle physics, Berkeley Laboratory long ago broadened its focus. Today, it is a multiprogram laboratory where research in advanced materials, life sciences, energy efficiency, detectors, and accelerators serves the nation's needs in technology and the environment. Berkeley Laboratory is located in the Berkeley Hills, next to the University of California at Berkeley, and is managed by the University of California for the DOE.

### **Los Alamos National Laboratory**

Los Alamos National Laboratory is one of twenty-eight DOE laboratories across the country. It is managed for the DOE by the University of California. The laboratory is one of the largest multidisciplinary institutions in the world. Approximately one-third of the laboratory's technical staff members are physicists, one-fourth are engineers, one-sixth are chemists and materials scientists, and the remainder work in mathematics and computational science, biological science, geoscience, and other disciplines. Professional scientists and students also come to Los Alamos as visitors to participate in scientific projects. The laboratory staff collaborates with universities and industry in both basic and applied research to develop resources for the future.

### **National Research Council**

The National Research Council was organized by the National Academy of Sciences in 1916 to associate the broad community of science and technology with the academy's purposes of furthering knowledge and advising the federal government. Functioning in accordance with general policies determined by the academy, the National Research Council has become the principal operating agency of both the National Academy of Sciences and the National Academy of Engineering in providing services to the government, the public, and the scientific and engineering communities. The National Research Council is administered jointly by both academies and the Institute of Medicine.

### **Nonproliferation and International Security Division, Los Alamos National Laboratory**

The proliferation of WMD and the means to deliver them remains a major national security issue despite the end of the cold war. The Nonproliferation and International Security (NIS) Division and its associated program offices report to the associate laboratory director for threat reduction and have primary laboratory responsibility for responding to proliferation threats

involving WMD. The division's mission is to develop and apply preeminent science and technology to deter, detect, and respond to proliferation and to ensure U.S. and global security—a mission that challenges the division's scientists and engineers to seek innovative solutions to highly complex technical problems. Because the division is science based, they work with many researchers in universities and other laboratories in the United States and around the world. They work especially closely with colleagues at Sandia and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories.

### **RAND Corporation**

RAND (an acronym for research and development) is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decision making through research and analysis. From its inception in the days following World War II, RAND has focused on the nation's many public policy problems, particularly on national security.

In the 1960s, RAND began addressing major problems of domestic policy as well. Today, RAND researchers operate on a uniquely broad front, assisting public policy makers at all levels, private sector leaders in many industries, and the public at large in efforts to strengthen the nation's economy, maintain its security, and improve its quality of life. They do so by analyzing choices and developments in many areas, including national defense, education and training, health care, criminal and civil justice, labor and population, science and technology, community development, international relations, and regional studies.

RAND was created at the urging of its original sponsor, the air force (then the Army Air Forces). Today, its activities are supported by a wide range of sources. U.S. government agencies provide the largest share of support, while charitable foundations, private sector firms, individuals, and earnings from RAND's endowment fund furnish a steadily growing proportion.

### **Sandia National Laboratory**

Sandia is a national security laboratory operated for the DOE by the Sandia Corporation, a Lockheed Martin company. Sandia designs nonnuclear components for the nation's nuclear weapons, performs a wide variety of energy research and development projects, and works on various responses to national security threats—both military and economic. Sandia encourages and seeks partnerships with appropriate U.S. industry and government groups to collaborate on emerging technologies that support Sandia's mission.



## EDITORIAL NOTE

The *Soviet Union and Republics of the Former U.S.S.R., 1995–1997 Supplement* collection consists of studies that became available during the period 1995–1997 from a variety of sources, including U.S. executive branch departments, agencies, and commissions; U.S. military educational institutions and organizations; and U.S. government contracts to universities, corporations, think tanks, and individuals.



# ABBREVIATIONS

The following abbreviations are used frequently throughout this guide and are listed here for the convenience of the researcher.

<b>ABCs</b>	American business centers
<b>APR</b>	Asia-Pacific Region
<b>BISNIS</b>	Business Information Service for the Newly Independent States
<b>CCGs</b>	Country Commercial Guides
<b>CIA</b>	Central Intelligence Agency
<b>CIS</b>	Commonwealth of Independent States
<b>CNA</b>	Center for Naval Analyses
<b>CPRF</b>	Communist Party Russian Federation
<b>CSCE</b>	Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
<b>CSIS</b>	Center for Strategic and International Studies
<b>CTR</b>	Cooperative Threat Reduction
<b>D.C.</b>	District of Columbia
<b>DOD</b>	Department of Defense
<b>DOE</b>	Department of Energy
<b>FLER</b>	Fund for Large Enterprises in Russia
<b>FSU</b>	Former Soviet Union
<b>FY</b>	fiscal year
<b>GAO</b>	General Accounting Office
<b>GSM</b>	General Sales Manager
<b>HIID</b>	Harvard Institute for International Development
<b>IMF</b>	International Monetary Fund
<b>IW</b>	information war
<b>KGB</b>	Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (Committee for State Security, USSR)
<b>NASA</b>	National Aeronautics and Space Administration
<b>NATO</b>	North Atlantic Treaty Organization

<b>NDR</b>	Russia Is Our Home Party
<b>NIEs</b>	National Intelligence Estimates
<b>NIS</b>	Newly Independent States
<b>NSR</b>	northern sea route
<b>OSCE</b>	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
<b>OTA</b>	Office of Technology Assessment
<b>P.L.</b>	Public Law
<b>PRC</b>	People's Republic of China
<b>RNU</b>	Russian National Unity Party
<b>SSI</b>	Strategic Studies Institute
<b>START</b>	Strategic Arms Reduction Talks
<b>TPCC</b>	Trade Promotion Coordinating Committee
<b>U.K.</b>	United Kingdom
<b>U.S.</b>	United States
<b>USAID</b>	United States Agency for International Development
<b>USDA</b>	United States Department of Agriculture
<b>USIA</b>	United States Information Agency
<b>USSR</b>	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
<b>VVS</b>	Voенно-vozdushniyesily (Soviet air force)
<b>WMD</b>	weapons of mass destruction
<b>WTO</b>	World Trade Organization





*A Guide to the Microfilm Edition of*

# **The Soviet Union and Republics of the Former U.S.S.R.**

**Special Studies,  
1995–1997**

**Supplement**

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# REEL INDEX

## Reel 1

Frame

### USSR (General)

- 0001      **1996**  
**Intentions and Capabilities: Estimates on Soviet Strategic Forces, 1950–1983.**  
*Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, D.C. Donald P. Steury (Editor). 1996. 529pp.*  
The documents in this volume—a selection of forty-one National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) on Soviet strategic capabilities and intentions from the 1950s until 1983—pertain to the U.S. intelligence community’s performance of its most critical mission during the cold war. The purpose in producing this volume is simply to make more readily accessible, to scholars and to the public, records that shed light on the history of American intelligence and foreign policy as well as on the history of the USSR and Russia. The current volume includes a much larger number of NIEs on Soviet strategic forces, but selecting which estimates to include was nevertheless difficult. For the most part the report includes those documents that exemplified intelligence thinking on the various elements of the topic rather than those that were for some reason unusual. To make the volume of manageable scope and size, only the shorter estimates have been reproduced in their entirety; the editor has included “Summaries” and “Key Judgments” of longer estimates, along with extracts from their other sections. In every case, the estimate in its declassified version has been transferred in its entirety to the National Archives. Readers interested in the full text of the documents may consult them there. NIEs on Soviet strategic forces drove the entire strategic analytical process within the American intelligence community and played a central role in the great strategic debates affecting U.S. behavior throughout the cold war. Controversy and analytical closure at the working level influenced debate and decision making at the policy level regarding arms control, force structure, resource allocation, military procurement, and contingency planning for war. Some regarded the NIEs as a bible; few of those concerned with Soviet strategic matters ignored the estimates. They provided the foundation for official U.S. public statements on Soviet military power and indirectly had a significant impact on the American population’s understanding of the Soviet strategic threat as well.
- 0530      **CIA Assessments of the Soviet Union: The Record Versus the Charges, An Intelligence Monograph.**  
*Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, D.C. Douglas J. MacEachin. May 1996. 47pp.*  
In the aftermath of the political breakup of the Soviet Union, charges that the CIA was oblivious to the deteriorating economy and corroding societal conditions that

set the stage for the breakup have taken the aura of conventional wisdom. This report is an attempt to refute those charges by producing proof about what the CIA had actually been reporting about conditions in the Soviet Union in their own words for recently declassified reports. The primary purpose of this monograph is not to “prove” that the CIA was right. Rather, the objective is to demonstrate that assertions that the CIA got it blatantly wrong are unfounded—that charges that the CIA did not see and report the economic decline, societal deterioration, and political destabilization that ultimately resulted in the breakup of the Soviet Union are contradicted by the record. Arguments about who was “how right” are of less use, much as we might wish to engage in them. As regards the charge of selectivity, the best answer is simply the material itself—its volume and the timespan it covers and the fact that so much of it as far back as the 1970s was unclassified from the outset. (There is, in fact, much additional unclassified material available to readers.) These products were simultaneously disseminated to diverse policy agencies and were available to congressional committees and sometimes specifically sent to them. There was complete consistency over a decade and a half between the material disseminated in unclassified form and in classified channels. This consistency was specifically cited in the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Review Committee’s report. To posit that the CIA maintained a contradictory picture in a separate set of reports that did not become known to the recipients of the documents cited here would mean that there was a conspiracy initiated well before one could have known of a need for it. Certainly there were divergent views and predictions in the CIA—as well as in other parts of the intelligence community and in the policy agencies and nongovernmental circles—on the potential impact that the economic and societal problems might have on political continuity in the USSR and on the military threat. But there was no disagreement within the CIA’s Office of Soviet Analysis as to the fact of those enormous problems.

0577

**The Bear Went over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan.** *National Defense University, Washington, D.C. Lester W. Grau (Editor). August 1996. 248pp.*

When the Soviet Union decided to invade Afghanistan, they evaluated their chances for success upon their experiences in East Germany, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. Unfortunately for their soldiers, as well as the people of Afghanistan, they ignored not only the experiences of the British in the same region but also their own experience with the Basmachi resistance fighters in Central Asia from 1918 to 1933. Consequently, in Afghanistan the Soviet army found its tactics inadequate to meet the challenges posed by the difficult terrain and highly motivated mujahideen freedom fighters. To capture the lessons their tactical leaders learned in Afghanistan and to explain the change in tactics that followed, the Frunze Military Academy compiled this book for their command and general staff combat arms officers. The lessons are valuable not just for Russian officers, but for the tactical training of platoon, company, and battalion leaders of any nation likely to engage in conflicts involving civil war, guerrilla forces, and rough terrain. This is a book dealing with the starkest features of the unforgiving landscape of tactical combat: casualties and death, adaptation, and survival. Battalion and company commanders, platoon leaders, and sergeants will find realistic issues within these vignettes to discuss with squad and team leaders and with vehicle commanders and drivers. Basic and advanced infantry officer and noncommissioned officer courses will find useful applications for both classroom and field instruction. Senior leaders may find invaluable insights into the dangers and opportunities that tactical units under their command may face in limited wars. Above all, the lessons in this book should help small unit leaders

understand the need for security, deception, patrols, light and little discipline, caution, vigilance, and the ability to seize the initiative in responding to unpredictable enemy actions and ambushes.

0825

**The Soviet Program for Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Explosions.**

*Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, California. Milo D. Nordyke. October 1996. 93pp.*

This report provides a historical perspective and an overview of the Soviet nuclear program for peaceful uses. It includes detailed discussions of major Soviet peaceful nuclear projects as well as more contained applications of nuclear energy by the Soviets in such activities as oil and gas production, cavity technology development, extinguishing runaway gas well fires, deep seismic sounding of the earth, disposal of toxic waste, and seismic decoupling experiments. Also included is a discussion of the arms control aspects of peaceful nuclear explosions by the Soviet Union. Appendices include lists of peaceful nuclear explosions by the Soviet Union by date and by purpose and an analysis of the Soviet program to develop nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes.

## Reel 2

### USSR (General) cont.

**1996 cont.**

0001

**The Forced Repatriation of Soviet Citizens: A Study in Military Obedience.**

*Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. Donna E. Dismukes. December 1996. 147pp.*

On February 11, 1945, at the conclusion of the Yalta Conference, the United States signed a Repatriation Agreement with the USSR. The interpretation of this agreement resulted in the forcible repatriation of all Soviets regardless of their wishes. Repatriation operations became scenes of carnage as Soviets fiercely resisted the return to persecution, torture, and in many cases execution. Military objections to the policy failed to result in its cancellation. This thesis examines the military struggle to find a balance between obedience and moral obligation under extremely difficult conditions. The forced repatriation operations, which took place from 1945 to 1947, stand as a precursor to the new world of peacekeeping and peace enforcement. These new military missions will undoubtedly bring military personnel face to face with operations of a similarly troubling nature. This study of past events may prove useful for the development of policy for future operations.

0148

**The Missile Design Bureaux and Soviet Manned Space Policy, 1953–1970.**

*Merton College, University of Oxford, Great Britain. William P. Barry. July 1996. 413pp.*

The Soviet manned space program is one of the most impressive and mysterious legacies of the Soviet Union. Evidence that has come to light since 1989 throws considerable doubt on earlier Western understanding of the Soviet space effort. One of the more puzzling aspects of the new data is the claim that the chief designers of several missile design bureaux played a pivotal role in the making of Soviet manned space policy. This claim contradicts much of what was thought to be known about the Soviet space program, their research and development system, and Soviet politics generally. This dissertation is an empirical study that seeks to answer four interrelated questions: (1) What major manned space projects did the Soviet Union engage in during the 1960s, and how were these projects authorized? (2) Did the chief designers play an influential role in the promotion, selection, approval, and implementation of these projects? (3) What

were the overall objectives and purposes of the Soviet manned space program? (4) What does the example of Soviet space policy tell us about the Soviet political system? The examination of institutions, individuals, and the policy-making process has led to the following conclusions. The Soviet manned space program was an extremely limited state undertaking until 1964. Prior to Nikita Khrushchev's ouster, the Soviet Union began several manned lunar space programs designed to upstage the U.S. Apollo moon landing effort. When all of these efforts failed by 1969, Soviet manned space policy was redirected toward orbital space stations. One chief designer, Sergei Pavlovich Korolev, played a central role in establishing the Soviet manned space program. The ability of chief designers to influence space policy was systematically restricted after 1960, however. The manned space program was essentially a political program. Throughout the 1960s, it was effectively controlled by a handful of party leaders to achieve their domestic and international political objectives.

### **Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)**

**1994**

0561

#### **Mineral Industries of Central Eurasia—1993.**

*Bureau of Mines, Department of the Interior, Washington, D.C. Richard M. Levine. 1994. 20pp.*

All of the successor states of the FSU, having shared a common economic development, now display the same trends regarding their mineral industries. The following trends became apparent among the new successor states: (1) large exports have been made of a wide variety of minerals produced, stockpiled, or transshipped for hard currency at the same time that mineral production is decreasing in almost all mineral production sectors; (2) shortages of minerals, particularly fuels, as the mineral producers in the new countries of the FSU prefer to export their mineral output for hard currency instead of fulfilling obligations to supply other FSU states or industries within their own countries; (3) a reorientation of domestic mineral consumption with metal producing, fabricating, and manufacturing industries, particularly those involved in defense industries, producing less and hence consuming less metal; and (4) large impacts on U.S. and world markets as increased mineral exports from the countries of the FSU enter world markets. Increased mineral exports that have had the most impact on world markets include aluminum, cobalt, ferroalloys, magnesium, nickel, potash, titanium, uranium, and zinc. Numbers that appear in the production tables and structure of industry tables in the text are preliminary estimates and subject to revision. They are provided to give the reader some indication of production and capacities for the mineral industries for these countries. Countries of major importance as minerals producers (Russia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan) are considered first, followed by the remaining successor states from Armenia to Turkmenistan in alphabetical order.

0581

#### **Foreign Affairs Chronology of Central Eurasia (Late March—June 1994).**

*Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Washington, D.C. NA. July 13, 1994. 54pp.*

The Central Eurasia chronology lists major foreign affairs visits, meetings, and statements of the CIS and individual Central Eurasian states at international, regional, and interregional levels during the second quarter of 1994 as reported in the media.

- 0635 **Foreign Affairs Chronology of Central Eurasia (Late June–September 1994).**  
*Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Washington, D.C. NA. October 18, 1994. 38pp.*

The Central Eurasia chronology lists major foreign affairs visits, meetings, and statements of the CIS and individual Central Eurasian states at international, regional, and interregional levels during the third quarter of 1994 as reported in the media.

- 0673 **Status Report of the U.S. Department of Energy’s International Nuclear Safety Program.**

*Department of Energy, Washington, D.C. NA. December 1994. 39pp.*

The DOE implements the U.S. government’s International Nuclear Safety Program to improve the level of safety at Soviet-designed nuclear power plants in Central and Eastern Europe, Russia, and Ukraine. The program is conducted consistent with guidance and policies established by the U.S. Department of State and USAID and in close collaboration with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Some of the program elements were initiated in 1990 under a bilateral agreement with the FSU; however, most activities began after the Lisbon Nuclear Safety Initiative was announced by the State Department in 1992. Within DOE, the program is managed by the International Division of the Office of Nuclear Energy. The overall objective of the International Nuclear Safety Program is to make comprehensive improvements in the physical conditions of the power plants, plant operations, infrastructures, and safety cultures of countries operating Soviet-designed reactors. This status report summarizes the International Nuclear Safety Program’s activities that have been completed as of September 1994 and discusses those activities currently in progress.

**1995**

- 0712 **Foreign Affairs Chronology of Central Eurasia (October–December 1994).**  
*Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Washington, D.C. NA. January 26, 1995. 43pp.*

The Central Eurasia chronology lists major foreign affairs visits, meetings, and statements of the CIS and individual Central Eurasian states at international, regional, and interregional levels during the fourth quarter of 1994 as reported in the media.

- 0755 **Former Soviet Union: U.S. Bilateral Program Lacks Effective Coordination.**  
*General Services Administration, Washington, D.C. NA. February 1995. 57pp.*

In late 1991, the Soviet Union was dissolved, and the newly independent states that succeeded it have been attempting to transform their Soviet-era command economies into more efficient, market-based economies and to establish more democratic governments. The United States has strongly supported this transition process, both diplomatically and financially. The structure that the executive branch established to coordinate, manage, and implement U.S. programs to help with this enormous undertaking is both unique and complex. To help provide an understanding of the programs and process, the GAO undertook this study to (1) identify the size, scope, and status of the various U.S. bilateral programs for the FSU; (2) describe the structures established for coordinating and managing these programs; and (3) describe some of the coordination and structural problems that the executive branch has faced. The GAO briefed congressional staff members on the results of this work during August and September 1994. This report summarizes information in those briefings.

0812

**Former Soviet Union: Creditworthiness of Successor States and U.S. Export Credit Guarantees.**

*General Accounting Office, Office of the Comptroller General, Washington, D.C. NA. February 1995. 171pp.*

This report was written in response to a request by Senator Patrick Leahy for an assessment of the creditworthiness of the FSU and its successor states in the context of the U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) Office of General Sales Manager (GSM)-102 agricultural export credit guarantee program. The USDA's GSM-102 export credit guarantee program's mission is intended to help maintain and further develop U.S. agricultural markets overseas. The Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade Act of 1990 (P.L. 101-624) (also known as the 1990 Farm Bill), however, prohibits the issuance of export credit guarantees for agricultural commodities to any country that the secretary of agriculture determines cannot adequately service the debt associated with a GSM-102 sale. Since early 1991, USDA has provided more than \$5 billion in GSM-102 export credit guarantees to the FSU and its successor states. In response to Senator Leahy's request the GAO analyzed their creditworthiness from a variety of perspectives, including debt burden, external financing requirements, liquidity, secondary market valuations of FSU debt, and country risk analyses. In addition, GAO (1) considered the general economic and political environment in the FSU and its successor states; (2) reviewed how the Soviet debt crisis developed and the relationship between debt problems on the one hand and economic reform and creditworthiness on the other; (3) examined how USDA assessments of creditworthiness and market considerations affected USDA's decisions on providing the FSU/successor states with credit guarantees; and (4) considered the exposure of the GSM-102 portfolio to default by the FSU and its successor states.

## Reel 3

**Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) cont.**

**1995 cont.**

0001

**Nuclear Proliferation from the Former Soviet Union and the Effects of U.S. Economic Incentives.**

*U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Craig L. Zimmerman. April 15, 1995. 30pp.*

This paper examines the U.S. role in stemming nuclear proliferation from the states of the FSU. Proliferation from the FSU is a critical danger to the world. Because of the breakdown of many of the security structures within the FSU that formerly ensured the safety of their weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and related material, the danger is very real. The implementation of the START treaties has also generated a great deal of excess fissile material. Because of the economic conditions in the FSU, there is rising crime concerned with the sale and distribution of this material. Finally, this paper examines the U.S. role in decreasing the danger of nuclear catastrophe caused by the lack of control. The primary force used in this effort is the Cooperative Threat Reduction Act (CTR)—better known as the Nunn-Lugar program—which was initiated in 1991 immediately after the failed coup attempt in Moscow. The paper examines in broad scope the types of efforts the CTR supports and gives examples of how that money is being spent. The paper takes the position that the CTR is extremely important to the vital interests of the United States. Recommendations are then given to enhance this vital program.

- 0031 **Foreign Affairs Chronology of Central Eurasia (December 1994–March 1995).**  
*Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Washington, D.C. NA. May 18, 1995. 40pp.*  
The Central Eurasia chronology lists major foreign affairs visits, meetings, and statements of the CIS and individual Central Eurasian states at international, regional, and interregional levels during the first quarter of 1995 as reported in the media.
- 0071 **U.S. Government Assistance to and Cooperative Activities with the New Independent States of the Former Soviet Union—Quarterly Report, April–June 1995.**  
*Office of the Special Adviser to the President and Secretary of State on Assistance to the New Independent States of the Former Soviet Union and Coordinator of U.S. Assistance to the NIS, Washington, D.C. Richard Morningstar. 1995. 42pp.*  
This quarterly report updates information on assistance to and cooperative activities with the NIS of the FSU during the period of April 1 through June 30, 1995. This past quarter, the new coordinator of U.S. assistance to the NIS, Richard Morningstar, was able to move quickly to begin making changes in the assistance program to make it more efficient and effective. In order to save considerable operating and administrative costs (at least \$2.5 million), the coordinator decided to combine the two enterprise funds operating in Russia: the Russian-American Enterprise Fund and the Fund for Large Enterprises in Russia (FLER). Following consultations with Congress and within the administration, the chairman of the board of the FLER, Michael Blumenthal, was asked to assume the chairmanship of the new fund, which was named the U.S.–Russia Investment Fund. In addition, the coordinator responded to congressional rescission actions by reducing the size of the Russian Officer Housing Program. Morningstar is undertaking a complete review of all NIS assistance and trade and investment programs with the goal of increasing efficiency and programmatic focus. The effectiveness of the U.S. government’s NIS assistance program tends to reflect the willingness and success of the NIS countries in their pursuit of political and economic reform. Although almost all of the NIS countries were either in a pre-election or post-election phase this past quarter, antidemocratic and pro-authoritarian trends were clearly visible in several of them. Where elections were held, local and international observers noted a wide range of irregularities. Meanwhile, on the economic side, many of the NIS countries made significant progress with their reforms and were consequently able to establish closer working relationships with international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Across the NIS inflation was on the decline, and production declines were slowing. This past quarter, overall expenditures of assistance funds increased from the March 1995 level of \$5.06 billion to \$5.61 billion by the end of June. Expenditures in the various segments of the overall assistance program continued to increase steadily. For example, USAID expenditures rose by over \$187 million this past quarter, boosting USAID’s total cumulative expenditures to \$1.28 billion, while the CTR (Nunn-Lugar) program’s expenditures increased by \$86 million this past quarter. Overall obligations of assistance funds increased by over \$616 million—in particular, USAID’s obligations increased by \$99 million, CTR obligations increased by \$143 million, and USDA food assistance obligations increased by \$219 million.

- 0113      **First Fiscal Year 1995 Semi-Annual Report on Program Activities to Facilitate Weapons Destruction and Nonproliferation in the Former Soviet Union.**  
*Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, Department of Defense, Washington, D.C. NA. March 31, 1995. 79pp.*  
This first FY 1995 semiannual report provides details on the implementation of CTR program activities to facilitate weapons destruction and nonproliferation in the FSU. The report is submitted in accordance with Section 1207 of the "Cooperative Threat Reduction Act of 1993, Title XII of Public Law 103-160." The report addresses the activities commonly referred to as the Nunn-Lugar program, initially established under Section 108 of the "Dire Emergency Supplemental Appropriations and Transfers for Relief From the Effects of Natural Disasters, for Other Urgent Needs, and for Incremental Cost of 'Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm' Act of FY 1992," P.L. 102-229, as amended, and Section 9110(a) of the "Department of Defense Appropriations Act for FY 1993," P.L. 102-396. This cover report describes the CTR program activities for the period of October 1, 1994, to March 31, 1995, and cumulatively, plus significant events that occurred in April 1995. The individual project summaries in the attached annex cover the period of October 1, 1994, to March 31, 1995, cumulatively. The number of CTR projects has not increased significantly over the period; thus, the focus of this report is on the activities undertaken to implement existing CTR projects. CTR program activities include DOD assistance to former Soviet republics to: (1) destroy nuclear, chemical, and other WMD; (2) transport, store, and safeguard weapons in connection with their destruction; and (3) establish verifiable safeguards against the proliferation of such weapons. In addition, since the program was initially established, Congress has refined and expanded the types of authorized activities to include conversion of weapons production and military capabilities into civilian activities and to include defense and military contact activities.
- 0192      **Foreign Affairs Chronology of Central Eurasia (Late March–June 1995).**  
*Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Washington, D.C. NA. July 25, 1995. 47pp.*  
The Central Eurasia chronology lists major foreign affairs visits, meetings, and statements of the CIS and individual Central Eurasian states at international, regional, and interregional levels during the second quarter of 1995 as reported in the media.
- 0239      **Report on Control and Accountability of Materials Related to Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Former Soviet Union.**  
*Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, Department of Defense, Washington, D.C. NA. June 1, 1995. 19pp.*  
In accordance with Section 1204 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1995, P.L. 103-337, this is the Report on Control and Accountability of Materials Related to Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Former Soviet Union. This report describes the progress being made in the states receiving assistance under the CTR programs toward development of effective systems of control and accountability for such materials. As identified in Section 1204, effective systems of control and accountability would allow that "Under such a system, officials of the U.S. and the recipient country should have an accurate accounting of the weapons of mass destruction in that country and the fissile and chemical materials from those weapons."

**U.S. Government Assistance to and Cooperative Activities with the New Independent States of the Former Soviet Union—Quarterly Report, July–September 1995.**

*Office of the Special Adviser to the President and Secretary of State on Assistance to the New Independent States of the Former Soviet Union and Coordinator of U.S. Assistance to the NIS, Washington, D.C. Richard Morningstar. 1995. 54pp.*

This quarterly report updates information on assistance to and cooperative activities with the NIS of the FSU during the period of July 1 through September 30, 1995. This past quarter, Richard Morningstar, the coordinator of U.S. assistance to the NIS, began to propose and push for the implementation of a number of changes in our assistance programs in response to changed circumstances in the NIS. For example, because the situation in several of the NIS has changed significantly, we can now begin to rely more on indigenous organizations and partnerships between small U.S. organizations and their NIS counterparts. In particular, a greater reliance on volunteers and nonprofit organizations will enable us to scale back the use of large, expensive contractors. Due to the drastic decline in funds available to support reform in the NIS—especially in Russia—the coordinator is placing an increased emphasis on cost-sharing and on the use of multilateral funding sources such as the World Bank, the European Union, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and is seeking ways to streamline or economize on every program. In addition, the coordinator has begun a careful examination of each program and activity to make sure that they are directly serving U.S. core objectives in each country. We can no longer afford to spend our shrinking resources on activities that may have only an indirect impact on the core objectives, even if these activities advance very laudable secondary objectives. The net result of these efforts will be a more streamlined overall assistance program that more efficiently and effectively utilizes the fewer resources available to advance U.S. objectives. The coordinator fully recognizes that our NIS assistance program was designed to have a relatively short lifespan. Over the next few years, we must look towards moving out of assistance areas that can be supported by other donors, or in which we believe enough progress has been made that U.S. assistance will no longer be necessary. While looking to scale back our assistance efforts, we must remain engaged at an appropriate level as long as our national interests continue to be very much at stake. Arbitrary deadlines are simply not in our best interest. In this context, the coordinator's office will continue to move forward to facilitate reform in the NIS, for our own sake and that of the recipient nations. Of course, the degree to which the U.S. government's NIS assistance programs are successful depends in large part on the willingness of the NIS countries to pursue political and economic reform. This past quarter, economic reform once again outpaced political reform in the NIS. In a few countries, democratic processes such as elections and referenda were used to strengthen the dominance of the executive branch over the legislative and judicial branches of government. Across the NIS, only marginal progress was made in the area of political reform; however, even in some of the politically less progressive countries, significant progress was made in the area of economic reform. Rates of inflation dropped to new lows, exchange rates of national currencies remained steady (except in Tajikistan and Turkmenistan), and many important market reforms were implemented as countries approached their economic turnaround points.

- 0312      **U.S.–Former Soviet Union Environmental Management Activities: A U.S. Department of Energy Cooperation Program with the Former Soviet Union.**  
*Department of Energy, Washington, D.C. NA. September 1995. 34pp.*  
The Office of Environmental Management has been delegated the responsibility for DOE's cleanup of the nuclear weapons complex. The nature and magnitude of the waste management and environmental remediation problem requires the identification of technologies and scientific expertise from domestic and foreign sources. Operational DOE facilities, as well as the decontamination and decommissioning of inactive facilities, have produced significant amounts of radioactive, hazardous, and mixed wastes. In order to ensure worker safety and the protection of the public, DOE must (1) assess, remediate, and monitor sites and facilities; (2) store, treat, and dispose of wastes from past and current operations; and (3) develop and implement innovative technologies for environmental restoration and waste management.
- 0346      **A Guide on Countertrade Practices in the Newly Independent States of the Former Soviet Union.**  
*International Trade Administration, Department of Commerce, Washington, D.C. Pompiliu Verzariu and Paula Mitchell. October 1995. 64pp.*  
The past decade witnessed a succession of political, economic, and financial upheavals that, hastened by global economic interdependence, affected nations regardless of their political or economic systems. Slower growth of the world's economies resulted in government policies that fostered bilateral commercial approaches to multilaterally induced economic problems. Therefore, countertrade practices proliferated in the 1980s. Today, countertrade is a reality in international commerce. Continuing pressures for countertrade are likely as a result of the levelling in the disbursement of commercial loans and export credits to debt-ridden developing countries. Consistent with its commitment to a nondiscriminatory free trading system, the U.S. government is opposed to government-mandated countertrade. These practices represent a direct government intervention in the marketplace that minimizes the dynamics of market forces and introduces noncommercial considerations. The U.S. government, however, maintains a hands-off policy toward countertrade arrangements that do not have government intervention or that U.S. exporters choose to pursue. Countertrade arrangements vary as a function of country, product, and time in response to the evolving economic needs of the trading parties and of the asset bases they bring to the transaction. This lack of uniformity makes rigorous how-to-do countertrade prescriptions impracticable and requires periodic updating of country practices. This book describes the evolution of countertrade in the NIS and provides information on practices in each republic. Its primary aim is to focus the awareness of readers on the areas of expertise they will need to further develop as practitioners.
- 0410      **Foreign Affairs Chronology of Central Eurasia (Late June–September 1995).**  
*Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Washington, D.C. NA. October 20, 1995. 30pp.*  
The Central Eurasia chronology lists major foreign affairs visits, meetings, and statements of the CIS and individual Central Eurasian states at international, regional, and interregional levels during the third quarter of 1995 as reported in the media.

- 0440      **Nuclear Safety: Concerns with Nuclear Facilities and Other Sources of Radiation in the Former Soviet Union.**  
*General Accounting Office, Office of the Comptroller General, Washington, D.C. NA. November 1995. 46pp.*  
While the safety problems of the fifty-eight Soviet-designed civil nuclear power reactors operating in the FSU and Central and Eastern Europe have received considerable international attention and assistance, many other nuclear facilities and other sources of radiation in the FSU also pose safety, health, and environmental concerns. For example, a 1993 accident at a plutonium reprocessing plant in Russia underscored the safety problems associated with these types of facilities. In this report, the GAO responds to a request by Senator Bob Graham to provide information on (1) nuclear facilities (other than civil nuclear power reactors), nuclear-powered vessels, and other sources of radiation in the FSU; (2) the views of U.S. and international experts on the safety of these facilities and other sources of radiation; and (3) U.S. and international efforts to address nuclear safety and environmental problems associated with these facilities and other sources of radiation.
- 0486      **Former Soviet Union: Information on U.S. Bilateral Program Funding.**  
*General Accounting Office, Office of the Comptroller General, Washington, D.C. NA. December 1995. 137pp.*  
This report provides financial information on U.S. bilateral programs with the NIS of the FSU from FY 1990 through December 1994 to help them make the transition to democratic societies with market economies. Specifically, it provides information on (1) the amount of funds obligated and expended; (2) the amount of credits provided, including subsidy costs; and (3) the appropriation source and budget function for these funds. The GAO has categorized this information by agency, recipient country, and programmatic sector.
- 0623      **Former Soviet Union: An Update on Coordination of U.S. Assistance and Economic Cooperation Programs.**  
*General Accounting Office, Office of the Comptroller General, Washington, D.C. NA. December 1995. 15pp.*  
In February 1995, the GAO reported that the executive branch lacked an effective coordination mechanism for U.S. bilateral programs designed to help the NIS of the FSU transform their centrally controlled economies into market-based economies and to establish more democratic governments. Specifically, the GAO reported that the State Department coordinator's authority was weak and that USAID and the other agencies using Freedom Support Act funds were frequently embroiled in disputes about implementation of their programs. Officials representing several agencies acknowledged the problems the GAO reported. State Department and USAID officials subsequently testified to Congress that coordination and interagency working relationships had improved. This report (1) assesses efforts to strengthen the coordinator's authority over bilateral FSU programs but identifies a new challenge to the coordinator's authority and (2) analyzes the impact of changes in USAID's relationships with other agencies on interagency cooperation in implementing Freedom Support Act programs. The GAO sent this report to those congressional committees that have primary responsibility for the U.S. assistance program to the FSU.

- 0638 **1996  
Analysis and Design of an Information Systems Network in the Former Soviet Union.**  
*Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. Matthew S. Herl and Gregory A. Rehard. March 1996. 87pp.*  
In an effort to facilitate democratic reforms in the FSU, the president of the United States authorized the establishment of American business centers (ABCs) through the Freedom Support Act of 1992. The act promotes U.S. economic interests by establishing commercial partnerships between the United States and the FSU. Integral to this transition is the role of information technology. The purpose of this thesis is to assist the ABCs in defining their information system needs by producing a network model that takes into account the unique operating environment within the FSU. The essential elements of this model are range, reach, and responsiveness. They characterize the utility of an information system to an organization. The model can be applied to the ABCs to form a baseline assessment that provides a point of reference from which a target architecture can be formulated. It is this target architecture that is intended to serve as a baseline configuration for local/wide area enterprise networks to be used by the ABCs within the FSU. The thesis concludes with a discussion of those factors that could significantly affect the viability of the ABCs.
- 0725 **U.S. Government Assistance to and Cooperative Activities with the New Independent States of the Former Soviet Union, Fiscal Year 1995 Annual Report.**  
*Office of the Coordinator of U.S. Assistance to the NIS, Washington, D.C. Richard Morningstar. April 1996. 212pp.*  
This annual report describes U.S. government activities that supported reform in the twelve NIS countries of the FSU during FY 1995. This report describes bilateral assistance programs in full implementation, now that funding from previous years is being fully deployed. The range and breadth of the programs described here are greater than in previous years and are likely to be greater than in subsequent years, as new funding continues to decline. The report describes the contributions to democratic and economic reform in each of the twelve NIS countries and describes the nature of our assistance by country and by sector. Described herein are the efforts of seventeen U.S. government agencies, twelve U.S. embassies, and thousands of U.S. and NIS citizens.

## Reel 4

- 0001 **Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) cont.  
1996 cont.  
Former USSR International Agriculture and Trade Reports: Situation and Outlook Series, May 1996.**  
*Economic Research Service, Department of Agriculture, Washington, D.C. NA. May 1996. 44pp.*  
U.S. agricultural exports to the countries of the FSU are projected to increase for the first time in five years to \$1.6 billion in FY 1996. Expanding exports of high-value products are driving the growth. The persistent contraction of the FSU livestock sector continues to keep the region's grain imports at record lows. Russia, the primary FSU food importer, was the top destination for U.S. poultry meat for the second straight year in 1995, with poultry purchases totaling over \$600 million. Russia is also a growing market for other U.S. animal products, fruits and vegetables, and beverages. Although U.S. exports account for 10 to 15 percent of total Russian high-value product imports, the U.S. market share could

expand through increased product promotion and investment in the country. Russian agriculture appears to suffer from a price/cost disadvantage vis-à-vis most imported foodstuffs. In the near to medium term, Russia is likely to remain uncompetitive in price—and thereby a net importer—for many commodities, especially livestock products, assuming it does not adopt strongly protectionist policies. In recent years, Russia (as well as Ukraine and certain other FSU nations) has been expanding controls on agricultural imports, using tariffs and nontariff measures. In most FSU countries (except the Baltic states) institutional reform in the production side of the agricultural economy has moved very slowly. The official “reorganization” of farms in Russia and other FSU nations in the early 1990s did little to change their organization, managerial behavior, or internal incentive structure. Land reform remains stifled. Farms have been able to avoid institutional reform largely because state subsidies continue to buttress them. The subsidies often take the indirect form of the state not calling in, or canceling, loans to farms. By propping up farms, the continued subsidization has two negative consequences for the economy. First, agriculture does not shed resources with low productivity that could be better used elsewhere. For example, although most Russian farms specializing in livestock production are unprofitable, few have ceased functioning. Second, the subsidies reduce pressure on farms to reform their managerial and work incentive practices, which would increase the productivity of resources used. By helping to keep productivity in agriculture low, the subsidies work to keep production costs high. This hurts farms’ ability to compete with foreign output. The subsidies and the accompanying lack of farm institutional reform are thereby part of the reason Russia and other FSU countries are imposing more restrictions on agricultural imports. Market reform, particularly price liberalization, has motivated some improvement in farm productivity. By hurting agriculture’s terms of trade, price liberalization has reduced farms’ purchases of inputs (such as machinery, fuel, fertilizer, and pesticides). This has stimulated farms to use those inputs they do buy more productively. In 1995, the livestock sector continued to contract, with output falling more than 10 percent due to declining productivity and inventories. At the same time, meat imports from non-FSU countries grew to one million tons. One reason is that the real appreciation of the ruble against the dollar increased the competitiveness of imports vis-à-vis high-cost domestic output, despite rising tariffs. A significant rebound in 1996–97 grain output, however, could lower currently high grain prices and improve FSU producers’ terms of trade, resulting in a temporary lift for the livestock sector and possibly reducing imports. Over the long term, the FSU livestock sector should stabilize and grow slowly, as economic recovery spurs demand. Long-term FSU meat imports are projected to remain near 1995 levels, however, with purchases of poultry declining slightly as those of beef and pork grow. Total FSU grain imports are forecast to decline 20 percent in 1996–97 to a record low for the third straight year. Also, domestic production is projected by USDA to increase more than 25 million tons from 120 million tons in 1995–96. The higher output is based on rising production in Russia and Ukraine, where increased area planted to winter grains and lower winter-kill point to an improved crop. A reduction in the state’s role (at the national level) in grain marketing has caused producer grain prices to approach world levels—most noticeably in Russia and the Baltics, where market reforms have made the most progress. Farmers have responded by expanding area to those grains (and crops) for which returns are highest. Over the long term, FSU grain output is forecast to increase due to higher yields and growing demand for feed. As a result, FSU grain imports should remain minimal, with intra-FSU flows accounting for most of the region’s grain trade.

0045

**Power Project Opportunities in Central and Eastern Europe and the New Independent States.**

*Advanced Engineering Associates International, Inc., Watertown, Massachusetts. NA. May 1996. 230pp.*

Throughout Central and Eastern Europe and the NIS, there is a pervasive and immediate need for substantial investments in the power and heat supply system derived from a variety of circumstances. In some countries, there are recurrent power shortages. In other countries, although there is an excess of installed capacity, many of the generating units are old, inefficient, polluting, and sometimes unsafe. Most of the generating units in Central and Eastern Europe and the NIS lack modern instrumentation and control systems. They also have relatively high production costs. Excessive system losses are common in both electricity and heat transmission and distribution networks. These losses are primarily due to a lack of investment in new equipment or replacement parts. They are also caused by a failure to perform regular maintenance and scheduled system upgrades over the course of several years. Operating conditions also have been constrained in many countries by the lack of fuel, poor financial condition of the operating enterprises, and political considerations. In the 1990s, fuel supplies have often been withheld by oil and gas producers in the NIS because of the importing country's inability to pay or [sic] accumulated arrears. The sector's operating enterprises faced increasingly negative financial conditions. This situation was largely due to the lack of sufficient earnings from highly subsidized customers and growing arrears from state agencies and publicly owned enterprises. The enterprises were also subject to poor financial management and a lack of accountability. Rather than performing on a commercial basis, the sector's enterprises generally served as tools for achieving political and economic development goals. To rectify such problems, most of the countries in these regions have undertaken efforts to ascertain least-cost expansion options and to diversify both their fuel suppliers and the fuel sources in generating plants. In an effort to diversify the country's energy base and minimize costs, the governments are prioritizing the development and utilization of domestic energy sources in a clean and viable manner. Another primary goal is to optimize the operating performance of existing generation and delivery systems by reducing inefficiency, system losses, and waste. In addition, most countries have introduced or plan to introduce means to achieve modern operating and financial management practices for the sector. In many cases, these are based on new legal, institutional, and regulatory frameworks for the sector. They often include a program to "corporatize" sector enterprises, introduce competition, and allow private participation in the sector. A number of countries have a competitive generating subsector. Many have privatized generating units and/or distribution enterprises. To improve sector finances, the pricing policy for regulated electricity and heat service has been modified in most Central and Eastern European countries and the NIS to provide sufficient revenues to reinvest in the sector and/or to attract private sector financing. The basic power sector infrastructure in these countries can be classified in the following categories: hydroelectric power generation systems; thermal power generation systems (electricity); nuclear power generation systems; transmission and distribution systems (electricity); and district heating cogeneration systems (electricity and heat).

- 0275      **Business Information Service for the Newly Independent States (BISNIS)  
U.S. Department of Commerce—International Trade Administration: U.S.  
Companies with Offices in Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan,  
Ukraine, [and] Russia (Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Russian Far East).**  
*Department of Commerce, Washington, D.C. NA. May 21, 1996. 313pp.*  
This report contains lists of U.S. companies with offices in Armenia, Azerbaijan,  
Belarus, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, the Russian Far East, Tajikistan,  
Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Russia. It also contains information on U.S. joint  
ventures in Belarus and Kyrgyzstan, the European Division of the American  
Bureau of Shipping, and a list of business contacts in Ukraine.
- 0588      **Protection and Surveillance of Nuclear Materials in the Former Soviet  
Union.**  
*Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, New Mexico. Rebecca Darnell-  
Horton (Editor). June 1996. 51pp.*  
The International Security Initiative at Sandia National Laboratories is dedicated  
to achieving a global nuclear security structure that reduces the danger of nuclear  
and other WMD. This structure includes a stable and predictable relationship  
among the five acknowledged nuclear weapons states; worldwide protection,  
surveillance, and control of nuclear material and weapons; and a nonproliferation  
and confidence-building regime that reduces the motivation to acquire WMD.  
Since the early 1970s, Sandia has been the principal DOE laboratory responsible  
for developing technology, concepts, and hardware to protect nuclear weapons  
and materials at facilities and during transportation. Since the breakup of the  
Soviet Union in 1991, the U.S. government—in particular, the DOE national  
laboratories such as Sandia—has been working cooperatively with scientists and  
engineers in various institutes, laboratories, and other organizations within the  
countries of the FSU to accelerate progress toward a common goal to reduce the  
risk of nuclear weapons proliferation, including such threats as theft, diversion,  
and unauthorized possession of nuclear materials. Sandia's International Security  
Program has worked toward this goal by supporting numerous projects in the  
FSU that help achieve the protection and security of nuclear material and  
facilities. Additionally, the cooperative interactions help to encourage the  
dismantling of all types of WMD, to advance nonproliferation activities, to assist  
the FSU states in converting their defense-oriented capabilities to civilian market-  
driven enterprises, and finally, to provide better Western access to the world-class  
science and technology that exists within the FSU.
- 0639      **Review of Agricultural Policies in Europe and the Former Soviet Union.**  
*Economic Research Service, Department of Agriculture, Washington, D.C. NA.  
June 1996. 140pp.*  
This report describes policies that affect the agricultural sector in thirty-eight  
countries in Europe and the FSU, including policies that affect commodity and  
input prices, the activities of parastatals (government-owned companies), and the  
integration of the economies in Europe and the FSU. To facilitate understanding  
of the policy choices made in each country, this report also presents data on each  
country's economy, trade flows, and resource base. Governments (especially in  
the FSU and Central and Eastern Europe) are reducing their role in agricultural  
markets by reducing or eliminating tariff and nontariff barriers to trade, the scope  
of parastatal activities, and/or budgetary transfers to agriculture.

0779

**Second Fiscal Year 1995 Semi-Annual Report on Program Activities to Facilitate Weapons Destruction and Nonproliferation in the Former Soviet Union.**

*Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, Department of Defense, Washington, D.C. NA. August 8, 1996. 104pp.*

The CTR program continues to make concrete progress in reducing the threat to the United States from the arsenal of WMD left in the FSU. CTR assistance continues to be used to facilitate and accelerate the dismantling of nuclear weapons systems in the FSU states where they remain: Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. As stated in the report, as of October 1, 1995, about 3,800 warheads have been removed from missiles and bomber bases. Over 2,500 warheads formerly deployed in Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan have been returned to Russia. Additionally, Kazakhstan became nuclear weapons free as of April 1995. CTR assistance has provided both political leverage supporting these activities and material aid to speed their implementation. There has been dramatic improvement in the CTR program obligation rate during this period. From FY 1992 to FY 1995 DOD received \$1.6 billion in authority for the CTR program. Of this \$1.6 billion, \$370 million was rescinded by Congress or expired before it could be obligated, leaving the program with \$1.23 billion in funding authority. Of this amount, cumulative obligations through September 30, 1995, are \$866 million, representing 70 percent of the total obligation authority available. This reflects an increase of \$336 million in obligations since March 1995. This report and its annex provide details of each CTR project, describe the participation of other departments and agencies in the implementation of the program, and address events that have occurred since the end of the first half of 1995.

## Reel 5

### **Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) cont.**

**1997**

0001

**U.S. Government Assistance to and Cooperative Activities with the New Independent States of the Former Soviet Union, Fiscal Year 1996 Annual Report.**

*Office of the Coordinator of U.S. Assistance to the NIS, Washington, D.C. Richard Morningstar. January 1997. 239pp.*

This annual report describes the U.S. government activities that supported reform in the twelve NIS countries of the FSU during FY 1996. This was a year of progress in terms of both political and economic reform. With only a few notable exceptions, the overall trend on both fronts was encouraging. This report summarizes our contributions to economic and political reform in each of the twelve NIS on a country-by-country basis, as well as by program. The progress these countries are making reflects their commitment to reform.

0240

**The Threat of Nuclear Movement.**

*U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Gerald M. Paine. April 7, 1997. 34pp.*

While WMD include biological, chemical, and nuclear material, this paper will focus on the nuclear component. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, nuclear material was left throughout the CIS. As these new states focused on economic and social issues, security and safety of nuclear material became secondary. This change in focus has provided conditions for the illicit movement of nuclear material and expertise. CIS admissions that illegal movement has occurred have been limited; however, material and technical expertise have been found in numerous locations. The United States and Russia have initiated many notable

programs, but the potential exists for continued illicit movement. As such, continual emphasis needs to be placed on stemming the movement of nuclear material and expertise.

0274 **Cooperative Threat Reduction: Status of Defense Conversion Efforts in the Former Soviet Union.**

*General Accounting Office, Office of the Comptroller General, Washington, D.C. NA. April 1997. 53pp.*

In response to a request by the chairman of the House Committee on National Security, the GAO reviewed the DOD's program to help convert defense industries in the FSU to commercial enterprises. At the time of the GAO's review, DOD had undertaken twenty conversion projects, and the Defense Enterprise Fund had completed agreements to undertake four projects. The GAO's specific objectives were to assess (1) the effect of defense conversion efforts on the elimination or reduction of military activities and production capabilities in former Soviet WMD enterprises, (2) the status of defense conversion projects and funding, and (3) conformance of the Defense Enterprise Fund's management practices to its grant agreement and the fund's operating expenses.

0327 **First Half Fiscal Year 1996 Semi-Annual Report on Program Activities to Facilitate Weapons Destruction and Nonproliferation in the Former Soviet Union.**

*Department of Defense, Washington, D.C. William Cohen. May 8, 1997. 108pp.*

The CTR program continues to make concrete progress in reducing the threat to the United States from the arsenal of WMD left in the FSU. CTR assistance continues to be used to facilitate and accelerate the dismantling of nuclear weapons systems in the FSU states where they remain: Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. CTR assistance has provided both political leverage supporting these activities and material aid to speed their implementation. This report and its annex provide details of each CTR project, describe the participation of other departments and agencies in the implementation of the program, and address events that occurred during the first half of FY 1996.

0435 **Second Half Fiscal Year 1996 Semi-Annual Report on Program Activities to Facilitate Weapons Destruction and Nonproliferation in the Former Soviet Union.**

*Department of Defense, Washington, D.C. William Cohen. July 7, 1997. 99pp.*

The CTR program continues to make concrete progress in reducing the threat to the United States from the arsenal of WMD left in the FSU. CTR assistance continues to be used to facilitate and accelerate the dismantling of nuclear weapons systems in the FSU states where they remain: Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. CTR assistance has provided both political leverage supporting these activities and material aid to speed their implementation. This report and its annex provide details of each CTR project, describe the participation of other departments and agencies in the implementation of the program, and address events that occurred during the second half of FY 1996.

0534 **First Half Fiscal Year 1997 Semi-Annual Report on Program Activities to Facilitate Weapons Destruction and Nonproliferation in the Former Soviet Union.**

*Department of Defense, Washington, D.C. NA. NA. 43pp.*

The CTR program continues to make concrete progress in reducing the threat to the United States from the arsenal of WMD left in the FSU. CTR assistance continues to be used to facilitate and accelerate the dismantling of nuclear

weapons systems in the FSU states where they remain: Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. CTR assistance has provided both political leverage supporting these activities and material aid to speed their implementation. This report and its annex provide details of each CTR project, describe the participation of other departments and agencies in the implementation of the program, and address events that occurred during the first half of FY 1997.

## Armenia

1996

0577

### **Country Commercial Guide: Armenia, Fiscal Year 1997.**

*U.S. Embassy, Yerevan, Armenia. NA. June 1996. 98pp.*

This Country Commercial Guide (CCG) presents a comprehensive look at Armenia's commercial environment, using economic, political, and market analysis. The CCGs were established by recommendation of the Trade Promotion Coordinating Committee (TPCC), a multiagency task force, to consolidate various reporting documents prepared for the U.S. business community. CCGs are prepared annually at U.S. embassies through the combined efforts of several U.S. government agencies. Modern Armenia, a small, strategically important country located at the crossroads of Europe and Asia, is in the midst of transition from a Soviet-style planned economy to a democratic society with a market economy. A legal and regulatory framework for a private sector is being steadily put into place. Political reforms are underway, and an increasing number of private businesses have already changed the economic landscape. The government privatization plan envisages that all small enterprises and most medium-to-large enterprises will be privatized by the end of 1997. Armenia's application to join the World Trade Organization (WTO) is progressing; the country hopes to become a WTO member in the first half of 1997. Economic development has been significantly impeded by the continuing embargo of Armenia's transportation routes by two of its four neighbors—Turkey and Azerbaijan. The potential for a renewed outbreak in the Nagorno Karabakh conflict likewise hinders economic growth. During the present transition period, Armenia remains highly dependent on humanitarian and technical assistance provided by the United States, the European Union, and international organizations. At the same time, the Armenia of today is politically the most stable and market-oriented Caucasus country, with some of the most liberal trade legislation in the CIS. Armenia adopted the first private property law in the NIS in February 1996, and there is significant progress underway in such areas as land registration and banking reform. Midland Bank has opened a branch in Yerevan that offers the full range of modern banking services. The receptivity to investment in impressive but idle research and manufacturing industries; Armenia's superior agri-products, especially fruits and vegetables; a large pool of underemployed and highly qualified specialists; an inexpensive labor force; the entrepreneurial spirit of Armenians; and Armenia's close ties with the United States through the American Armenian diaspora combine to offer attractive prospects for U.S. businesses. There are growing investment and partnership opportunities in such areas as power generation, aviation, construction, electronics, apparel, tourism, food processing, industrial property acquisition, and banking. This report contains chapters on economic trends and outlook; political environment; marketing U.S. products and services; leading sectors for U.S. exports and investment; trade regulations and standards; investment climate; trade and project financing; and business travel. The report also includes appendices containing country data, trade and investment statistics, and country contacts.

## Azerbaijan

1994

0675

### **Energy and Security in Transcaucasia.**

*Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Stephen J. Blank. September 7, 1994. 77pp.*

One of the world's enduring regional conflicts is in Nagorno-Karabakh. This war pits local Armenians and their cousins from Armenia against Azerbaijan and has enmeshed Russia, Turkey, and the Western allies (France, the U.K., and the United States) in a complex series of regional relationships. The international stakes of this war involve the control over exploration for natural gas and oil and the transshipment of these commodities from Azerbaijan to the West. Energy resources represent Azerbaijan's primary means of economic modernization and are therefore vital to its economic and political freedom. For Russia and Turkey the question is one of access to enormous amounts of desperately needed hard currency and control over a long-standing area of contention between them. More broadly, Russia's tactics in attempting to impose a peace settlement in the war and to establish control over a large share of the local energy economy represent a recrudescence of the imperial tendencies in Russian policy that are incompatible with democratic reform. Accordingly, this war is overlaid with international rivalries of great scope and of more than regional significance. Western policy here is a sign of U.S. and European intentions to preserve the post-Soviet status quo while Russian policy is no less illustrative of the direction of its political evolution.

1996

0752

### **Country Commercial Guide: Azerbaijan.**

*U.S. Embassy, Baku, Azerbaijan. NA. August 1996. 46pp.*

This CCG presents a comprehensive look at Azerbaijan's commercial environment, using economic, political, and market analysis. The CCGs were established by recommendation of the TPCC, a multiagency task force, to consolidate various reporting documents prepared for the U.S. business community. CCGs are prepared annually at U.S. embassies through the combined efforts of several U.S. government agencies. Azerbaijan has enormous economic potential, particularly in the energy sector. By 2010, total investment in the oil and gas sector may be \$23 billion. Best prospects for U.S. products in 1997 include oil/gas field machinery; telecommunications equipment and services; power generation systems; food processing/packaging; pharmaceuticals; water resource equipment; pollution control equipment; computers/peripherals; automotive parts and service; and health care services. There is strong demand in all of these sectors. Lack of financing will inhibit sales until Azerbaijan begins to realize oil revenues around the turn of the century. Azerbaijan's economic future depends on how its government proceeds with economic reform and uses the revenues from Azerbaijan's energy resources. Despite Azerbaijan's oil wealth, and a flourishing trading sector, there has been only slow and painful progress toward a market economy. The good news centers on the government's successful financial stabilization policies from 1995 through mid-1996. Working closely with the IMF, the government of Azerbaijan reined in state credit and consolidated control over the state budget. In 1995, annual inflation dropped from 1,664 percent the previous year to 85 percent, with a further decline to 28 percent forecast for 1996. The bad news is the lack of significant progress on structural reforms, particularly privatization. Successful privatization of state enterprises over the next three years, combined with new capital investment, modern management practices, and a favorable overall commercial environment, could

help stimulate economic growth. Agricultural output could be expanded dramatically with the right combination of privatization of land, modern inputs, and marketing techniques. Agricultural potential is great. Pockets of rural prosperity have appeared where local leaders have taken the initiative to privatize farms. Baku, Azerbaijan's largest city and port, could be the hub of regional transportation and communications systems for the Trans-Caucasus and Central Asian republics. Azerbaijan became an independent republic in December 1991 and established diplomatic relations with the United States in early 1992. Coup attempts and other internal political problems have caused difficulties in Azerbaijan's movement toward democracy. The first post-independence parliamentary election in November 1995 was flawed, but some opposition candidates were seated. The ongoing conflict with Armenia regarding the region of Nargorno-Karabakh has discouraged economic activity outside the oil sector. With a cease-fire with Armenia now in its second year and a relatively stable government, the government of Azerbaijan now can focus on economic reform. A U.S.-Azerbaijan bilateral trade treaty, ratified in April 1995, is in effect. The United States and Azerbaijan are now discussing a draft bilateral investment treaty. This report contains chapters on economic trends and outlook; political environment; marketing U.S. products and services; leading sectors for U.S. exports and investment; trade regulations and standards; investment climate; trade and project financing; and business travel. The report also includes appendices containing country data, trade and investment statistics, and country contacts.

## **Baltic States**

**1996**

0798

**U.S. Foreign Policy and the Baltic States.**

*Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. Karin A. Shuey. March 1996. 60pp.*

This thesis examines U.S. foreign policy toward the Baltic states from 1918 to 1991 to determine if the United States has been realistic in its dealings with small nations. An analysis of U.S. policy indicates that the United States acts hypocritically by compromising its moral principles when domestic political costs are high. The sacrifice of national values degrades the credibility of the moral high ground necessary for U.S. policy. This study reviews the events that occurred during the three major periods in U.S.-Baltic relations: the initial period of Baltic independence following World War I, the Soviet annexation of the Baltics during World War II, and finally the beginning of the second period of Baltic independence during the breakup of the Soviet Union. In all three cases, U.S. policy was unclear and contradictory. This study concludes that despite the U.S. policy of nonrecognition of the Soviet annexation of the Baltic states during the cold war, the United States failed to adhere to its principles when given the opportunity. In the process, it also neglected problems within its own borders that required attention perhaps more urgently than those outside. The tendency for U.S. policy to ignore the issues that actually threaten its security internally and to place a higher priority on external matters that do not have a real impact on its standing could lead to its inadvertent downfall.

0858

**NATO Expansion and the Baltic States.**

*Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. Timothy R. Trampenau. December 1996. 137pp.*

This thesis examines the prospects for the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) in the NATO expansion process. To provide historical perspective, previous NATO expansions and recent official NATO policies toward expansion are reviewed. Actions and deliberations in the Baltic states regarding NATO

expansion are examined to set the stage for the most critical elements of the analysis, the American and Russian positions. The decisive influence of American leadership within NATO is assessed, and views on NATO expansion within the American body politic and elected leadership are surveyed. The role of Russian opposition to NATO expansion and, more importantly, the sources of this opposition within the Russian political elites are examined, with particular attention to the formal decision-making structure and internal political dynamics. Finally, the thesis assesses the probable effect of alternative forms of NATO expansion on European security and stability.

## Reel 6

### Belarus

1996

0001

**Implementation of the Helsinki Accords: The Current Situation in Belarus.**  
*Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Washington, D.C. NA. October 30, 1996. 24pp.*

This report consists of a briefing of the CSCE on the volatile political and human rights situation in Belarus and focuses on the then-upcoming November 24 constitutional referendum. Over the last few years, Belarus has shown signs of serious deterioration in its political and economic situation as growing authoritarianism and repression of human rights have become the subject of rising concern both within and outside Belarus. Since the election of 1994 there has been ever greater centralization of power, especially at the expense of the Belarusian parliament and the constitutional court. Basic rights and freedoms—freedom of expression, assembly, and association—have all come under increasing assault in clear violation of Belarus's freely undertaken commitments under the OSCE. The government has virtually destroyed the ability of independent media to operate and has hampered opposition access to the press. Indeed, we see a chilling pattern of press intimidation, harassment, and censorship. The president's draft constitution fails to provide any semblance of separation of powers and rule of law. In short, Belarus is moving in a direction opposite to that of virtually all its neighbors, a point that was recently noted by Congress when it urged that no U.S. assistance go directly to the current government of Belarus.

### Central Asia

1994

0025

**The Media in Central Asia: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, [and] Uzbekistan.**  
*Internews, Washington, D.C. Eric Johnson, Martha Olcott, and Robert Horvitz. April 1994. 37pp.*

Independent media in much of Central Asia do not yet enable diverse sectors of society to articulate their problems and seek solutions through public interaction, as they do in the West. For the most part, media in the three countries examined in this study, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan, still provide only governmental information and entertainment. Independent television stations and newspapers have acquired some freedom, at least in the capitals, in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. With local variations, television tends to reach a wider audience than the press. President Akaev's government in Kyrgyzstan has most vocally supported media freedom, but financial factors preclude the media from expressing this freedom much beyond Bishkek. In Uzbekistan, on the other hand, a clear policy against airing dissenting opinions has effectively prevented the development of nongovernmental sources of information. The economic condition of the new media is precarious in all three countries. Central Asia has no paper

plants, and the imported price of newsprint is so high that most people cannot afford newspaper subscriptions. Presses, broadcast frequencies, and radio and television transmitters remain almost exclusively under government control, so the government effectively retains the last word over use of the media for expressing opposition to or criticism of official policy. In both Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, democracy-building requires working with and supporting the emerging independent media, and there are many opportunities to do so. International charitable foundations should act quickly and work closely with promising journalists on implementing the recommendations in this report, and technical assistance programs should be expanded to include a media development component. The opportunities in Uzbekistan are more limited and the environment is a more difficult one in which to work, but the degree of need is no less great. In all three countries, particular attention should be paid to supporting the independent media in building a strong commercial basis to ensure economic survival within local circumstances.

### 1995

0062

#### **Central Asians Take Stock: Reform, Corruption, and Identity.**

*United States Institute of Peace, Washington, D.C. Nancy Lubin. February 1995. 32pp.*

The new Central Asian states—once obscure outposts of the FSU—are becoming a significant focus of U.S. foreign policy. Central Asia's enormous resource base—including the largest gold mine in the world, enormous reserves of other nonferrous metals and cotton, and some of the world's largest resources of oil and gas—has, since the collapse of the Soviet empire, made the region increasingly attractive to foreign investors. Uzbekistan alone is the eighth largest gold producer and the fourth largest cotton producer in the world. Turkmenistan is the world's third largest producer of natural gas. Some believe that the rich oil and gas resources of Kazakhstan will make that country another Kuwait. Central Asia has also become more important to our political, strategic, and humanitarian interests because of a range of features and factors. These include a population of over 50 million, mostly Muslim; a huge territory the size of Eastern and Western Europe combined (Kazakhstan alone is the ninth largest country in the world) and bordering on the volatile Middle East; extreme poverty and devastating environmental problems; several authoritarian governments; frequent human rights abuses; a great deal of regional strife; and a vast arsenal of nuclear weapons. It is likely that events in Central Asia will reverberate far beyond the republics' borders. For all these reasons, it is in the West's interest to encourage the development of stable, democratic systems and market economies in these new countries and to minimize the social, ethnic, religious, and other sources of conflict that could destabilize the region further. But increasingly, effectiveness in these efforts will depend as much on the views of the Central Asian populace as on policies promulgated by their leaders. As a small step toward understanding some of these popular views, this author, under the auspices of the United States Institute of Peace and working with the Expert Center in Uzbekistan, conducted a public opinion survey in June and July 1993 among 2,067 respondents in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan—countries that together comprise almost three-quarters of Central Asia's population and about 80 percent of its landmass. The survey results suggest that Western foreign policy toward Central Asia must be structured to take account of a population whose support for reform may be more complex and ambivalent than perhaps previously thought; whose support for sometimes authoritarian leaders may be quite strong; whose leaders may have magnified less significant threats, such as Islamic fundamentalism, to obscure more pressing problems; and in whose countries organized crime and corruption

have become major obstacles to reform. Western assistance efforts must be sensitive not only to the hardships, lack of social safety nets, and cultural values and traditions, but also to the uniquely contorted mixture of Soviet and Middle Eastern political and economic systems in these new countries, which may be quite different from other parts of the world. Finally, democratization and reform cannot be viewed primarily as policies to be implemented from the top down. Instead, reforms will emerge not only as a result of new laws or regulations, but also from the oversight and accountability that come only with a greater sense of empowerment from below. A shift to a healthy market can occur only when there is a sense that it will contribute to the greater well being of the population and not just to the corrupt government and the organized criminal world. How the population of Central Asia thinks and feels about these issues will become an increasingly important factor as we refine our policies for the region.

0094

**Energy, Economics, and Security in Central Asia: Russia and Its Rivals.**

*Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Stephen J. Blank. May 10, 1995. 56pp.*

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 led to the creation of five new states in Central Asia. These states—Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan—have become both objects of international rivalries in Central Asia and sources of new political forces as they act to enlarge their independence in world politics. This monograph attempts to trace the importance of the new forces unleashed by the advent of these states by focusing on the struggle around energy and security issues involving them. These issues will have significant impact upon the security of the Middle East; the CIS, especially Russia; South Asia; and even China. Already the impact of these new states is being felt in international politics in these regions.

0150

**After Empire: The Emerging Geopolitics of Central Asia.**

*Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Washington, D.C. Jed C. Snyder (Editor). October 1, 1995. 253pp.*

When the Soviet Union collapsed, fifteen sovereign states suddenly appeared on the geopolitical landscape. None were less prepared for independence than the five republics of Central Asia. The peoples of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan had existed for seven decades in a semifederal state of suspension. The region, so dependent upon Soviet largesse that its rich cultural heritage was nearly smothered, had been the object of imperial competition for centuries—Soviet domination being merely the latest. The Institute for National Strategic Studies is engaged in a multiyear project to examine the evolution of the new states comprising Central Asia and the Trans-Caucasus. This book, which completes the first phase of this project, incorporates research papers and discussions originally presented at a conference of leading scholars from the United States, Russia, Europe, and the Middle East who gathered to examine the region's political, economic, social, and security evolution since 1989. As the papers illustrate, the West's image of Central Asia as a homogeneous belt of Islamic countries with uniform views of the region's future orientation is false. The papers also illustrate that hyperbolic prognoses of an "Islamic implosion" threatening to embroil the region in violent insurrections, possibly spreading throughout the FSU and the Middle East, are false as well. They have simply not materialized. Islam, in fact, has yet to emerge as a potent political force in Central Asia. This region is now lifting itself from economic obscurity and political isolation. Although distinct national identities are only in formative stages today, each of the five Central Asian states is likely to move in

an individual direction, motivated by distinct national interests. The key issue is the extent of Russia's influence in Central Asia and its long-term implications for the region's security.

**1996**

0403

**The New Great Game in Muslim Central Asia.**

*Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Washington, D.C. M. E. Ahrari. January 1996. 95pp.*

This report offers information on the new "great game" in Central Asia. The first section of this study offers an overview of the domestic problems of the Central Asian republics, such as acute economic underdevelopment, absence of economic and industrial communication and transportation infrastructures, and ecological problems that need urgent remedies. The argument here is that not only is the resolution of these problems at the core of the Central Asian states' diplomatic activities, but that the potential resolution of these problems will also determine the future of peace and stability in that region. The prospects for political pluralism and democracy and the role of Islam are issues requiring a closer examination of these republics. A potential incorporation of democracy by most, if not all, of these states might enable them to shun political extremism of all shades. In this context, they also must try to involve Islamic parties in the ever-escalating pace of political activities in their domestic arena and not to curb the activities of these parties, or even try to ban them by using the excuse of "Islamic fundamentalism." The issue of nuclear weapons involving Ukraine and Kazakhstan is also analyzed. The second section covers the modalities of the new great game, focusing on the activities of Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and the United States and analyzing three important observations: (1) Although the diplomatic and political maneuverings of these states are aimed at promoting their respective strategic agendas in Muslim Central Asia, it is the political preferences and priorities of the newly independent republics that are going to play a crucial role in assigning priorities to any of these actors. (2) While the competitive interactions of the three regional actors—Iran, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia—serve as an important wrinkle of the new great game, one should be careful about assigning undue importance to these interactions. In the final analysis, the future significance of these interactions is most likely to be determined by the Central Asian republics themselves. (3) The resurgence of overly assertive, if not aggressive, tendencies in Russia's foreign policy is a development likely to intensify the level of turbulence in an already troubled region. As the sole remaining superpower, the United States cannot long afford to concede a free hand to Moscow in the name of bringing about stability in Central Asia.

0498

**Central Asia: A New Great Game?**

*Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Diane L. Smith. June 17, 1996. 56pp.*

In January 1996, the U.S. Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) and the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) hosted a conference on "Asian Security to the Year 2000." One focus of the conference was the growing relevance of events in Central Asia. Perhaps nowhere on the continent was the cold war transformation in the security environment more dramatic than in Central Asia. There the sudden retraction of Soviet power and decline in superpower competition was rapidly followed by the creation of new states, whose prospects for legitimacy, development, and independent survival were, at best, uncertain. The half decade that has followed the dissolution of the Soviet Union has not been sufficient time for any of the vast challenges facing Central Asia to have been addressed definitively. Nor can we be confident that a stable regional

“system” has coalesced. Yet, the past five years have produced an emerging pattern of relations amenable to tentative analysis. That is the task Lieutenant Colonel Diane Smith of SSI undertook for the Asian security conference. In this monograph, she details the complex problems facing the region and then turns her attention to Central Asia’s evolving security structure. By involving the “great game” analogy, she takes the perspective that, for this part of the continent, it is the nations surrounding the region that will play the primary role in shaping its future (although the new Central Asian nations are participants, not pawns, in this struggle for influence). Smith’s analysis focuses on the interests and actions of five of those surrounding nations: Iran, Pakistan, India, Russia, and China; each has thus far tempered, to some degree, its actions to advance those interests in recognition of the competing interests of the others. For the United States, a power vacuum in Central Asia seems a remote concern at first blush. Smith’s review makes clear, however, that the paramount American stake lies in helping to ensure that Central Asia does not become a “game gone bad” that draws the great Asian powers into conflict. Her survey concludes with policy recommendations toward that end.

**1997**

0554

**Challenges and Options in the Caucasus and Central Asia.**

*Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Pavel K. Baev. April 1997. 29pp.*

In April 1997, the U.S. Army War College held its Eighth Annual Strategy Conference. This year’s topic was “Russia’s Future as a World Power.” The author of this monograph, Dr. Pavel Baev, a senior researcher at the International Peace Research Center in Oslo, Norway, discusses the disintegration of order along Russia’s southern border. Following a brief overview of the evolution of Russian policies in the Caucasus and Central Asia in the immediate post-Soviet period, Baev evaluates the impact of the Chechen war and then analyzes the growing role that petroleum plays in the political equation. Baev concludes that the growth of nationalism among the states in the Caucasus and Central Asia has combined with the decline in capability of the Russian army to encourage many of the states to seek greater autonomy from Russian influence. While Russia is in strategic retreat, the political forces acting upon President Boris Yeltsin are so intense as to increase the possibility that hasty and unwise decisions may be forthcoming. Turbulence in the so-called “near abroad” and political weakness at home plagued Russia at the turn of the century, forcing Tsar Nicholas II to turn to his more conservative and autocratic advisers for advice and policy. A fledgling move toward democratization was weakened even before Russia found itself embroiled in World War I. As this century turns, the course of Russian democracy again hinges, to a degree, on events on Russia’s periphery. This makes Baev’s analysis that much more germane to those concerned with Russia’s future.

## Estonia

**1993**

0583

**Implementation of the Helsinki Accords: Human Rights and Democratization in Estonia.**

*Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Washington, D.C. NA. September 1993. 29pp.*

The last major Helsinki commission report on human rights in Estonia (*Renewal and Challenge: the Baltic States, 1988–89*, covering all three Baltic states) was published in January 1990. Even at that time, it was noted that “virtually anything can be stated publicly in Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia.” It had been a year and a half since the last Estonian political detainee had been released. Today, two of

Estonia's most prominent political prisoners of the cold war era sit in parliament. The press is free to the point, some claim, of irresponsibility. Most of the former Communist Party nomenklatura has been swept from positions of power, although charges of KGB collaboration by this or that political figure are still leveled occasionally by opponents. In place of Communist-era distrust and persecution of religion, a law has been passed by parliament that gives preferential status to "traditional" Estonian denominations. Briefer, more recent commission reports have specifically addressed the issue of the Russian minority in Estonia. The first report was a section of a broader commission examination of ethnic minorities in CSCE states (September 1991). The second report was based on a September 1992 commission staff visit to monitor the elections to the riigikogu (parliament). During that trip, staff also conducted interviews with various representatives of the Russian community who were disenfranchised as a result of not being granted citizenship. This second report concluded that despite their discontent over being denied suffrage, most Russians were clearly more concerned about economic issues such as unemployment and rising prices. There was, nevertheless, a link between the Russians' noncitizen status and their economic anxieties, *i.e.*, that their status might adversely affect their employment opportunities, pensions, participation in privatization, and so forth. The report also recommended that parliament deal with the "Russian question" by ameliorating, if not removing, the sources of anxiety for Russians: by clarifying procedures for obtaining citizenship and guaranteeing both political and economic opportunities for noncitizens. The Estonian government has indeed simplified naturalization procedures for many potential applicants and clarified statutes in various areas of civil rights and economic opportunities. The problem as far as many Russians are concerned, however, is that the clarifications have not moved in the direction they had hoped. In the words of one representative of the Russian community to a visiting American official: "Are our human rights violated? Do we feel comfortable here? The answers to both questions are No." This report on Estonian implementation of CSCE human dimension commitments will first review the substantial progress that Estonia has made in protecting human rights and building democratic institutions and then focus on the status of Estonia's Russian population and their human rights concerns.

## Kazakhstan

**1994**

0612

### **Housing Allowances in Kazakhstan: Program Design and Implementation Strategies.**

*International City/County Management Association, NA. Barbara J. Lipman and Antony A. Phipps. September 1994. 56pp.*

This report was prepared in response to a request from the Ministry of Construction, Housing and Territorial Development of the Republic of Kazakhstan to assist the government in preparing a preliminary plan for implementing a national program of housing allowances. Like other NIS countries, Kazakhstan must manage the difficult transition from a command economy to a market economy in a short period of time. In order to sustain the transition program, the government is committed to a course of widespread housing privatization, gradual decentralization of construction and management of the housing stock, and steady reduction of subsidies to the housing sector. Currently, in Kazakhstan, it is estimated that between 60 and 85 percent of the housing stock (apartments and single-family homes) already is privatized. Local governments, however, remain responsible for providing housing management, maintenance, and utility services to the large majority of the housing stock, including the privatized portion. The fees collected from residents for these services amount to only 2 tenge per

square meter or approximately 20 percent of the actual cost of 11 tenge per square meter. Estimates for the municipality of Kapchagi, for instance, indicate that monthly subsidies for housing amount to more than 6 million tenge per month, or an average of 430 tenge per month for every housing unit. Despite these enormous subsidies, many low-income households cannot afford their current housing costs and will be unable to afford higher fees without some governmental assistance. By presidential decree, therefore, the government is proposing to implement a national program of targeted housing allowances as a means to protect the welfare and housing opportunities of low-income families, while at the same time allowing local governments to raise property management, maintenance, and utility fees to cover the full cost of providing these services. The Ministry of Construction, Housing and Territorial Development is responsible for the new housing allowances program. Starting in late 1994 or early 1995, the ministry intends to implement two versions of a housing allowance program in the municipalities of Talgar and Kapchagi. Talgar and Kapchagi are considered a good testing ground for two distinct approaches to implementing a housing allowance scheme because they are approximately the same size and are close to Almaty, but their housing stocks differ. Almost two-thirds of the housing units in Talgar are single-family homes, while virtually all the area of Kapchagi being considered for the program consists of multifamily units.

#### 1995

0668

##### **Kazakhstan Defense Enterprise Directory (Second Edition).**

*Bureau of Export Administration, Department of Commerce, Washington, D.C. NA. March 1995. 125pp.*

With the publication of the second edition of this directory, the U.S. Department of Commerce reiterates the U.S. government's commitment to promoting American private investment to encourage defense conversion in Kazakhstan. U.S. government help to bolster private U.S. investment in Kazakhstan is an important element in U.S. policy toward the NIS. It supports President Bill Clinton's vision of the way trade can help nurture peace and prosperity abroad and bring economic vigor to the United States. While official government assistance will be important in supporting the processes of demilitarization, democratization, and economic reform underway in Kazakhstan, private sector investment has far greater potential to facilitate the restructuring of the Kazakhstani economy and to raise living standards. At this time American business has the chance to enter sections of the Kazakhstani market never before open to foreign firms, including where defense conversion is occurring. Opportunities exist, but much will depend on the initiative, creativity, and persistence of American business to make the most of them. The benefits from investment flow both ways, by supporting American jobs and profits as well as helping to maintain U.S. competitiveness. The Department of Commerce is publishing this directory to help U.S. businesses as they investigate the investment possibilities connected with Kazakhstani defense conversion. It is hoped that the information contained here will lead to productive and successful new business relationships between enterprises in both countries.

#### 1997

0793

##### **Country Commercial Guide: Kazakhstan, Fiscal Year 1997 (Revision 1).**

*U.S. Embassy, Almaty, Kazakhstan. NA. 1997. 56pp.*

This CCG presents a comprehensive look at Kazakhstan's commercial environment, using economic, political, and market analysis. The CCGs were established by recommendation of the TPCC, a multiagency task force, to consolidate various reporting documents prepared for the U.S. business community. CCGs are prepared annually at U.S. embassies through the

combined efforts of several U.S. government agencies. Kazakhstan has made impressive strides toward a market-based economy, particularly at the macroeconomic level, since independence in 1991. The rate of inflation has slowed to less than 30 percent per year, the national currency is convertible with the U.S. dollar, and, after a five-year slide, overall production is now increasing in the country. Massive interenterprise arrears are slowing Kazakhstan's economic recovery, however. President Nursultan Nazarbayev's term of office was extended in 1995 by referendum to the year 2000, ensuring a relatively stable political environment. A new constitution, adopted in August 1995, concentrates power in the presidency. The government of Kazakhstan has shown commitment to economic reform, although an inefficient bureaucracy and corruption can pose obstacles to foreign investment. The United States and Kazakhstan have maintained close relations since Kazakhstan's independence in 1991. Kazakhstan is a major recipient of U.S. assistance, most of which has been for nuclear disarmament and defense conversion. Kazakhstan has also received more than \$220 million, committed since 1993, toward economic reform, democracy-building, health care, and the environment. In addition, the Central Asian-American Enterprise Fund provides credit to local entrepreneurs, including those working with potential foreign investors. Kazakhstan has applied for WTO membership and was granted observer status in February 1996. Joining the WTO will help integrate Kazakhstan into the world economy and will provide benefits to foreign investors, including a stable trade policy and adherence to the WTO's trade-related measures. U.S. companies have been active in Kazakhstan since 1991, particularly in the oil and gas, business services, electric energy, and mining sectors. U.S. exports to Kazakhstan totaled \$72 million in 1995, down from \$109 million in 1994. U.S. exports in the first ten months of 1996 totaled only \$49 million. The United States ranks behind Russia, China, Germany, and Turkey in total exports to Kazakhstan. Kazakhstani customers are very open to Western products, although they have limited buying power. The average monthly wage in Kazakhstan was \$105 in January 1997. Kazakhstan encourages joint venture arrangements, particularly with many of its own industries idled by the economic downturn. A foreign partner should expect to supply high-tech equipment and financing for the venture. A shortage of funds has made it difficult, at times, for the Kazakhstani government to pay outsiders for products or services. Government procurement and the tendering process for privatization are not always fully transparent. Kazakhstan has increased import tariffs on a number of Western products since forming a customs union with Russia and Belarus (the Kyrgyz Republic has not ratified the customs union) in January 1995. These import tariffs will need to be reduced in connection with the accession of the customs union countries to the WTO. Kazakhstan's customs system is often an obstacle to doing business, particularly because customs duties are not leveled in an orderly, consistent manner. USAID and U.S. Customs are providing training, exchanges, and technology transfers to improve Kazakhstani customs. Other nontariff barriers include a weak system of commercial law, inadequate local financing to service loans, and inconsistent and arbitrary implementation of laws. This report contains chapters on economic trends and outlook; political environment; marketing U.S. products and services; leading sectors for U.S. exports and investment; trade regulations and standards; investment climate; trade and project financing; and business travel. The report also includes appendices containing country data, trade and investment statistics, and country contacts.

## Latvia

1993

0849

### **Implementation of the Helsinki Accords: Human Rights and Democratization in Latvia.**

*Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Washington, D.C. NA. September 1993. 36pp.*

Among the most contentious “nationality problems” to emerge from the dissolution of the USSR has been that of the “Russians” in the Baltic states. While analysts in the former USSR and the West have written much about the “25 million Russians stranded” outside Russia, the issue has had a special resonance in Latvia and Estonia. They alone among the Baltic states and the former Soviet republics have not granted citizenship to all residents. Their failure to do so, by making problematic the legal status of the Russian-speaking community, has lent a particular edge to controversies these countries share with most of the former Soviet republics—and many republics inside Russia—over language laws and Russian accusations of anti-Russian chauvinism. As will be seen in this report, Latvia and Estonia have their reasons for not offering the option of automatic citizenship to the Russian-speaking community. But whether citizenship is a “human right” has now become an issue for the CSCE and international human rights organizations, which have studied the troubled situation in the Baltic states. For this reason, reports on CSCE implementation in Latvia and Estonia concentrate on citizenship and minority issues, as opposed to CSCE “Basket Three” (human dimension) issues. In all of these latter “traditional” respects, Latvia is a functioning democracy, with a multiparty system and freedom of the press, expression, assembly, religion, and movement. This report is the Helsinki Commission examination of CSCE implementation in Latvia since 1989, when *Renewal and Challenge: The Baltic States, 1988–1989* (January 1990) described developments in the region that made the most of Mikhail Gorbachev’s glasnost and perestroika. At that time, freedom of expression and assembly were already highly developed. Moscow’s weakening grip on the Baltic states and related breakdown of the Latvian Communist Party’s monopoly of the political agenda, as well as the dissipation of fear among an increasingly politicized populace, permitted long-festered grievances to surface. The political forms they took in the late 1980s are still being played out today, some two years after the restoration of Latvian independence, and may well influence politics in Latvia for the foreseeable future. It should be pointed out here that “Russians” and “Russian-speakers” are not interchangeable, even though there has been much confusion in the Western media about these terms and the communities they purport to identify. In brief, all Russians are Russian-speakers, but not all Russian-speakers are Russian. More demographic and sociological information about this community is provided in this report.

1995

0885

### **Country Commercial Guide: Latvia, Fiscal Year 1996.**

*U.S. Embassy, Riga, Latvia. NA. 1995. 31pp.*

This CCG presents a comprehensive look at Latvia’s commercial environment, using economic, political, and market analysis. The CCGs were established by recommendation of the TPCC, a multiagency task force, to consolidate various reporting documents prepared for the U.S. business community. CCGs are prepared annually at U.S. embassies through the combined efforts of several U.S. government agencies. Since achieving independence in 1991, Latvia has made striking progress toward restoring a market economy and completing reforms to help it recapture the prosperity of the pre–World War II years. With a population of 2.5 million, Latvia is a relatively small, but potentially attractive, market for

American computers and office equipment, building products, capital machinery and equipment, and consumer products. One of the country's strongest business attractions is its capital, Riga, which has emerged as a commercial, financial, and transportation hub for the Russia/Baltic region. Latvia is the central of the three Baltic states; just over a third of its population is concentrated in Riga, the largest city in the Baltics. The commercial environment is very friendly to American companies, a fact underscored by President Clinton's signing of a bilateral agreement on trade relations and intellectual property rights protection during his July 1994 visit to Riga. The United States and Latvia also signed a bilateral investment treaty in January 1995. The country has no controls on import, export, or use and conversion of foreign currencies, making investment and repatriation of profits exceptionally easy. The Latvian government has adopted modern laws establishing copyrights, patents, and trademarks. The mechanism for enforcing intellectual property rights protection is under development. Telecommunications are being rapidly modernized under a commercial agreement between Lattelekom, the Latvian telecommunications company, and a consortium of British and Finnish companies. Office space is both relatively easy to find and inexpensive—six to thirty-five dollars per square meter. English is the West European language of choice in government and business. In considering the long-term prospects for the Latvian market, Americans should bear in mind that, having reached freedom after fifty years of occupation, Latvia is a recovering country, not a developing country. Many Latvians have education, values, and aspirations similar to those of middle class inhabitants in Northern and Western Europe. While these Latvians do not have the income to match their aspirations, there is every reason to believe that they are working hard to attain it. We can expect continued steady progress in rebuilding their shattered economy. American products face strong competition in the Latvian market from Western and Northern European competitors. Latvia has free trade agreements with the European Union, Norway, and Switzerland. In April 1994, a trilateral free trade agreement between the three Baltic countries went into effect, abolishing all tariffs on industrial products. The Baltic states have reached an agreement to establish a customs union by 1998. Bolstered by historical trade relations between Latvia and their countries, companies from Sweden, Germany, and Finland approach the Latvian market with great confidence. American companies have the advantage that the United States hosts the largest Latvian émigré community in the world. Hundreds of Latvian Americans have returned to Latvia to assume leading roles in government and business; their activities have created strong bonds between the United States and Latvia for the first time in the two countries' histories. As in other countries to emerge from the old Soviet Bloc, government bureaucracy, corruption, and organized crime are the most significant hurdles to U.S. trade and investment in Latvia. While these obstacles make it more complex to do business in Latvia than in the West, very few of the U.S. companies that have tested the Latvian market have found the problems insurmountable. In part, this is because foreign companies enjoy relatively easy access to senior government officials in this small country. Most U.S. companies doing business in Latvia rate the business environment as among the best to be found in Eastern Europe or the FSU. Because the courts and legal system are not yet functioning as they would in the industrialized West and Latvian regulatory and tax structures are still at the formative stage, however, there are fairly high levels of uncertainty associated with doing business in Latvia. U.S. companies operating successfully in Latvia accept the higher risk as part of the price of getting in on the ground floor in the expanding East European and Russian markets. This report contains chapters on economic trends and outlook; political environment; marketing U.S. products and services; leading sectors for U.S. exports and investment; trade

regulations and standards; investment climate; trade and project financing; and business travel. The report also includes appendices containing country data, trade and investment statistics, and country contacts.

## Reel 7

### Lithuania

1997

0001

**Country Commercial Guide: Lithuania, Fiscal Year 1998.**

*U.S. Embassy, Vilnius, Lithuania. NA. 1997. 22pp.*

This CCG presents a comprehensive look at Lithuania's commercial environment, using economic, political, and market analysis. The CCGs were established by recommendation of the TPCC, a multiagency task force, to consolidate various reporting documents prepared for the U.S. business community. CCGs are prepared annually at U.S. embassies through the combined efforts of several U.S. government agencies. With a population of 3.8 million, Lithuania is a relatively small, but potentially attractive market for American computers and office equipment, consumer products, pharmaceuticals, capital equipment and machinery, [and] environmental and electric power generation technologies. Most businesses have been privatized during the first round of privatization and private persons both local and foreign are allowed to own land. It is believed that the second round of privatization, in which \$725 million in state property will be sold for cash, is one of the potential major attractions for foreign investment this year. In the beginning of 1997 the Lithuanian government removed the Lithuanian state telephone monopoly from the list of state enterprises not to be privatized. Two hundred companies will be up for sale, and for the first time, some of those will be in the energy and telecommunications sector. Industry is Lithuania's largest economic sector and large industries account for the bulk of Lithuania's capital investment. Lithuania is seeking to further liberalize its foreign investment laws to assist in attracting foreign investment. The Lithuanian government is following a cautious but Western-oriented program of economic reform in banking and monetary policy, price structure, tax laws, land ownership laws, fiscal policy, and foreign trade legislation. It has also adopted modern laws establishing copyrights, patents, and trademarks. Lithuania has signed free trade agreements with twenty countries. In April 1994, a trilateral trade agreement among the three Baltic countries went into effect, abolishing all tariffs on industrial products. Also the Baltic states have reached an agreement to establish a customs union by 1998. Having regained independence after fifty years of occupation, Lithuania considers itself a recovering country, not a developing country. Many Lithuanians have education, values, and aspirations similar to those of middle class inhabitants of Western Europe, and they have worked hard to rebuild their shattered economy. As in other countries of the FSU, government bureaucracy, corruption, and organized crime are the most significant hurdles to U.S. trade and investment in Lithuania. Very few U.S. companies doing business in Lithuania have found these problems insurmountable, however. This is partly because foreign companies enjoy relatively easy access to senior government officials in the country. Most U.S. businesses in Lithuania rate the business environment as among the best to be found in the countries of the FSU. This report contains chapters on economic trends and outlook; political environment; marketing U.S. products and services; leading sectors for U.S. exports and investment; trade regulations and standards; investment climate; trade and project financing; and business travel. The report also includes appendices containing country data, trade and investment statistics, and country contacts.

## Russia

- 0023 **1993**  
**Russian-Soviet Unconventional Wars in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Afghanistan.**  
*U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Robert F. Baumann. April 1993. 217pp.*  
 The Soviet Union's agonizing decade-long struggle against a fiercely determined mujahideen resistance in Afghanistan offers a compelling illustration of the perils that can await a modern power that commits conventional forces against an unconventional foe in an undeveloped theater. That the Soviets embarked on such a rash course in 1979 is especially striking in light of the American experience in Vietnam just a few years earlier and Russia's long historical involvement in fighting Muslim tribesmen in the Caucasus and Central Asia. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, imperial Russia attempted to impose its authority on the Caucasus only to become embroiled in a protracted and brutal war against the mountain tribes of Dagestan. A charismatic leader, Shamil, emerged to harness the power of a formidable resistance that nearly foiled the Russian plan of conquest, which was fulfilled only after decades of destructive and costly campaigning. Following the collapse of opposition in Dagestan in 1859, the Russians concentrated on the conquest of Central Asia as far as the Afghan and Persian frontiers. Here, vast steppes and deserts—formidable obstacles standing between Russia and the remote khanates—eventually yielded to the determination and methodical preparation of key Russian commanders. Established by a series of major campaigns from the 1850s to the 1880s, Russian rule in Central Asia remained stable until the Bolshevik Revolution of October 1917. With the collapse of imperial power, however, the empire dissolved. Efforts to impose Soviet rule over the former imperial possessions in Central Asia sparked popular resistance among the Muslim tribes and required massive intervention by the Red Army.
- 0240 **1994**  
**Soviet Air Power in the New Russian Mirror.**  
*RAND Corporation, NA. Benjamin S. Lambeth. 1994. 28pp.*  
 This report provides an overview of the capabilities and limitations of the Soviet air force, the Voenno-vozdushniyesily (VVS), since World War II. The report argues that the VVS is in a state of major disrepair, is no longer a serious threat to the United States, and faces major problems in its efforts to upgrade and maintain operational capability. With the collapse of the Communist system, however, the VVS has been presented with an unprecedented opportunity for change and reform based on the model provided by the allied air forces in the Persian Gulf War of 1991. The VVS will still be faced with major budget cuts, however, and its future remains uncertain at best.
- 0268 **Russian–United States Guide for Tactics, Techniques and Procedures of Peacekeeping Forces During the Conduct of Exercises.**  
*NA, NA. NA. 1994. 197pp.*  
 During the course of the 1990s, the United States and Russia have been moving steadily toward closer, more cooperative bilateral relations. This important, positive development was punctuated in April 1993 at the Vancouver Summit when President Clinton and President Yeltsin declared their intention to form a “strategic partnership” between the United States and Russia. This unprecedented declaration clearly marks the commitment of these two great powers to move from competition to cooperation in the international arena. Following the lead of the two presidents, the DOD and the Russian Ministry of

Defense have taken significant steps to develop the defense and military aspects of the U.S.–Russian strategic partnership. In May 1993, delegations from the Russian General Staff and U.S. Joint Staff met in Washington, D.C., for the first ever U.S.–Russian Joint Staff talks. In September 1993, Russian Minister of Defense Pavel Grachev and U.S. Secretary of Defense Les Aspin signed a “Memorandum of Understanding and Cooperation in Defense and Military Relations,” a document that commits both sides to expand contacts and cooperative activities between their armed forces. Perhaps the most visible and important example of cooperation in defense and military relations is the development of a U.S.–Russian initiative in the area of combined peacekeeping training, an initiative first mentioned publicly at the Vancouver Summit. This initiative is particularly important for four reasons: it demonstrates recognition by the United States and Russia of the significance of peacekeeping operations for the maintenance of peace in today’s world; it provides an opportunity for the armed forces of the United States and Russia to obtain some practical experience in interoperability in peacekeeping; it represents an unprecedented level of cooperation for the armed forces of the United States and Russia; and it provides an example of the kinds of mutually beneficial cooperative activities that are now possible in a Europe that is no longer divided along bloc lines. This U.S.–Russian initiative will culminate in a small-scale combined peacekeeping training exercise, to be conducted by elements of the Russian 27th Motorized Rifle Division and the U.S. Third Infantry Division in July 1994 in Totskoye, Russia. In addition, both sides have agreed to carry out a second small-scale training exercise at a time and place to be announced later. The successful completion of these training exercises will undoubtedly lay the basis for additional advances in U.S.–Russian military cooperation in the future. This report lays out the guidelines for these joint exercises.

- 0465      **Media Developments: Russia and Ukraine Number 6.**  
*Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Washington, D.C. NA. May 25, 1994.*  
*33pp.*  
This report is aimed at reporting and analyzing changes to and events affecting the Russian and Ukrainian media and is compiled exclusively from material carried in foreign broadcast and press media.
- 0498      **Media Developments: Special Issue on Russian Military’s Expanding Media Influence.**  
*Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Washington, D.C. NA. June 22, 1994.*  
*17pp.*  
Faced with continuing budget cuts and low morale, the Russian military has turned to the electronic media in an effort to build greater public support for the armed forces and military spending. Apparently convinced that electronic media are more effective means for influencing public opinion than traditional print media, the Ministry of Defense has expanded its television and radio production capabilities while substantially reducing the number of ministry-sponsored newspapers, magazines, and journals. As a result, radio and television programming written and produced at the Ministry of Defense has begun to appear regularly on the national radio and television networks. While it is too soon to tell if the effort is having the desired effect, defense ministry programming, which often plays to Russians’ sense of injured national pride, could end up strengthening Russian nationalism.

- 0515      **Rough Road to Markets in Russia and Eurasia.**  
*Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, D.C. NA. July 15, 1994. 26pp.*  
Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991, the fifteen successor states have traversed a variety of political and economic paths as they proceed toward market-oriented economies—which all of the new countries proclaim as their long-term goal. It has not been easy anywhere, but it has become clear that more rapid economic reforms are beginning to yield payoffs that slower approaches have not achieved. This is illustrated clearly by events in the two largest countries. Whereas Russia's reforms have begun to improve responsiveness to consumer needs, Ukraine's efforts to retain more vestiges of the old system have failed to prevent a severe economic decline. This paper focuses primarily on Russia, which continues to influence developments throughout the region because of its size, power, and wide-ranging ties with the other Eurasian states. The progress of Russian economic reforms to date is reviewed first, followed by a survey of economic performance and a brief discussion of the short-term outlook. Finally, the status of economic reforms in the other countries is summarized.
- 0541      **Space Station: Update on the Impact of the Expanded Russian Role.**  
*General Accounting Office, Office of the Comptroller General, Washington, D.C. NA. July 1994. 18pp.*  
In response to a request by Senator William Cohen, the ranking minority member of the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, Committee on Governmental Affairs, the GAO examined the impact of Russian participation in the NASA space station program. On June 21, 1994, the GAO provided an interim report on whether expanded Russian participation will (1) reduce space station funding requirements by \$2 billion, as estimated by NASA, and (2) improve the station's capabilities for conducting research. As requested, the GAO updated the information in their June 1994 report on the funding impacts of Russian participation.
- 0559      **Media Developments: Russia and Ukraine Number 7.**  
*Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Washington, D.C. NA. August 8, 1994. 34pp.*  
This report is aimed at reporting and analyzing changes to and events affecting the Russian and Ukrainian media and is compiled exclusively from material carried in foreign broadcast and press media.
- 0593      **Russian Policy and the Korean Crisis.**  
*Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Stephen J. Blank. September 30, 1994. 35pp.*  
North Korea's nuclear program is the greatest current threat to U.S. and Northeast Asian security. The outcome of negotiations over this program will have a tremendous impact on the future of the Korean peninsula and on the vital interests of the United States and of Korea's neighbors: China, Japan, and Russia. Bearing this in mind, CSIS convened a conference on June 28–29, 1994, to consider the crisis surrounding North Korea's nuclear program in its international context. Experts spoke about the program and its impact on the two Koreas and on the neighboring states. Professor Stephen Blank presented this paper on Russian policy with regard to Korea. Blank relates Moscow's position on the issues of North Korean nuclearization to the broader domestic debate in Russia over security policy, in general, and Asian policy, in particular. He contends that Russia's policy is a function of that broader debate and must be

understood in that context. The SSI is publishing the paper as a contribution to the understanding of the current Korean crisis and of Russian security policy, particularly in Asia, but also in the context of its overall formulation.

0628

**Mars Together and Fire & Ice: Report of the Joint U.S./Russian Technical Working Groups.**

*Joint U.S./Russian Technical Working Groups, NA. NA. October 1994. 114pp.*

The United States and the FSU have independently engaged in planetary exploration since the dawn of the space age. Both have flown many missions to the Moon, Mars, and Venus, and both continue to hold planetary science among the highest priorities within their space programs. Some cooperation in planetary exploration between the United States and the FSU has been in place for many years. Although scientific data has been exchanged, and scientists from each side routinely have contributed to each other's projects, most of these interactions have been at a distance. Until recently, no truly joint undertaking, where each side was a full co-equal with the other, was possible in the climate that prevailed. The end of the cold war opened up an exciting opportunity. Instead of independently pursuing a common goal, the mutual benefit of the United States and Russia joining forces became obvious. Two phenomena prompted this joint venture. The change in the political climate allowed contacts and exchanges that had been prohibited for decades, and funding constraints on both sides prompted each to look at new ways of undertaking exploration at less cost. It was against this background that a delegation of U.S. space planners led by Dr. Wes Huntress, associate administrator for space science at NASA, set off for Russia in the spring of 1994 to discuss possible joint missions to explore the solar system. This report is the result of those discussions and of plans for joint U.S.–Russian missions to Mars and Pluto, a solar probe, and a study of and recommendations regarding launch vehicles.

0742

**Russia's New Security Services: An Assessment.**

*Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. NA. October 31, 1994. 77pp.*

The purpose of this study is to examine the evolution of the Russian security services since the KGB was disbanded in 1991 and to assess the extent of their influence on domestic and foreign policy. The study describes and analyzes the changes that have occurred in the security services under Yeltsin. It discusses the different agencies that have been created to replace the KGB, as well as the laws that have been passed to govern these agencies. Particular attention is devoted to how Yeltsin has used the security services as a means to fight his political opponents and to further Russian policies towards the so-called near abroad. The conclusions are based on a detailed study of the Russian media, as well as on interviews and Western analyses.

0819

**Russian and Ukrainian Views on NATO Expansion.**

*Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Washington, D.C. NA. November 14, 1994. 14pp.*

Russian government officials, legislators, and politicians have almost uniformly voiced opposition to any expansion of NATO that would exclude Russia and leave NATO's mission essentially unchanged. Many call for a new European security system based on CSCE in which a transformed NATO would play a subordinate role and view NATO's Partnership for Peace as a stopgap measure in which Russia can participate until this new structure is created. Anti-Western opposition spokesmen predictably have condemned not only NATO expansion but also NATO's very existence and any form of Russian cooperation with it. More

reformist figures have expressed fear that the inclusion of Central-Eastern European countries would isolate Russia and strengthen the hand of Russian antidemocratic forces. At least some reform-minded figures, including President Yeltsin, have not ruled out Russia itself eventually becoming a member of NATO. Although most Western-oriented foreign affairs specialists appear dubious about NATO expansion, a debate is starting to emerge in which some specialists contend that Russia has no power to prevent NATO expansion and will only alienate itself from Europe by trying. They call instead for the government to do more to reduce fear in Central-Eastern Europe of Russian imperialism and to build strong bilateral ties to NATO. Since Leonid Kuchma's election as president, Ukrainian government and parliamentary leaders have made few direct comments on the topic of NATO expansion, other than to rule out Ukrainian membership. Ukraine's earlier eagerness to integrate into Western structures under former President Kravchuk is being tempered by Kuchma's emphasis on pursuing a foreign policy that is "balanced" between East (the FSU) and West. Ukraine has not opposed NATO expansion into Central-Eastern Europe, but there are signs of concern in the new government that such an expansion would cause Ukraine to be viewed as a buffer state between Russia and the West. While the government appears committed to expanded cooperation with NATO through the Partnership for Peace, leftist parliamentary leader Moroz has voiced skepticism toward the value of such cooperation, while nationalist leaders have portrayed Partnership for Peace as a sop to Russia.

0833

**Media Developments: Russia and Ukraine Number 8.**

*Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Washington, D.C. NA. November 23, 1994. 34pp.*

This report is aimed at reporting and analyzing changes to and events affecting the Russian and Ukrainian media and is compiled exclusively from material carried in foreign broadcast and press media.

0867

**The Far Eastern Border: An Aspect of Russo-Chinese Relations.**

*Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. Jeffrey L. Scribner Jr. and George L. Blasco. December 1994. 107pp.*

Both China and the Russian Federation still claim rightful ownership of numerous small riverine islands that make up a portion of their long Far Eastern border. While the majority of the Russo-Chinese border disputes have been laid to rest, the disposition of these islands has prevented the two countries from completely finalizing a border agreement. The objective of this thesis is to concentrate on the historical background of the border dispute, trends in current bilateral border talks, and a potentially dangerous new ingredient that may dampen hopes for a successful new agreement—Chinese influx into the Russian Far East. It is the hypothesis of this thesis that both Russia and China, at the government-to-government level, will strive to maintain the status quo, but that on a local level, continued disagreement and intransigence on both sides will continue and prevent Russo-Chinese relations in the region from being normal and stable.

## Reel 8

### Russia cont.

- 0001      **1994 cont.**  
**Sources of Contemporary Russian Foreign Policy.**  
*Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. David A. Welch. December 1994. 135pp.*  
The purpose of this thesis is to systematically employ two explanatory theories as tools for the study of foreign policy and to test the two theories against one another to determine their relative explanatory power. This thesis investigates Russian Federation foreign policy regarding three contemporary issues—the “near abroad,” the Kurile Islands dispute, and the current Bosnian conflict—by conducting an analysis of Russian policy statements and doctrine in the period from the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the formation of the Russian Federation on January 1, 1992, until August 1994. The analysis is based on hypotheses that seek to explain Russian foreign policy decisions with reference to two theories: the concept of balance of power that emerges from political realism and the more recently developed concept of “strategic culture.”
- 0136      **Yeltsin’s Analysis Staffs: Growing Prominence, Continuing Political Rivalry.**  
*Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Washington, D.C. NA. December 5, 1994. 13pp.*  
The recent appointment of prominent new economic officials drawn from President Yeltsin’s personal analytical staffs—Economy Minister Yevgeniy, Finance Minister Vladimir Panskov, and presidential economic assistant Aleksandr Livshits—highlights the increasing importance of the analytical groups working directly under the president. The president’s analytical staffs—along with the whole presidential administration—have mushroomed since Sergey Filatov became leader of the administration in early 1993 and have become fields of rivalry between Filatov and Yeltsin’s top personal assistant, Viktor Ilyushin, who has fought for an analytical staff under his own control and independent of Filatov. Filatov lost his monopoly over analysis units in April when Livshits’s “Group of Experts” became independent of Filatov’s administration, and Filatov’s power is currently threatened by a November Yeltsin order to cut the swollen administration to reduce duplication.
- 0149      **Solzhenitsyn Competing for Political Spotlight in Russia, and Offering an Alternative to “Red-Brown” Nationalism.**  
*Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Washington, D.C. NA. December 16, 1994. 22pp.*  
Since returning to Russia in May after a twenty-year exile, Nobel prize-winning author Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn has made a concerted effort to capture the public eye, traveling across the country and appearing frequently in national and local media. He publicized his return with a fifty-five-day journey from Vladivostok to Moscow that featured frequent stops to meet with local officials and address ordinary citizens. In September, one of Russia’s two national television networks broadcast a series of interviews with Solzhenitsyn after its main evening newscasts. He addressed the state дума in October and had a four-hour meeting with President Yeltsin in November. Between his initial arrival in Moscow and his дума speech, Solzhenitsyn made still more forays into the Russian heartland to address citizens and meet with officials. Solzhenitsyn used his tour and media appearances to attempt to sell Russians on his vision for the salvation of the country and its people. Its key elements include rejection of imperialism; peaceful unification of the Slavs; and a unique, Russian path of development.

1995

0171

**The Russian Military's Role in Politics.**

*Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Washington, D.C. James H. Brusstar and Ellen Jones. 1995. 68pp.*

One of the most crucial challenges that democratizing states face is that of redefining civil-military relations and transforming the military into a force loyal to the new democratic system. In order to prevent the military from becoming a threat, democratizing governments must reeducate their military professionals and instill in them a sense of respect for democratic institutions and the multiparty system. The goal is to limit the military's role in politics and develop a tradition of an apolitical army. The problems facing Russia in this regard are multifold. It inherited from the USSR an officer corps for which loyalty to both the Soviet Union and the ruling Communist Party was a prerequisite to professional advancement. Although civilian control over the military was strong, the top political leadership shared with the military elite a high respect for military power and hence accorded military programs and armed forces needs a high priority. The Soviet armed forces were, in effect, the favorite son of the command economy. The military lost its privileged status with the advent of Gorbachev. The old, familiar bureaucratic decision-making process was replaced by semidemocratic institutions far less congenial to military interests. In December 1991, the Soviet Union itself disappeared and, with it, the unified army. These changes led to downsizing and reduced funding for today's Russian military—developments that have traumatized and angered the once-pampered officer corps. This paper is an analysis of how the military has reacted to these events. In it, the authors examine the military's record over the past five years: its words, deeds, and attitudes in response to the political, economic, and social changes that have transformed the region. The authors have chosen to focus on one particular aspect of these transformations—one that has proven to be especially threatening to the military: the disintegrative trend that eventually overtook the Soviet Union, led to the demise of the unified Soviet armed forces, and continues to threaten the integrity of Russia as well. As part of this focus, the authors assess the military's actions during three critical events: the abortive August 1991 coup, the Belovezh agreement formalizing the demise of the USSR, and the fall 1993 political crisis in Moscow.

0239

**Russian Federation: Determinants of Corn Import Demand.**

*Economic Research Service, Department of Agriculture, Washington, D.C. Sharon S. Sheffield and Roger Hoskin. January 1995. 28pp.*

This report provides an overview of the Russian domestic corn sector and the factors that affect corn import demand. Low domestic corn production and increasing demand for feed grains, the result of state policy to increase per capita consumption by expanding inventories, led to high levels of corn imports during the 1970s and 1980s. These imports were financed with hard currency export earnings and, later, through export assistance. Since the breakup of the USSR, most Russian corn imports continue to be centralized through the government and distributed by the state company Roskhleboprodukt. Primary suppliers of corn to Russia (and the FSU) have included the United States, Argentina, China, Canada, Thailand, and Eastern Europe. Since 1988, however, the United States has held 70 to 90 percent of the FSU corn import market share, largely due to available export supplies and, more recently, financial assistance. The most important determinants of import source are export financing and price. Quality characteristics could become more important when processors and livestock

producers begin to make import decisions. Over the long run, Russian corn import demand could decline, given a smaller livestock sector and domestically produced feed substitutes.

0267

**A Basic Guide to the Telecommunications Market of Russia.**

*Office of Telecommunications, International Trade Administration, Department of Commerce, Washington, D.C. Richard H. Paddock, Eric Scheye, and Yuri Malkov. January 1995. 162pp.*

The phenomenal political and economic changes now taking place in the FSU will continue for many years, outpacing the ability of most analysts to keep up with them. Enormous undertakings—the abolishment of the FSU and its conversion from a single command economy into a collection of market economies—will carry on well into the next century. As government authorities in these new republics (sometimes referred to collectively as the NIS) strive to identify and remove obstacles to economic growth and development, poorly developed communications systems loom large. Today, each republic faces the enormous task of building a communications system to serve its future needs, while simultaneously preparing to participate in the global economy. Full participation in the global economy will require the formation of a stable government, the establishment of an adequate legal structure, and the privatization of state-owned enterprises. Obsolete or obsolescent technologies and limited service capabilities in the communications networks of the NIS complicate all of these goals. It will take time to remedy the region's communications dilemma; it is too much to expect that seven decades of neglect can be corrected in just a few years. Policy makers and entrepreneurs in the republics, however, are well aware of the role that modern communications systems play in facilitating future economic development. The urgency of the need will hopefully quicken the pace of reform and development. To accomplish all that must be done, the republics are looking beyond their borders for technology, expertise, and financing. Communications organizations of the NIS are seeking partnerships with foreign companies that understand the potential of the region's market. Despite uncertain conditions, agreements have been, and are being, reached between government organizations and local business enterprises in the republics and foreign telecom equipment suppliers and service providers. Since 1990, new telecom facilities and services of all types have come into existence, and some are thriving. Foreign companies are attracted by the sheer size of the region's telecom market, which the U.K.'s Telecommunications Research Center recently characterized as a potential rival to Western Europe and Asia as the largest in the world by the year 2000. Conducting business in the region will continue to have associated risks, however, and market entry may prove difficult, even as the market expands. Those looking for telecom business opportunities are well advised to proceed with caution and have a long-term plan. The fact remains, however, that the NIS will eventually, inevitably, be one of the largest telecom equipment and services markets in the world.

0429

**Russia's Invasion of Chechnya: A Preliminary Assessment.**

*Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Stephen J. Blank and Earl H. Tilford Jr. January 13, 1995. 28pp.*

On December 11, 1994, Russia invaded the secessionist republic of Chechnya in the North Caucasus. The aim was to suppress the republic's government, led by General Dzhokar Dudayev, compel it to accept Moscow's authority, and force it to renounce its bid for independence and sovereignty. This invasion, which quickly turned into a military quagmire for Russia's troops, triggered a firestorm of domestic opposition, even within the higher levels of the Ministry of Defense. As a

result, the invasion has the most profound and troubling possible consequences for the stability of the Russian government, Russian democracy, and the future political-military relationship. This special report, based on what is already known, attempts to assess the discernible consequences of this invasion and provide a framework within which future developments can be assessed. It is offered as a contribution to debate on this timely issue.

0457

**The Impact of Chechnya on Russia's Foreign Policy: Warnings of Dangers Ahead.**

*Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Washington, D.C. NA. January 25, 1995. 12pp.*

Russia's use of force to suppress Chechen separatists has generated a sharp debate among the foreign policy elite over the impact that Moscow's actions will have on foreign relations. While the Yeltsin administration has attempted to play down the intervention's foreign policy impact and emphasize diplomatic business as usual, several prominent Russian legislators, international affairs specialists, and media commentators are warning that Moscow's brutal but ineffective show of force in Chechnya has seriously damaged Russia's foreign policy interests. In particular, they argue, Moscow's troubled attempt to crush Chechnya's drive for independence will accelerate the expansion of NATO, slow Russia's integration into Europe, scare off Western lenders and investors in Russia's economy, reduce Russia's leverage over the so-called "near abroad," and galvanize opposition to Russia among Islamic states. It is still unclear whether the debate will have significant impact on Russian foreign policy. Many of those who have articulated serious concerns are not strong supporters of Foreign Minister Kozyrev or his foreign policy line, and the Yeltsin administration may be tempted to discount their warnings as political posturing. Nevertheless, Moscow may be eager to counter the perception that Chechnya has dealt a blow to Russia's international position by launching a diplomatic offensive designed to demonstrate Russia's international importance and influence. It is doubtful that such an offensive would succeed in quieting the critics, however, at least in the near term.

0469

**The Dynamic of Russo-Israeli Relations in the Post-Soviet Era.**

*Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. Kelley Grady Dunkelberg. March 1995. 81pp.*

The new state of Russia has been pursuing a rapprochement with the state of Israel since the late 1980s, during the leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev. These two states have been continuing the expansion of diplomatic and economic relations with one another under Boris Yeltsin. The original impetus for this radical change from the previous position of having no diplomatic relations was the FSU's reevaluation of its strategic interests in the Middle East and abroad. Domestic and international pressures to reestablish relations were present in the Soviet era, but ideological and social taboos, as well as entangling diplomatic alliances, prevented this occurrence. The recent and continuing rapprochement between Russia and Israel has been facilitated by the change in political leadership in Israel and makes good sense for Russia's struggling economy, strategic interests, and emigration concerns. The fall of the Soviet Union has left Russia vulnerable in these areas; expanded relations with Israel could provide the means of helping to alleviate some of Russia's problems, as well as proving Russia's benevolence to the United States, on whom Russia still depends. Russia is also seeking to reinforce its status as a world power and therefore has been actively promoting a Middle East peace plan between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization.

0550

**Recent Russian Views on NATO Expansion.**

*Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Washington, D.C. NA. March 17, 1995. 12pp.*

Russian government officials, legislators, and politicians continue to express reservations about NATO expansion, but, since the December 1994 decision of the North Atlantic Council to study the issue, many appear to see expansion as inevitable. President Yeltsin and foreign ministry figures appear to be focusing on timing, condemning what they call the hasty pace of expansion that they claim the alliance has undertaken, charging that it will preclude the partnership with NATO that Russia wants, and calling for a new mechanism to cement such a partnership. Predictably, opposition figures are using the new NATO impetus toward expansion to belabor the Yeltsin government, warning that expansion is directed against Russia. Some governmental and legislative officials are suggesting, however, that differences among alliance members may ultimately delay or prevent NATO expansion or constrain it so that it would be less detrimental to Russian interests. Some Western-oriented specialists are blaming foreign policy shortcomings of the Yeltsin government for the failure to stop NATO's movement toward expansion and are warning that expansion could well destroy current arms control regimes. At the same time some are recommending policies that they claim will make expansion more palatable for Russia.

0562

**U.S.–Russian Cooperation in Space.**

*Office of Technology Assessment, Washington, D.C. NA. April 1995. 133pp.*

The recent broad political rapprochement between the United States and the FSU nations has transformed the environment for cooperation in space projects and led to cooperative programs in space with Russia and other FSU states that would have been unimaginable just a few years ago. Chief among these are the high-profile human space flight cooperative activities involving the space shuttle–Space Station Mir dockings and the international space station. This report surveys the potential benefits and drawbacks of expanded cooperation with Russia and other nations of the FSU in space activities and examines the impacts of closer cooperation on U.S. industry and U.S. national security concerns. Such cooperation has begun to yield scientific, technological, political, and economic benefits to the United States. The political and economic risks of cooperating with the Russians, however, are higher than with the United States' traditional space partners. Cooperation in robotic space science and earth remote sensing is proceeding well, within the stringent limits of current Russian (and U.S.) space budgets. Including Russia in the international space station program provides technical and political benefits to the space station planners, but placing the Russian contribution in the critical path to completion also poses programmatic and political risks. The report notes that much of the motivation for the expansion of cooperation with Russia lies beyond programmatic considerations. In particular, it points out that continued cooperation, including large payments for Russian space goods and services, may help stabilize Russia's economy and provide incentive for some of Russia's technological elite to stay in Russia and contribute to peaceful activities in space. Lack of opportunities at home might otherwise cause them to seek employment abroad where their skills might contribute to the proliferation of WMD. Finally, the report assesses the pros and cons of expanded commercial ties and their impact on the U.S. space industrial base and on aerospace employment.

0695

**Barkashov and the RNU: Russian Neo-Nazis Planning the “National Revolution.”**

*Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Washington, D.C. NA. April 19, 1995. 28pp.*

The Russian National Unity Party (RNU), led by Aleksandr Barkashov, represents—along with several less-well-known groups, such as Nikolay Lysenko’s Russian National Republican Party and Andrey Anokhin’s Werewolves—the most radical wing of Russia’s nationalist opposition. The ideology of RNU and the other groups includes core elements of nazism: It centers on the idea of a “national revolution” that proclaims “the nation is above all.” It regards Jews and other “cosmopolitan” and “alien” forces as the primary elements of the national revolution in Russia, seeing them as bent on the dismemberment and exploitation of the Russian state and the eventual genocide of the Russian nation. It shares nazism’s ideological fusion of nationalism and socialism, which emphasizes that the workers’ movement, youth groups, and the military are the main organizational base of the national revolution. It calls for a program of “genetic purification” as the first step to the restoration of a powerful and feared Russia. It professes a mystical faith in the ability of the Russian nation to save itself by violent struggle and advocates immediate and violent action to achieve its aims. Attempting to demonstrate this principle in practice, RNU’s armed formations played a prominent role in the September–October 1993 uprising by Yeltsin’s opponents. Although ultranationalist and national Communist opposition leaders such as the Liberal Democratic Party’s Vladimir Zhirinovskiy and the Russian Communist Party’s Gennadiy Zyuganov also allude to sinister foreign forces planning genocide of Russians and espouse ideologies that fuse elements of nationalism and socialism, they stop short of the radicalism of the RNU and other national revolutionary groups and do not subscribe to the racial agenda. For that reason, and perhaps also because of the national revolutionaries’ use of Nazi and quasi-Nazi symbols and programmatic declarations, most other oppositionists have kept their distance from the RNU, and some have even denounced RNU members as dangerous provocateurs. For its part, the RNU has denounced other opposition groups as weak-kneed compromisers and bureaucratic time-servers, if not outright agents of the anti-Russian conspiracy. Barkashov has made an effort to present himself and the RNU as normal players of the political game. The RNU has registered as a political party and recently put forward a candidate in a by-election for a vacant *duma* seat. Despite Barkashov’s rhetoric about playing by the rules of the political game, the RNU’s violent actions and programmatic statements demonstrate neither the inclination nor the temperament to rest their ambitions on slim hopes of winning elections.

0723

**Russia’s Democratic Moment? Defining U.S. Policy to Promote Democratic Opportunities in Russia.**

*Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. William C. Martel and Theodore C. Hailes (Editors). May 1995. 338pp.*

The discourse in the United States about the end of the Soviet Union and the emergence of Russia from the ashes of totalitarianism is awash in metaphors. We commonly hear it said that the democratic experiment in Russia is the greatest strategic opportunity in the history of the twentieth century to build a stable and prosperous international order. While these may be compelling symbols for the momentous nature of revolutionary change in Russia, these ideas do not offer much guidance to the United States as we shape our policies toward Russia. What, then, is the problem with the relatively simple notion that the United States has an interest in assisting Russia with its democratic transformation? To put

matters simply, the problem is that the United States is struggling to find an approach for influencing democratic and economic reform in Russia. For the American people, the result is a debate that swings between extremes and thus confuses those individuals who, in principle, support the idea of assisting Russia in its time of trouble. While we might charge that the fault lies with those responsible for crafting U.S. policy to help shape the democratic transformation of Russia, there is a larger responsibility for those who aspire to influence the public debate in the United States about the proper conduct of our policy toward Russia. We believe that there is a fundamental obligation to articulate a strategy that relates what can be done to what should be done. We believe that the United States has not met either of these objectives. The broad problem is that the notion of democratic and free-market economic reform remains clouded in confusion, as several propositions highlight. First, the term “democratic reform” means more than the creation of a post-totalitarian state. If we use the history of the last several hundred years as a guide, the formation of a democratic state means that Russian power and authority must be balanced between the people and their government. It also suggests that the core beliefs and principles in Russian society, or what we call “political culture,” must be redefined to support the notion of decentralized power and responsibility. Furthermore, we use the term democratic reform to include both political and economic reform. One reason is that with a moment’s reflection on the nature of democratic states, it is evident that the discourse on power and money is intimately and inextricably linked to the nature of politics within a state. Another factor is that the nature of the democratic revolution in Russia is not captured by the term “reform.” The events in Russia are vastly more complicated than mere reform because they involve a fundamental reordering of political and economic relations in a society that was under totalitarian control. For outsiders, the immediate consequence of democratic reform is to weaken Russia’s ability to play an assertive role in international politics, though some hope that a newly democratic Russia will amass the power to act as a counterweight to the strategic aspirations of the United States, Europe, and China. The broader argument is that there are no universal expectations about what democratic reform may produce in Russia—for both the Russians and the countries that have stakes in the outcome. But we do hope that democracy has a future in Russia and that it will develop into a political, economic, and security partner. While the authors focus mainly on Russia, the book examines how the process of democratic reform is unfolding in Ukraine, notably in the areas of governmental and military reform. This comparison is significant because it allows us to observe two states beginning the process of democratic reform from the same condition. The experience of Ukraine is important because, while it started in roughly the same place as Russia, it is following a different course of reform. While Russia seems to be moving on a brisk course of reform, Ukraine is moving much more slowly and thus presents an alternative to the Russian model of democratic reform. Finally, Ukraine’s position in Eastern Europe provides a litmus test of Russian intentions in the region, notably whether Ukraine will be subjected to pressure from Russia to be reabsorbed. The purpose of this book is to help the American people and their policy makers shape their often discordant thoughts into a coherent policy that assists Russia with its democratic experiment. It begins with the philosophical principle that it is in the national interest of the United States to influence democratic reform in Russia. The corollary of this principle, however, is that how Russia manages democratic reform is up to the Russian people themselves. As the reader will discover throughout the book, the magnitude of the problem is

such that neither the United States nor any other state can be the architect of building democracy in Russia. Nor should the United States or other states expend enormous political capital and economic resources fostering the illusion that we can.

## Reel 9

### Russia cont.

#### 1995 cont.

0001

#### **Reform and the Revolution in Russian Defense Economics.**

*Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Stephen J. Blank. May 19, 1995. 44pp.*

As Russia's invasion of Chechnya shows, the Russian armed forces are suffering from tremendous shortages of capable leaders and soldiers. These problems, among others, relate directly to the shortage of funds for the military. Yet Russia cannot afford to spend more than it is now spending on the armed forces. This is the crux of an abiding Russian strategic dilemma, namely the gap between the state's ambitions and objectives and the means of realizing them. Until Russia resolves this dilemma by scaling back its goals, tremendous pressure and impetus to revive a state system in which military spending and the social forces that benefit from a stress on such spending will prevail in politics. This monograph examines the defense sector's current crisis that has come about due to the collapse of the Soviet Union and of the Russian economy. Should Russia continue to fail to meet the challenge of overcoming an economy excessively geared to defense, prospects for the security of Russia's neighbors and for Russia's democratization remain dim. In the final analysis, the crisis of Russia's defense economy is a vital part of the ongoing crisis of the Russian state.

0045

#### **Russian Defense Legislation and Russian Democracy.**

*Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Stephen J. Blank. August 17, 1995. 52pp.*

As recent events demonstrate, Russia's political system has yet to stabilize. This is particularly the case with civil-military relations for, as the course of the Chechnya invasion reveals, control by the government over the military is erratic and the military is all too often politicized. In this vein, legislation on civilian control of the military and on peacemaking operations in Russia and the CIS is a particularly important barometer of the course of Russia's democratization and stabilization. In this study, Dr. Stephen Blank dissects that legislation and finds that it reflects and contributes to the drift away from democratic rule toward a form of presidential power that is unaccountable to either legal or parliamentary institutions. Furthermore, these laws will also politicize the military still further and promote the use of Russian armed forces in so-called peacemaking operations that actually contribute to Moscow's openly proclaimed program to reintegrate the CIS around it. Therefore, these draft laws should arouse considerable concern among those charged with, or interested in, monitoring Russia's troubled evolution to democracy.

0097

#### **Entrepreneurial Proliferation: Russia's Nuclear Industry Suits the Buyers Market.**

*Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. Thomas D. Whalen and Andrew R. Williams. June 1995. 309pp.*

The Soviet Union collapsed in December 1991, bringing an end to four decades of the cold war. A system of tight centralized controls has given way to chaotic

freedom and unmanaged, entrepreneurial capitalism. Of immediate concern to most world leaders has been the control and safety of over thirty thousand Soviet nuclear weapons. After 1991, the Soviet centralized system of management lost one key structural element, a reliable “human factor” for nuclear material control. The Soviet systems for physical security and material control are still in place in the nuclear inheritor states—Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus—but they do not restrain or regulate their nuclear industry. In the chaos created by the Soviet collapse, the nonproliferation regime may not adequately temper the supply of the nuclear materials of the new inheritor states. This could permit organizations or states seeking nuclear weapons easier access to fissile materials. New initiatives such as the U.S. CTR program, which draws upon U.S. technology and expertise to help the NIS solve these complex problems, are short-term tactics. At present there are no strategies that address the long-term root problems caused by the Soviet collapse. This thesis demonstrates the extent of the nuclear control problems in Russia. Specifically, it examines physical security, material control and accounting, regulation and enforcement, and criminal actions. It reveals that the current lack of internal controls makes access to nuclear materials easier for aspiring nuclear weapons states.

0406

**“Russia’s Tinderbox”: Conflict in the North Caucasus and Its Implications for the Future of the Russian Federation.**

*John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts. Fiona Hill. September 1995. 121pp.*

This report examines how the overall structural legacy of the USSR and these specific factors have produced conflict in the North Caucasus. The first section of the report explains how the USSR was structured and how this affected the political development of the North Caucasus republics. The second section discusses the crisis of national and regional leadership and the general political vacuum in the North Caucasus. It describes how one regional organization, the Confederation of Peoples of the Caucasus, has tried to seize the initiative in this vacuum, provoking confrontation with Moscow and exacerbating the cleavage between the North Caucasian peoples and the region’s Russian population. The third section describes the confusion in Moscow’s regional policy and its failure to find a strategy for dealing with the North Caucasus. This exposition of the overall problem is followed by a comprehensive overview of the conflicts in the North Caucasus in the fourth section. This overview describes how the specific factors of population density, ethnic diversity, economic decline, religious cleavages, and the experience of the deportations have triggered conflict in individual cases, and it indicates how some republics have thus far managed to avoid violent conflict. The report concludes with a case study of Chechnya. It offers an explanation of how the structural legacy of the USSR, the political naivete and poor judgment of Chechnya’s new leadership, and Moscow’s ad hoc policy combined to provoke a full-scale war on the territory of the Russian Federation.

0527

**Nuclear Wastes in the Arctic: An Analysis of Arctic and Other Regional Impacts from Soviet Nuclear Contamination.**

*Office of Technology Assessment, Washington, D.C. NA. September 1995. 245pp.*

One of the lasting legacies of the cold war, and the buildup in nuclear weaponry and military over the past fifty years, is nuclear waste and its threat to human health and the environment. Notable examples of waste dumped into the open environment have caused people and nations to demand information about what was done and what health risks may result. In 1993, disclosures about Russian dumping of submarine reactors, nuclear fuel, and other wastes into the Arctic and

North Pacific oceans brought this region and its problems into the world spotlight. People in the United States want to know about this dumping and other discharges of radionuclides into the oceans. They want to understand the risks from Russian nuclear activities, both past and future, and the potential threat to their health and that of the Arctic ecosystem. Because of these concerns, Senator Ted Stevens, chairman of the Defense Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee, and senators William V. Roth and John Glenn, chairman and ranking minority member of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, asked the OTA to prepare this assessment of nuclear waste in the Arctic. This report examines the environmental and human health impacts from wastes dumped into the Arctic and North Pacific regions, from nuclear contaminants discharged into these environments, and from radioactive releases from both past and future nuclear activities in the regions. The report presents what is known and unknown about this waste and contamination and how it may affect public health. Because so many factors are involved and science cannot provide absolute answers to many questions, this study emphasizes the need for care, caution, awareness, and prudence. It also stresses the need for a stable and enduring institutional framework and international cooperation for long-term observation and monitoring.

0772

**Russian Views on NATO Expansion.**

*Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Washington, D.C. NA. September 29, 1995. 13pp.*

Russian government officials, legislators, politicians, and policy analysts have toughened their opposition to NATO expansion. Many insist that the West will have to choose between NATO expansion and partnership with Russia and warn that Russia may be forced to take military countermeasures if expansion occurs. The Defense Ministry has been a driving force behind the hardened stance, but the upcoming duma and presidential elections and NATO decisions on Bosnia—made in many Russians' view behind Russia's back—are also playing a part. Foreign policy analysts are no longer discussing options that could make expansion more palatable to Russia but are recommending delaying tactics that could either prevent expansion or drag out the process until a new European security system that includes Russia is developed.

0785

**Soviet/Russian Armor and Artillery Design Practices: 1945–1995.**

*U.S. Marine Corps Intelligence Activity, Quantico, Virginia. NA. October 1995. 570pp.*

This study provides an unclassified design and development history of Soviet and Russian tanks, light armored vehicles, artillery, and antitank weapons since World War II. This study is a reference tool intended for use by Marine Corps and army research and development organizations, combat arms schools, students of military technology, and military officers and civilian employees of DOD requiring an unclassified reference on Soviet and Russian armor and artillery. This study is unclassified. It was based not only upon unclassified literary sources, but also upon direct contact and discussions with officials in the Russian tank/armor community. To that extent, the study is as accurate as unclassified sources can make it. But it must be mentioned that it does not represent validated intelligence. This study was developed for educational and reference purposes only and cannot be substituted for validated intelligence for operational, research and development, or test purposes.

## Reel 10

### Russia cont.

- 0001      **1995 cont.**  
**Changes to Campaign Program Reveal Differences within NDR.**  
*Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Washington, D.C. NA. October 6, 1995. 13pp.*  
Substantial changes made between the draft and final versions of the Russia Is Our Home Party's (NDR) election program suggest that Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin and other NDR leaders worked to overcome considerable differences among the various interests represented in the bloc. Chernomyrdin's ability to achieve compromise positions among interests as diverse as those of Moscow-based liberals and conservative regional officials indicates that the NDR leadership is willing to be flexible in its drive to define a political middle ground. A comparison of the NDR's draft campaign program for its first congress on August 12 and the final program approved at the bloc's second congress on September 5 reveals that the bloc's coordinating council made extensive amendments to the program's provisions on economic reform, crime, foreign policy, and defense industries. The final version included a stronger emphasis on privatization and plays down the government's role in regulating the economy. The final program also demonstrated diminished enthusiasm for the government's tight budget and monetary policy, as passages demanding increased government spending were added. The section dealing with crime was greatly expanded and includes stronger condemnation of government corruption. In the foreign policy section, harsh criticism of the West and of the government's foreign policy agenda was toned down substantially. Strong criticism of the defense industry was removed.
- 0014      **The Devolution of Russian Military Power.**  
*Defense and Arms Control Studies Program, New York, New York. Stephen M. Meyer. November 1995. 16pp.*  
In the mid-1980s the cold war was still cold. The United States and the Soviet Union were increasing their defense spending as they entered a new cycle of rearming. NATO and Warsaw Pact forces faced each other across Central Europe. Today, a mere ten years later, there is no Soviet Union or Warsaw Pact. Former Soviet allies are clamoring to enter NATO and Russia's military is literally a shadow of its former self. In the context of chronicling the contraction of Soviet military power the term "evolution" may seem misapplied. Evolution generally evokes images of an organism or system moving progressively toward more complex forms of order and functioning. Devolution may be a more fitting concept. But this is the crux of the issue: Are we witnessing a devolutionary change in Russian military policy? Do the trends and patterns we have followed since the collapse of the Soviet empire—drastically reduced resources and declining capabilities—reflect the likely state of Russian military power for the next decade? Or are these trends merely noise that mask a truly evolutionary path toward a reinvigorated military? There are two dimensions to this analysis. First we should consider indicators of current directions and trends in Russian military capabilities and use of force in support of national policy. These include both resource inputs (manpower, money, technology, etc.) and force outputs (unit manning, levels, equipment readiness, logistics capacity, etc.) and address the question: How are capabilities likely to look if trends continue largely unaltered? In fact the qualifier is the pivotal issue confronting us. How likely is it that current trends will continue? Isn't it more reasonable to assume that Russian leaders will intervene to halt, and even reverse, the decline in Russian military power? In fact, isn't it most likely that the continuing economic and political turmoil in Russia will bring to power a

nationalist regime—or even a military regime—that would make rebuilding military power a priority? Therefore, the second dimension to this analysis is an examination of political currents within the Russian military. Does the military, or some faction within it, have a political agenda to rebuild Russian military power? Is it capable of concerted and orchestrated activity to force a commensurate shift in state priorities? This report seeks to answer these questions.

0030

**Information Warfare: Russia, France, and the United Kingdom.**

*Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. Robert Garian. November 1995. 33pp.*

Threats to information systems have become a serious concern to governments and businesses all over the world. There is particular interest in and concern for the security of information systems among those nations that intend to be strong competitors in the evolving global economy and that are either planning or already upgrading their electronic infrastructure in the form of information superhighways. Networks have become the nervous systems of business organizations and governments, and they are also an integral part of military projections of force across the globe. Networks are also the potential synthetic battlefields of what has been called netwars. Threats to existing and future information systems are being taken more seriously than ever before in the military context. For example, the vulnerability of Iraq's military communications infrastructure during the Gulf War is often cited as a sign that an information war (IW) is upon us. "We didn't knock the anti-aircraft batteries out, we knocked out the central coordination stations for the batteries. The 117 Stealth fighter itself was designed to deprive the enemy of key information by not appearing on radar screens. The whole thing was about info-war." While information as a weapon is an old dimension of warfare, its impact has grown with the accelerated pace of conflicts, advances in defense electronics, and the growing importance of networks that serve commercial and government organizations at all levels. The new IW weaponry can be as simple as an electronic box that can fool a telephone system as to the caller's identity, an inexpensive microcomputer that can be used to hack into a military database, or an encryption system, a computer virus, or a hidden circuit on an integrated circuit chip that will be triggered upon the occurrence of a particular event. It might also be a stealth fighter or a virtual reality cave with complete fusion of real time information from a war zone with artificial intelligence decision support to generate both strategies and tactics for command approval. Cyberwar, often used as synonymous with IW, can be considered the most extreme or fantastic wing of IW in which automated agents (clever software or robots of various kinds) can inflict ingenious mischief or damage on enemy information systems. This report defines and explains the various types of IW and then summarizes what is known about U.S., Russian, U.K., and French attitudes toward IW.

0063

**Russian Views on NATO Expansion, Part 2: October–Early November 1995.**

*Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Washington, D.C. NA. November 15, 1995. 12pp.*

Russian government officials, legislators, politicians, and most policy experts continue adamantly to oppose NATO expansion. In contrast to their past statements, officials now stress that their objections are driven by concerns over Russia's security. In an apparent warning to the West, Defense Ministry officials have leaked to the press reports that they are preparing tough countermeasures in the event that NATO forces are stationed near Russia's borders and are broadening the scope of intelligence activities against NATO. A few policy experts differ from the mainstream in minimizing the threat from NATO expansion, while

others appear to be urging Russia to shift its strategy for opposing expansion to focus more on constructive engagement with Eastern Europe.

0075

**Russian Views on NATO Enlargement, Part 3: November 1995.**

*Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Washington, D.C. NA. November 30, 1995. 13pp.*

Russian government officials, legislators, and politicians continue to oppose NATO enlargement, but the broad outlines of a more nuanced Russian approach toward NATO that stresses cooperation while retaining, but muting, opposition toward enlargement has emerged in recent weeks. The thrust and tone of statements by Defense Minister Pavel Grachev and Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev, however, suggest that a struggle over Russia's NATO policy persists within the ministries.

0088

**A Market-Oriented Petroleum Industry as a Prerequisite to Russian Economic Security.**

*Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. Gerald P. Yegge. December 1995. 145pp.*

The Russian petroleum industry is facing a critical juncture where expedient reform is necessary immediately. The main focus of this thesis is to account for the primary barriers that hamper the free flow of former Soviet petroleum into international markets and to suggest alternatives to current Russian energy policy. A secondary objective is to scrutinize U.S. foreign policy with respect to the possibility of influencing the augmentation of world petroleum supplies. Preliminary indications suggest that confidence-building measures have been slowly introduced by the Yeltsin administration, but the positive effects have not yet been felt by the petroleum industry. International investment within the Russian petroleum industry has been sluggish at best. Transnational oil companies continue to be reluctant to invest in Russia and the FSU due to political and economic uncertainty and the high risk of capital loss. The future of the Russian petroleum industry appears promising provided the major barriers (e.g., tax codes, presidential decrees, pipeline construction and maintenance, and capital investment) are directly confronted and not circumvented for political leverage or corrupt economic gains.

0233

**1996**

**The Warrior Who Would Rule Russia: A Profile of Aleksandr Lebed.**

*RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California. Benjamin S. Lambeth. January 1996. 136pp.*

Aleksandr Lebed remains all but unknown to most Americans. Yet in the wake of Russia's presidential election on June 16, 1996, which pitted Boris Yeltsin in a runoff against the Communist challenger, Gennady Zyuganov, Lebed, a forty-six-year-old former army two-star general, became overnight one of that country's most powerful men. Despite his expected failure to place as a finalist himself, Lebed nevertheless became Russia's man of the hour with a surprisingly strong finish in third place. That positioned him as a kingmaker to swing the July 3 runoff between the two top contenders and prompted a scramble by both finalists to garner his support.

**Russia's December 1995 Duma Elections: Communist[s] Run Far Ahead of Other Parties.**

*Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Washington, D.C. NA. January 31, 1996. 25pp.*

The December 17, 1995, duma elections brought a striking victory for the Communist Party (CPRF) and a serious setback for reformers and Premier Viktor Chernomyrdin's centrist NDR. The CPRF came in first in the party list voting, and the left more than doubled its raw vote from the previous elections in December 1993, increasing from 10.9 million to over 22 million (32 percent of the party list vote), apparently by luring a substantial number of 1993 no-shows to the polls. Voter turnout in 1995 increased by about 14 million. Most of the left's gain went to the CPRF, whose party list vote rose from 6.6 million to 15.4 million (22 percent). The CPRF won sixty-three of the eighty-nine regions, provinces, and districts in the party list voting, including sixteen of nineteen provinces in southern Russia. The CPRF also far outdistanced other parties in district elections, winning fifty-eight seats nationwide. It won twenty-three of the forty-five district seats in southern Russia and about one-fourth to one-fifth of the seats in the central and Ural regions but did very poorly in the north. Nationalist parties as a group came in second in the party list voting, though the vote for Vladimir Zhirinovskiy's LDPR fell substantially. The LDPR had come in first in 1993 with 12 million votes, but in 1995 its vote dropped to 7.7 million, placing it second but far behind the CPRF. Moreover, the party won only one district seat. As a whole, however, the nationalist parties increased their party list vote from 12.3 million to 13.5 million. Reformist parties' vote dropped from 18 million in 1993 to 10 million. They did their best in St. Petersburg and Moscow city, winning fourteen of their thirty seats in the two cities. Grigoriy Yavlinskiy's Yabloko bloc was the only reform party to clear the 5 percent threshold to win seats in the party list voting. It won thirty-one seats in the party list voting and fourteen in the districts. Its raw vote was 4.7 million, only a .5 million increase over 1993. All reformist parties together won only about sixty seats. The reformers' loss was apparently the centrists' gain, as the centrists' total increased from 8.3 million in 1993 to nearly 16 million. Chernomyrdin's bloc cleared the 5 percent threshold to win forty-five party list seats. It led the party list vote in Moscow city with 19 percent, but it fielded no district candidates there. Despite its apparently substantial financial and political resources and support from the regional establishment, NDR won only 10 percent of the party list vote and elected only ten deputies in districts. The election law provision that excluded any party that failed to win at least 5 percent of the vote further magnified the leftists' victory. Thanks to the 5 percent provision, the four parties that cleared the hurdle won roughly double their percentage of the popular vote in percentage of seats. With only 51 percent of the party list vote, the four parties got all of the 225 seats allocated by party list. This turned the CPRF's 22.3 percent of the vote into 44 percent of the party list seats. Between party list seats and district seats, leftist parties wound up with 187 of the 450 duma seats (41 percent). The results of the 1995 duma elections have some ominous implications for Russia's future. The CPRF, its leftist allies, and left-leaning independents won enough seats in the duma to elect a CPRF member as speaker and take control of many important committee chairmanships, a development that does not augur well for cooperation between Yeltsin and the duma during the remainder of his term or for further progress on privatization and other economic reforms. The size of the leftist and nationalist party list vote may have ominous implications for the June presidential elections. Leftists pulled the largest bloc of votes and nationalists the next largest—together accounting for over half the votes. Unless reformers and centrists rally around a single candidate they may not survive into the second round, leaving the prospect of a Communist versus nationalist runoff.

- 0394      **Russia and Northeast Asia.**  
*Center for Naval Analyses, Alexandria, Virginia. Charles E. Ziegler. February 1996. 57pp.*  
The commander of the Seventh Fleet asked CNA to assess the security environment of the Asia-Pacific region (APR) between now and 2010. This research memorandum focuses on the most probable evolutionary trends for Russia and the Russian Far East during this period. It is based on information available through March 1995.
- 0451      **Promoting Democracy: Progress Report on U.S. Democratic Development Assistance to Russia.**  
*General Accounting Office, Office of the Comptroller General, Washington, D.C. NA. February 1996. 84pp.*  
As requested by the chairman and ranking minority member of the House Committee on International Relations, the GAO reviewed U.S.-funded democracy programs of USAID; USIA, including projects funded by USIA's annual grant to the National Endowment for Democracy; the State Department; and DOD. This report focuses on democracy projects in Russia and addresses whether such projects were meeting their developmental goals and contributing to political reform from fiscal years 1990 through 1994. To make this assessment, the GAO examined projects in six areas: independent media, trade union development, political party development, rule of law development, electoral support, and civil-military relations. The GAO also inquired into State Department and USAID views on the future of the U.S.-funded democracy program in Russia.
- 0535      **Ballistic Missile Defenses and Russian Retaliation Issues.**  
*Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Department of State, Washington, D.C. F. S. Nyland. March 1996. 32pp.*  
This report presents an examination of the degradation of a Russian retaliatory nuclear strike if the United States and Russia were to deploy their theater or antiballistic missile defenses in their homelands. Also, consideration is given to efforts for restoring the effectiveness of a Russian retaliation and the effects on first-strike stability of deployments of theater missile defenses in one or both homelands.
- 0567      **The Northern Sea Route: Its Development and Evolving State of Operations in the 1990s.**  
*Cold Regions Research & Engineering Laboratory, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Washington, D.C. Nathan D. Mulherin. April 1996. 84pp.*  
The summer of 1991 marked the first time in recent history that Russia offered to escort ships of other countries across the northern sea route (NSR). For moving cargo between the North Pacific region and Northern European ports, the NSR, along Russia's northern coastline, is between 35 and 60 percent shorter than the traditionally used routes through the Suez and Panama canals. In addition to its shorter distance, there already exists an extensive port and shipping infrastructure, a current cargo base, and the potential for developing new markets in Russia and other northern areas. These incentives are attracting considerable attention from the international shipping community, including that portion servicing Alaskan and northwestern U.S. ports. This report is a general compilation of the historical usage, recent trade developments, the current regulatory climate, the physical environment, the ports and navigational infrastructure, cost factors, and practical considerations that may shape future U.S. interests in the route.

- 0651      **NATO Enlargement: The Russian Perspective and Implications for Future Policy.**  
*U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Clifford M. Dickman. April 2, 1996. 27pp.*  
The concept of NATO enlargement has become the first major stumbling block between a newly democratic Russia and the United States/NATO. This study explores the issue, from the views of all concerned, while focusing on the Russian perspective to better understand their opposition to the expansion of NATO. The paper reviews the political, military, and social ramifications of the proposed enlargement on the democratic evolution of Russia. In conclusion, the paper recommends some potential policy alternatives to reap the advantages of NATO enlargement while not putting additional pressures upon Russia during their transition period.
- 0678      **Obstacles to Engaging Russia's Military-Industrial-Academic Community.**  
*U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Bernard E. Ellis. April 15, 1996. 52pp.*  
This study describes the obstacles to U.S. engagement of Russia's military-industrial-academic community in some form of military-technological cooperation. It argues that obstacles remain because no explicit legal or regulatory umbrella exists under which bureaucrats in each country may conduct business to resolve legitimate concerns (such as protection of intellectual property and release of information to third parties). The paper concludes by outlining three policy options. It recommends a U.S. policy toward Russia on military-technological cooperation.
- 0730      **Ensure Russia's Market Reforms and Democracy Succeed: Move and Process Consumer Goods.**  
*U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Larry J. Studer. April 15, 1996. 35pp.*  
Russia is experiencing significant political changes that have affected and will continue to affect the United States and the world. Many of the changes have adversely affected the standard of living for the Russian people. They are experiencing high inflation, shortages of food, and possible job losses. This study looks at the Russian transportation system as being a significant cause of the food shortages. The information was obtained from current news publications, U.S. government publications, encyclopedia data, Regional Strategic Appraisal course work, and historical references. The research indicates that Russia produces sufficient food to feed the country. The problem is the amount lost in transportation from producer to consumer.
- 0765      **Restoring Russia's Environment: A Strategic Challenge to the United States.**  
*U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. A. Allen Rasper. April 15, 1996. 53pp.*  
The magnitude of environmental devastation throughout the FSU is becoming more apparent as the countries transition to democracy and they more openly discuss their past practices, current problems, and future direction. This study explores the strategic implications of Russia's environmental problems. It endeavors to answer several related questions: Should the United States be concerned about the environmental devastation that exists in Russia? How severe is the problem? What are the ramifications? What corrective action is Russia taking? How is the United States helping?

- 0818      **East of Eden: Addressing Russian Interests during NATO Enlargement.**  
*U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Jonathan P. Chase. April 15, 1996. 34pp.*  
The last five years have been turbulent times throughout Europe. The political, economic, military, and social realities of a Europe no longer threatened by the Soviet Union calls into question the entire security architecture of the continent. In the process of redefining security and stability in Europe, many nations are looking to cultivate security relationships in areas that no longer enjoy the certainties of a bipolar world. Given that NATO will enlarge to meet the security needs of Europe and the North Atlantic region, this paper identifies Russian security interests that will be threatened by NATO enlargement. The author suggests how the United States should address Russian security interests during the enlargement process.
- 0852      **Russian Security Policy in the Asia-Pacific Region: Two Views.**  
*Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Peggy Falkenheim Meyer and Anatoly Bolyatko. May 27, 1996. 54pp.*  
In May 1995, the British Ministry of Defense, SSI, the RAND Corporation, the Institute for National Security Studies of the U.S. Air Force Academy, and King's College, London, hosted a conference at King's College on "Russian Defense and Security Policy." The participants at the conference discussed a wide range of Russian defense and security policies, from civil-military relations to defense economics, and regional policies: Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia, and the APR. The two papers offered here, written by Dr. Peggy Falkenheim Meyer and Major General (Retired) Anatoly Bolyatko, reflect Western and Russian views on Russian policy in East Asia and its challenges. In this forum, as throughout the conference, the intent was to juxtapose Western and Russian views on topical issues. Since the conquest of Siberia, Russia has been an Asian and Pacific power. The end of the cold war transformed this entire region's security structure, a transformation that accelerated when the Soviet Union fell apart and was replaced by Russia. Russia faces new security challenges in this most dynamic of regions, which still holds substantial possibilities of military conflict. But there has been a tendency in the West to overlook the new Russia's place in Asia. Among the objectives of the London conference was the intention to remedy this gap in our perceptions and bring to our audience an understanding by both Russian and Western scholars of the threats and challenges Russia faces here and its efforts to deal with those challenges. Thus, these papers focus on Russia's relations with key Asian states and with its efforts to obtain a military détente with the United States and reduce the dangers and threats of nuclear war with the United States. These papers should help improve our understanding of how Russian elites view Asia and the challenges Russia faces, while at the same time Russians learn how Western analysts view their policy. This enhanced mutual understanding should contribute to the debate and discussion that began in London and facilitate mutual understanding among Russian, Asian, European, and American observers and audiences.
- 0906      **Russia's Military Doctrine and the Internal Use of Military Force.**  
*U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Dale E. Roth. June 6, 1996. 40pp.*  
On December 11, 1994, President Boris Yeltsin gave the order for the Russian armed forces' invasion of the self-proclaimed independent state of Chechnya. The intent was to gain control of an internal conflict and ensure the integrity of the Russian Federation with a quick, decisive victory. What was to be a short-term

military action to achieve this intention, however, developed into a protracted conflict that continues to draw national and international criticism toward Russia. This paper covers the conflict in Chechnya relevant to Russia's current military doctrine, use of force, and the armed forces' capability to achieve success and posits implications resulting from the analysis. Some correlation is drawn between Russia's use of force to conduct operations internal to state borders and peacekeeping operations conducted within the region that includes former Soviet states. The intent is to provide an awareness of the problems Russia faces with balancing use of force with the capability of the force to achieve success. The intent is also to portray Russia's need for an improved process to selectively commit forces, for military reform, and to decrease the inclination to use force as the primary means for resolving conflict.

0946

**Russia: Country Commercial Guide, Fiscal Year 1997.**

*U.S. Embassy, Moscow, Russia. NA. July 30, 1996. 65pp.*

This CCG presents a comprehensive look at Russia's commercial environment, using economic, political, and market analysis. The CCGs were established by recommendation of the TPCC, a multiagency task force, to consolidate various reporting documents prepared for the U.S. business community. CCGs are prepared annually at U.S. embassies through the combined efforts of several U.S. government agencies. Russia, spanning eleven time zones and serving as home to about 150 million people, possesses tremendous natural and human resources. Demand today for imported consumer goods, capital equipment, and services remains remarkably strong, with imports representing an unusually large percentage of the national market. Despite outstanding long-term market potential, Russia continues to be an extremely difficult country in which to do business. The Russian Federation continues to pursue a program of dramatic economic, political, and social transformation. Despite President Yeltsin's successful reelection campaign, continued economic reform remains subject to the influence of the Communist-controlled state дума (the Russian parliament). It seems a safe assumption that Russia will be characterized by structural change and commercial uncertainty for at least the next few years. Even the most optimistic scenarios envision a protracted process as Russia continues the task of fashioning a legal foundation for commerce, rationalizing the regulatory and taxation regimes with which businesses must comply, and completing the task of creating from scratch a highly effective and consistent customs administration. The duration and final outcome of this process are still uncertain. Consequently, Russia today offers U.S. business both high risk and potentially high rewards. This report contains chapters on economic trends and outlook; political environment; marketing U.S. products and services; leading sectors for U.S. exports and investment; trade regulations and standards; investment climate; trade and project financing; and business travel. The report also includes appendices containing country data, trade and investment statistics, and country contacts.

## Reel 11

### Russia cont.

- 0001      **1996 cont.**  
**Russian Defense Business Directory: St. Petersburg and Leningrad Oblast.**  
*Bureau of Export Administration, Department of Commerce, Washington, D.C. NA. July 31, 1996. 279pp.*  
The publication of this fifth installment of the *Russian Defense Business Directory*, focusing on St. Petersburg and neighboring Leningrad Oblast, underscores the continued commitment of the U.S. Department of Commerce to working with Russian industry in making a successful transition to profitable civilian endeavors, and it highlights the critical role of private trade and investment in helping Russian defense enterprises shift to commercial ventures. The Department of Commerce works actively to remove unnecessary obstacles to trade and investment, foster commercial cooperation, and facilitate American involvement in this region. Since the publication of the fourth installment of this directory, the Department of Commerce has continued its efforts to alert U.S. industry to opportunities in Russian defense conversion. For example, the Department of Commerce, together with USAID, DOD, and DOE, sponsored an Entrepreneurial and Defense Conversion Conference in Yekaterinburg, Russia, from May 20 to 24, 1996. More than forty U.S. business representatives and over 150 Russian representatives from the Urals participated in the conference and held business discussions about opportunities in central Russia. Through other Commerce Department efforts, such as the Special American Business Internship Training program, the Commercial Service officers, BISNIS, and the ABCs, they have also supported the development of business ties between U.S. firms and converting Russian defense enterprises. Equipped with this installment of the *Russian Defense Business Directory*, American firms can access a wealth of business opportunities available in Russia. In doing so, they are equipped with the information to promote trade, investment, and free market know-how necessary to help speed Russia's transition to a market economy.
- 0280      **Aviation Development in Russia's Far East.**  
*University of Hawaii, Honolulu, Hawaii. David M. Bachler. August 1996. 183pp.*  
The majority of western scholarship on Russia and the Soviet Union focuses on European involvement, particularly aviation studies. Such literature overlooks Russia's sprawling East Asia holdings, its strategic position in the North Pacific, and the large aviation investment the nation made in its Far East. Hence, this work offers a Pacific perspective on military and civil aviation development in Russia from 1904 to the early 1970s. This region's natural wealth and location between North America and Asia inspired plans to protect, connect, and exploit it by aviation. Moreover, during the formative years of flight, enmity with Japan and a Soviet emphasis on self-sufficiency greatly influenced aviation's employment. Military expenditures overwhelmed civil development, and not until the early 1970s did any regular international service connect Russia's Far East. Perhaps other scholars will further investigate the military structuring, civil developments, economic consequences, and personalities subsequent to those introduced in this work. Toward such understanding, this text offers both an explanation for the Far East's lengthy aerial isolation and an appreciation for the Russian paramilitary approach to aviation.

0463

**Russian-American Cooperation in Weapons of Mass Destruction Counterproliferation.**

*Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. Richard S. Dabrowski. September 1996. 89pp.*

This thesis examines the opportunities and risks associated with a new form of military cooperation between the United States and Russia: joint strategic special operations for counterproliferation contingencies—to seize and secure, or to disable or otherwise neutralize, WMD, facilities, or WMD-armed terrorists. This thesis compares Russian and U.S. views on the future security environment, looking for areas of overlap that could serve as the basis for mutually acceptable cooperative approaches to military options—especially in areas in or around the FSU—to deal with new WMD threats. The most effective military options might require the creation of a Russian-American response force similar to DOE's Nuclear Emergency Search Team, expanded to be usable against a wide variety of WMD threats. This thesis analyzes the circumstances in which Russian-American special operations forces cooperation is more likely to succeed than U.S. unilateral action. The analysis concludes that information-sharing may be the most likely form of cooperation, although any Russian-American cooperative effort would reveal to the other side sensitive information about capabilities and vulnerabilities in the area of cooperation.

0552

**The Influences and Sources of Post-Soviet Russian Foreign Policy: A View of the Caucasus Region.**

*Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. Mark Elliott. September 1996. 175pp.*

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the apparent transition of its successor states to democracy gave rise to hopes of greater cooperation between the United States and Russia. These hopes were met instead by a contradictory mix of cooperation and confrontation and the growing rumblings of a nationalistic Russia harboring fanciful desires of restoring its fallen empire. The aim of this thesis is to explore the various influences that shaped the goals and means of Russian foreign policy. The approach taken is to examine the synergistic effects of a variety of political, geographic, economic, cultural, and ethnic influences rather than searching for a systematic explanation of Russian actions. Using the Caucasus region as a starting point for investigation, this author demonstrates how these factors, in combination and isolation, account for the development of Russian action. Equally as important is the recognition that these factors are not new to post-Soviet Russia but previously influenced both imperial and Soviet Russia.

0727

**Annual Agricultural Situation Report: Russia.**

*U.S. Embassy, Moscow, Russia. S. Reid and E. Vassilyeva. October 1, 1996. 20pp.*

The revival in Russian agriculture that has been predicted by many observers over the last two years has yet to begin. Overall agricultural production continues to decline, with meat producers particularly hard hit. The politics of uncertainty severely constrain the activities of domestic and foreign entrepreneurs, and because levels of domestic and foreign investment are so low, producers have not been able to improve the conditions under which they operate. Factor productivity is extremely low in Russia compared with the West. The surge in Russian imports of food products since 1991 is the direct result of the difficulties faced by domestic farmers and processors and has brought with it progressively louder calls for protection from foreign competition in the name of national security. Policies designed to foster growth in the agriculture sector are

characterized by their on-again, off-again nature, while lack of money in federal and local budgets is blamed for policy failures.

0747

**Foreign Assistance: Harvard Institute for International Development's Work in Russia and Ukraine.**

*General Accounting Office, Office of the Comptroller General, Washington, D.C. NA. November 1996. 119pp.*

This report responds to a request from the chairman of the House Committee on International Relations that the GAO review the Harvard Institute for International Development's (HIID) work. Specifically, the GAO assessed (1) how USAID awarded assistance agreements to HIID to carry out work in Russia and Ukraine and (2) HIID's role and accomplishments in implementing assistance agreements to develop a Russian capital market and devise a legal reform program. In connection with evaluating HIID's role, the GAO also assessed the effectiveness of the Russian Privatization Center in implementing USAID post-privatization and land reform projects.

0866

**Russia's Atomic Tsar: Viktor N. Mikhailov.**

*Center for International Security Affairs, Los Alamos National Laboratory, New Mexico. C. Austin Reams. December 1996. 42pp.*

Minatom (the Ministry of Atomic Energy) was created to manage Russia's nuclear weapons program in the age of disarmament. The ministry is responsible for the development, production, and maintenance of nuclear weapons; warhead dismantling; the production of nuclear materials for weapons; the disposition of nuclear materials disassembled from warheads; the administration of Russia's vast nuclear weapons complex; the development of policy for the future role of Russia's nuclear complex; and payment of employees entrusted with such tasks. Thus, Minatom is instrumental in the implementation of arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation agreements. The director of Minatom, Viktor N. Mikhailov, wields a great deal of power and influence over Russia's nuclear infrastructure. He is an important player amid efforts to reduce the threats posed by Russia's decaying nuclear complex. There are certainly other personalities in the Russian government who influence Minatom; however, few affect the ministry as profoundly as Mikhailov. His ability to influence Russia's nuclear complex has been clearly demonstrated by his policies in relation to the U.S. purchase of Russian highly enriched uranium, the planned fissile material storage facility at Mayak, materials protection, and control and accountability programs and by his unwavering determination to sell commercial nuclear technology to Iran. Mikhailov has also been a key negotiator when dealing with the United States on issues of transparency of weapons dismantling and fissile material disposition, as well as the use of U.S. threat reduction funds. His policies and concerns in these areas will affect the prospects for the successful negotiation and implementation of future nuclear threat reduction programs and agreements with Russia.

**1997**

0908

**Russia's War in Chechnya: Testing Democracy in the Crucible of War.**

*University of Washington, Seattle, Washington. James Lawrence Turner. 1997. 158pp.*

This thesis argues that the war in Chechnya occurred due to democratic structural weaknesses and that the cessation of hostilities in Chechnya is the result of maturing democratic norms. If this proposition is correct then this thesis would add a potential corollary to the democratic peace theory, which is that transitional democracies may still fight each other but will eventually seek a peaceful settlement due to emerging internal constraints.

## Reel 12

### Russia cont.

1997 cont.

0001

**The Dynamics of Russian Weapons Sales to China.**

*Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Stephen J. Blank. March 4, 1997. 50pp.*

Russia has recently sold or transferred many military weapons or technologies to China. Russian state policy has also officially joined with China in a relationship described as a strategic cooperative partnership. Some Russian diplomats also say that there is virtually complete identity with China on all issues of Asian and global security. Dr. Stephen Blank examines this relationship carefully for what it reveals about both states' international security policies. As he focuses on Russian arms sales to China, he finds that these sales, and China policy in general, reveal much that is disturbing about the nature of the Russian policy process and Russia's profile in Asia. Indeed, it appears that Russia needs China more than China needs Russia and that Russia has lost control of the policy process. Arms manufacturers are making their own deals with China, bypassing the government. Their actions reflect the broader picture by which private sectors or lobbies are able to capture control of Russian state policy and manipulate it to their own interest, not to the discernible Russian national interest. Russian policy increasingly appears to be moving toward a confrontation with the United States from which only China will gain as a state, while private Russian interests also profit at the expense of Russia's strategic position. The anti-American aspects of this process also apparently accord with the widely reported Chinese suspicions about U.S. policy. For this reason, the evolving nature of the Russo-Chinese relationship is or should be of utmost interest to policy makers and analysts alike.

0051

**Why Russian Policy Is Failing in Asia.**

*Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Stephen J. Blank. April 2, 1997. 58pp.*

Since its inception as a state, Russia has been both a European and an Asian power. Although Russia today, as was true during much of its history, is torn by an identity crisis over where it belongs, its elites have never renounced Russia's vital interests in Asia and the belief that it should be recognized as a great power there. That belief and Moscow's ability to sustain it are now under threat, however, as Dr. Stephen Blank's thorough analysis informs us, due to the ongoing failures of Russian policy makers to come to grips with changed Russian and Asian realities. At the same time, this aspect of Russian policy has been neglected in American assessments of Russia. This is a serious shortcoming, because, in Blank's view, Russia's Asian policies, viewed in their full breadth, are important signs of present and future trends concerning its behavior at home and in the wider world. Those policies are also significant as Asia's importance in world affairs rises. We ignore the threatening situation facing Russia, and Moscow's failure to adjust to those threats, only at our own peril. The growing concern over Russian arms transfers to China, a subject addressed in this study, is only one sign of unexpected negative trends that might work against U.S. interests if we continue to neglect Asian aspects of Russia's global behavior and policy.

- 0109      **Russia After Yeltsin: Implications for U.S. National Security.**  
*U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Charles B. Lee Jr. April 7, 1997. 44pp.*  
With the recent health problems of Russia's President Yeltsin it becomes prudent to ask who would assume control of Russia if Yeltsin were suddenly to die or become incapacitated for a lengthy period of time. This paper examines the key power brokers who are likely to play a significant role in a post-Yeltsin power struggle, and it discusses the implications for U.S. national security interests in the region should these individuals assume power. It also outlines the various critical internal and external factors—Russian nationalism/authoritarianism, the “power troika,” and NATO expansion—that are likely to influence the succession outcome. The United States can exert some leverage on the succession outcome by acting decisively now in employing a variety of political, military, and economic means in an effort to affect those internal/external factors that are likely to impact the succession outcome. There is a “window of opportunity” that the United States must fully exploit now if it expects to have a hand in shaping the political and economic future of Russia in the long term.
- 0153      **Organized Crime in Russia: A Threat to the National Security Interests of the United States.**  
*U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. James T. Clifford. April 9, 1997. 28pp.*  
Organized crime in Russia has a direct, negative impact on the national security interests of the United States. The U.S. national security interests in Russia include regional stability, development of a free market-based economy, and control of the proliferation of WMD. These interests are best served by a viable, democratic government in Russia. With the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia began a movement toward democracy. The powerful force of organized crime within Russia and its grip on the domestic economy, however, is impeding its progress. International solutions to this challenge include greater cooperation among Western nations to stem the flow of illegal money and material out of Russia. For its part the United States is developing closer law enforcement ties with the Russian Ministry of Interior. The Federal Bureau of Investigation opened an office in Moscow. Future efforts must be focused on the mutual development of criminal intelligence in order to identify, arrest, and successfully prosecute Russian organized crime figures. In addition the products, goods, and services that Russian organized crime provides to the Russian people must be produced and delivered through the legal Russian market.
- 0181      **The Russian Military in the 21st Century.**  
*Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Alexei G. Arbatov. June 3, 1997. 25pp.*  
In April 1997, the U.S. Army War College held its Eighth Annual Strategy Conference, the topic of which was “Russia's Future as a World Power.” Most of the speakers discussed various aspects of the many crises besetting Russia, and there were differing views on whether Russia would be able to surmount those crises and make the transition to a politically stable democracy and a market economy. Dr. Alexei Arbatov, the deputy chair of the Defense Committee of the duma, delivered the banquet address and provided SSI with this monograph. In his remarks, Arbatov stated that political and economic reform had largely failed and that we could reasonably fear further turmoil in the Russian economy and accompanying political and military structures. The very fact that a freely elected member of the duma, representing one of the four primary political parties, was speaking to an assembly at the U.S. Army War College indicates the distance that

Russia has already traveled in this decade. Nonetheless, Arbatov's remarks made clear how difficult Russia's near-term future will be. In this monograph, Arbatov provides a very candid appraisal of Russia's current military capabilities. But more importantly, he also outlines a vision for the future of the Russian military. His vision is set within a well-reasoned strategic context and takes into consideration a domestic economic and political environment that includes a free-market economy and the further development of constitutional democracy.

0206

**The Crisis in the Russian Economy.**

*Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Vitaly V. Shlykov. June 30, 1997. 25pp.*

The words, from the 1970s ballad, "Me and Bobby McGee," "Freedom's just another word for nothing left to lose..." might apply to the terrible state of the Russian economy and, by extension, Russia's armed forces. Since the Soviet Union crumbled in 1991 and the Russian government set the country on its shaky journey toward capitalism and democracy, the Russian economy has been in a downward spiral; one that has drawn a majority of Russians into poverty and even lowered the average life expectancy by some 10 percent. To provide some scale for comprehending the magnitude of this problem, the more than 1.5 million men and women in uniform in the Russian armed forces and the 600,000 civilian employees of the Ministry of Defense, as well as the several million military pensioners throughout the land, must share a total defense budget of \$15–18 billion per year. That is about one-fourth of the U.S. Army's budget. This paper, by retired Soviet Army Colonel Vitaly Shlykov, is a brutally honest appraisal of the harsh realities that are a part of today's Russia. It was presented at the Army War College's Eighth Annual Strategy Conference, "Russia's Future as a World Power," held at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, April 22–24, 1997. Shlykov's paper is even more sobering when one considers that the October Revolution of 1917 began in the bread lines of Petrograd and Moscow.

## Tajikistan

**1995**

0231

**Afghan Sources of the Tajikistan Civil War.**

*U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Scott W. Tousley. 1995. 135pp.*

This study investigates Afghan influences in the Tajikistan civil war. Ongoing conflict in Afghanistan overlaps the Tajikistan conflict that developed after the USSR's 1991 breakup. The Tajikistan civil war includes elements of ethnic, religious, and political conflict. This research classifies Islam, leadership, the border, and Russian experiences as Afghan sources of the Tajikistan conflict. Independent sources of the Tajikistan conflict include Tajik state's weakness, Islam, and Russian strategy toward the "near abroad." The study concludes that the Tajik conflict should be viewed from a regional perspective. Existing boundaries and regimes of the Central Asian region interact at the political level. Islamic influence, while impacted by the Afghanistan conflict, retains more extensive roots in Tajikistan. Finally, Russian influence in Tajikistan follows from broader Central Asian and "near abroad" policies toward all of Central Asia. Some of these regional issues (Uzbek political trends and regional environmental and economic trends) promise to develop into serious causes of continuing conflict in Tajikistan and throughout Central Asia.

0366

**The War in Tajikistan Three Years On.**

*United States Institute of Peace, Washington, D.C. NA. November 1995. 16pp.*  
As many as fifty thousand people have died and thousands more have been wounded and made homeless by the civil war that has raged in Tajikistan, the poorest of the Central Asian republics of the FSU. It was the bloodiest conflict in the aftermath of the Soviet collapse, until Chechnya. But the torment in Tajikistan was obscured by the carnage in the Balkans and Chechnya. A military stalemate and a cease-fire have produced a fragile moment of peace that has periodically been marred by fighting and could be fully shattered by any of the forces, in addition to the Tajik government and the opposition, competing for influence and power—Russia, Iran, Uzbekistan, opposition supporters in Afghanistan, and even the ubiquitous arms and drug smugglers who profit from the conflict. On June 6, 1995, the United States Institute of Peace organized a forum on the Tajikistan conflict to explore prospects for negotiations and an end to the war. It included Ambassador Stanley Escudero, who had recently completed three years as the chief U.S. representative in the Tajik capital, Dushanbe, and the French scholar Olivier Roy, now at the French National Center for Scientific Research and former head of mission in Tajikistan for OSCE. This report is based on that forum.

## Turkmenistan

**1997**

0382

**Country Commercial Guide: Turkmenistan, Fiscal Year 1998.**

*U.S. Embassy, Ashgabat, Turkmenistan. NA. 1997. 61pp.*  
This CCG presents a comprehensive look at Turkmenistan's commercial environment, using economic, political, and market analysis. The CCGs were established by recommendation of the TPCC, a multiagency task force, to consolidate various reporting documents prepared for the U.S. business community. CCGs are prepared annually at U.S. embassies through the combined efforts of several U.S. government agencies. Turkmenistan is a new, constantly changing market in which the investor or business must be flexible, persistent, and patient in order to succeed. It is a country of vast, untapped natural resources, and the opportunities for investment and business are varied and numerous, but the risks inherent in doing business in the FSU require that potential investors and businessmen proceed cautiously. Although initially slow to begin reforms, the government of Turkmenistan now has embarked on a macroeconomic reform program, including privatization of industrial enterprises. The government of Turkmenistan is still grappling with how to implement the presidential decrees on privatization, however, and the problems inherent in a command economy continue to frustrate Western businessmen. All decisions are made at the highest levels of government. Political considerations continue to strongly influence economic decisions. The regulatory and legal foundations of a market economy are still being developed. Business infrastructure and know-how are improving but still lag behind many other countries of the FSU. The problem of renegotiation of signed contracts remains. These issues are gradually being resolved as the government and the population become more familiar with the international norms of the world market. Throughout the Soviet period, Turkmenistan's economy was based on exploitation of its natural gas, oil, and cotton. Today, the government is focusing its attention on expanding export markets for its natural resources and increasing the value of its exports. The government has placed a priority on investment in light industry, transportation and communication networks, and processing facilities. In addition, the government has invested heavily in infrastructure improvements designed to attract foreign businesses to invest in Turkmenistan. The government has now turned its attention to reforming its economy and legal system to support these

priorities. This report contains chapters on economic trends and outlook; political environment; marketing U.S. products and services; leading sectors for U.S. exports and investment; trade regulations and standards; investment climate; trade and project financing; and business travel. The report also includes appendices containing country data, trade and investment statistics, and country contacts.

## Ukraine

1995

0443 **Ukraine: Stability and Instability.**

*Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Washington, D.C. John Jaworsky. August 1995. 89pp.*

This paper attempts to assess the stability of Ukraine since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Thus in 1995 the challenge facing Ukraine's leaders is not to forge ahead rapidly in creating a model, market-based, liberal democracy. Rather, the challenge is to combat effectively a number of destructive forces undermining the basis for a legitimate, law-governed, economically viable state and to promote a reform process that would begin to slow and then gradually reverse Ukraine's socioeconomic decline. Given the numerous difficulties involved in assessing a country's stability, no attempt will be made in this paper to engage in facile predictions about the direction of long-term future developments in Ukraine. Rather, this is an attempt to assess the validity of current concerns regarding this country's stability and to analyze the factors that have influenced and will continue to influence the domestic political and socioeconomic situation in Ukraine. Special emphasis will be placed on evaluating how the current reform process may contribute to the country's success or failure in achieving "mid-range" stability. Some of the strategic implications of recent developments in Ukraine for regional security will also be discussed briefly.

0532

**Ukraine: Crimean Separatist Campaign Defused...for Now.**

*Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Washington, D.C. NA. August 23, 1995. 21pp.*

Despite the election of separatist-minded Yuriy Meshkov as the Crimean republic's president in January 1994, infighting among the separatists allowed Kiev to take a hands-off approach to Crimean separatism for over a year. By March 1995, however, signs of reconciliation among the feuding Crimean factions stimulated Kiev to attempt a crackdown, which Simferopol vigorously resisted with open appeals to Moscow and a call for a referendum in April. Recommendations from the OSCE issued on May 23 following roundtable discussions involving both sides largely backed Kiev's legal position but urged compromise and moderation on both sides. One day before a June 1 deadline set by the Ukrainian Rada, the Crimean Supreme Soviet abandoned its decision to hold a June 25 referendum on its 1992 constitution and approved a new draft constitution that conforms to Ukrainian laws. The Crimean parliament's actions reduced Kiev-Simferopol tensions without extreme measures by either side. Following up on this vindication of their position, pro-Kiev Crimean deputies moved in July to depose Sergey Tsekov, the Crimean Supreme Soviet's pro-Russian chairman; replace him with the pro-Kiev Agrarian Yevhen Suprunyuk; and elect a new parliamentary presidium along interfactional lines. Despite these leadership changes, however, the instability and shifting majorities within the Crimean parliament will likely threaten the unity of the pro-Kiev lobby as well.

- 0553      **A Strategic-Military Analysis of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.**  
*Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. Askold I. Kobasa. December 1995. 172pp.*  
This thesis is a strategic net assessment of the Ukrainian armed forces that analyzes the Ukrainian military's present capability and desire to fight for its newly proclaimed state. It evaluates the military doctrine of Ukraine, the force structure and levels of its military, the various strategic and operational factors affecting the force, and the effects of the "ethnic security map" created by the FSU on the present-day Ukrainian military. Finally, it assesses four major components of military capability—force structure, modernization, readiness, and sustainability. The findings of this study are that the Ukrainian armed forces can sustain short-term combat operations but not a long war. Nevertheless, the potential is there for the Ukrainian military to develop fighting capability to deter war. Even in its current force posture, Ukraine is a serious regional military power. It can defend its western borders and, for the near term, provides credible deterrence against a potential external military threat from Russia. This capability will improve in time as military reforms progress and the other components of military capability are brought up to projected levels.
- 0725      **1997**  
**The Internal Aspects of Ukrainian National Security.**  
*U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Igor Bazhenov. 1997. 33pp.*  
Among the newly independent states that have emerged after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Ukraine occupies a crucial place. With a population of about 52 million and an area of some 233 square miles, Ukraine is considered by many to be the country that is most likely to achieve economic prosperity. Unfortunately, in spite of its resources and economic potential, Ukraine's political and economic development has lagged behind expectations. Moreover, lack of economic reform has created conditions that could undermine Ukrainian independence. Poor economic conditions, organized crime, high levels of corruption within the government, and an irresponsible parliament are the primary causes of instability in Ukraine. Resolution of these issues is vital to Ukrainian national security as well as the continuation of Ukrainian independence.
- 0758      **Investment Opportunities in Ukrainian Defense Conversion.**  
*Bureau of Export Administration, Department of Commerce, Washington, D.C. NA. June 1997. 244pp.*  
This report contains information on investment opportunities for American businesses in Ukraine. It contains a directory of Ukrainian enterprises, an overview of the Ukrainian economy, and trade statistics and sources of financing for U.S. investors.

# SUBJECT INDEX

The following index is a guide to the major topics, personalities, activities, and programs in this microform publication. The first number after each subentry refers to the reel, while the four-digit number following the colon refers to the frame number at which a particular file containing information on the subject begins. Hence, 3: 0071 directs the researcher to the file that begins at frame 0071 of Reel 3. By referring to the Reel Index, which constitutes the initial segment of this guide, the researcher will find the main entry for the subject.

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